

RISING U.S. STAKES IN AFRICA

Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy

A Report of the
Africa Policy Advisory Panel

Chairman

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Executive Secretary

J. Stephen Morrison

May 2004



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**Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC**

February 2, 2004

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Powell:

We are pleased to deliver for your review the results of the Africa Policy Advisory Panel that was authorized by Congress in early 2003. We are grateful that you generously agreed to oversee and support this effort.

The Panel members and expert authors have proposed several high quality policy initiatives, tied to evolving core U.S. national interests in Africa, that should attract strong interest within this administration, Congress, and the next administration. Each product has been subjected to multiple reviews. Each is attached with an executive summary. In brief, they cover:

1. **Postwar Sudan**—the urgent security and other challenges it will present (we provided you an early copy in mid-January);
2. **Strengthening African capital markets**—Paul Applegarth’s work, which has considerable promise to help jump start the Millennium Challenge Account;
3. **An elevated U.S. energy approach to Africa**—this could help inform the G-8 summit later this year, and is supplemented by a detailed projection by PFC Energy of massive future earnings by Nigeria and Angola, among other key West African oil producers;
4. **An Africa conservation initiative**—congressional interest is burgeoning in this area. The initiative calls for a focus upon transboundary ecosystems, community-based management, and strengthening Africa’s parks and protected areas;
5. **Strengthening U.S. counter-terrorism efforts**—the moment may be propitious for a Muslim outreach initiative, enhanced attention to West Africa, and a push to solidify gains in Sudan and test a new approach to Somalia;
6. **Strengthening crisis diplomacy and peace operations**—the proposal argues for stepping up U.S. diplomatic readiness, while strengthening African peace intervention capacities;
7. **Sustaining U.S. leadership on HIV/AIDS**—contains a pragmatic menu of steps to build systematically on the momentous gains borne of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

Across these diverse proposals, three common binding themes emerge.

- a. First, Africa has assumed a **new strategic place** in U.S. foreign policy. This shift is reflective of how 9/11 altered the overall strategic U.S. conception of global security. It is also reflective of how five factors over the past decade have forced a reappraisal of Africa's significance: HIV/AIDS; terror; oil; armed conflicts; and global trade.
- b. Second, sustained **senior level U.S. leadership**—yours and President Bush's among the foremost—has changed opinion on Africa, reshaped the boundaries of expectations, eroded old barriers in American thinking, and raised demands for policy innovation matched by demonstrable results. That leadership has emerged in interaction with the intensified mobilization of new American constituencies, including Congress.
- c. Third, the conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa brings in its wake **demand for new implementing policies, programs, human skills, and finances**. A strategic approach cannot be done ad hoc or on the cheap. It requires articulating a coherent new vision that makes the case for new institutional approaches to Africa, backed by serious new funding of choice initiatives. When a peace agreement is signed in 2004 in Sudan, U.S. leadership will be essential to meeting security threats and peace consolidation challenges that will follow. A strategic approach will require long-term attention in Africa to education and building health infrastructure. It will require a priority focus upon building Africa's private financial sector, engaging more systematically and effectively with Africa's 300 million Muslims, coming to terms with enduring terrorist threats in broken parts of Africa, and ensuring effective peace operations that are indeed within reach, if there is sufficient political will.

Again, in closing, we are proud and honored to have been part of this process and grateful to you for your support of it. After you have had time to review the attached documents, we wish to request the opportunity to meet briefly with you in mid-February to hear your thoughts on the results and to discuss possible next steps, including vetting the results both before an interagency audience and in a public conference with input from Congress.

With warmest personal regards,

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Preface

We would like to express our gratitude to the participants and contributors who made possible the successful work of the Africa Policy Advisory Panel. The leadership of Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va.) resulted in the authorization by Congress of the panel, mandated to generate innovative and actionable recommendations on how to strengthen U.S.-Africa policy to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. Secretary Powell endorsed the panel and empowered it to act expeditiously.

The panel further benefited from the active participation and guidance of its members, a diverse group of high-level leaders drawn from Congress, the executive branch, business sector, academies, and foundations. Panel members included Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wis.), Representative Ed Royce (R-Calif.), General Carlton W. Fulford Jr. (ret.), Dr. Helene Gayle, Paul V. Applegarth, Constance Berry Newman, Chester Crocker, Robert Rotberg, Pamela Bridgewater, Peter Seligmann, Thomas Gibian, Kofi Adjepong-Boateng, and Richard McCormack. No less important, our expert authors—Paul V. Applegarth, Princeton N. Lyman, Jeffrey Herbst, David L. Goldwyn, Robert E. Ebel, Nicholas P. Lapham, Todd Summers, Bathsheba N. Crocker, and Dina Esposito—devoted much time and energy in producing the dynamic, pragmatic proposals profiled in the report. We thank Michael Rodgers and Monica Enfield of PFC Energy for a detailed and thorough analysis of past and future oil revenues projected for the oil-producing governments of West and Central Africa. Last, but not least, Nelly Swilla, CSIS Africa Program staff, skillfully oversaw the organization of the panel's work, including production of the final report.

To a significant degree, the panel's success is attributable to the bipartisan spirit of its deliberations, a testament to the increasing congruence of opinion that Africa is steadily becoming vital to U.S. national interests. Early on in the process, the panel identified seven key issues in Africa that required high-level, sustained U.S. engagement: West and Central Africa's emergence as key oil suppliers; strengthening Africa's capital markets and financial sector; a strategy for a post-conflict Sudan; crisis diplomacy and peace operations; countering the terrorist threat; natural resource conservation; and the need to build on U.S. leadership on HIV/AIDS.

Last, the panel's high quality, provocative, analyses and proposals deserve serious consideration by senior leaders in the administration and Congress and by the wider interested public. We welcome the chance to share these results with as broad an audience as possible.

Sincerely,

Walter H. Kansteiner III
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Chair, Africa Policy Advisory Panel
Former assistant secretary of state for
African Affairs

J. Stephen Morrison
Director, CSIS Africa Program
Executive Secretary, Africa Policy
Advisory Panel

Overview

J. Stephen Morrison

Introduction

During the Africa Policy Advisory Panel's opening session on September 12, 2003, panel members advised the panel's chair, Walter Kansteiner, its executive secretary, J. Stephen Morrison, and its expert authors to be bold and imaginative as they elaborated their analyses and recommendations for eventual inclusion in the final product to be delivered to Secretary of State Colin Powell in early February 2004. From the advisory panel's inception, individual panel members worked closely with the secretariat and expert authors throughout the drafting process. At the panel's second session, December 12, 2003, and its final discussions on January 20, 2004, panel members offered additional suggestions to strengthen the draft papers, substantively and analytically. The panel's chair, secretariat, and expert authors have taken the panel members' guidance fully on board and are grateful for their extensive contributions over the past months.

The panel commissioned special in-depth studies that were issued in 2004 as free-standing publications: (1) recommendations on the urgent challenges that postwar Sudan in 2004 will present to the United States, the UN, and others, and (2) a proposal to strengthen Africa's capital markets. Unlike the studies that yielded proposals, the third commissioned study—appendix A, this volume—presents the estimated wealth that oil will bring to five African producing countries in the next six years.

Through active working groups, the panel also produced five provocative, detailed proposals for innovations in U.S.-Africa policy: (1) a new U.S. energy policy; (2) measures to strengthen U.S. counterterrorism efforts; (3) a U.S. conservation initiative; (4) a strategy to address chronic crises and instability through strengthened diplomacy and support for priority peace operations; and (5) recommendations for sustaining U.S. global leadership on HIV/AIDS.

Together, these products cover several of the most critical challenges before the United States and lay out an ambitious agenda for future action by the Bush administration, Congress, and the next administration. All are central to U.S. policy interests in Africa. Indeed, that was a guiding criterion for their placement on the panel's agenda.

These writings are free of partisan bias, have been subjected to multiple reviews, and have passed through several iterations. Each is accompanied by a brief executive summary. Much effort has been made to coordinate the papers and minimize overlap and duplication.

Three Common Themes

Across the different products that the panel has generated, three compelling, cross-cutting themes emerge.

Africa's New Strategic Position

First, and arguably most profound, Africa has assumed a new, strategic place in U.S. foreign policy and in the definition of vital U.S. national interests. This shift moves the United States away from the past habit of treating Africa as a humanitarian afterthought and begins to reverse a decade-long decline in the United States' presence and engagement in Africa.

This shift is driven by several powerful factors. Most obvious, September 11 altered the overall strategic U.S. conception of global security and forced a rethinking of how Africa fits, taking account of its special humanitarian, security, and developmental needs. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued by the president in September 2002, formally argued, in dramatic, unequivocal terms, that Africa had become vitally significant in the quest to combat transnational terror networks and their state sponsors. It made the case, on both moral and security grounds, that a special concerted effort had to be made to save and improve the lives of persons threatened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Perhaps less obvious, only after September 11 did the United States begin, retrospectively, to appreciate fully how five factors over the previous decade have steadily elevated the significance of Africa to U.S. national interests and, implicitly, stirred a historic challenge to the United States to respond in new, innovative ways. These drivers include HIV/AIDS, terror, oil, armed conflicts, and global trade.

HIV/AIDS, terror, and violent war are raw threats. Expanding oil wealth, tied in part to U.S. investment and markets, is an opportunity to diversify U.S. imports from outside the Persian Gulf, but that opportunity could easily go bad and become a threat that worsens instability. The emergence of an African voting block in the WTO is a new factor that can impact U.S. worldwide trading interests, positively or negatively, as the most recent Doha round has demonstrated.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic swiftly tore through eastern and southern Africa in the 1990s. Only in recent years has the reality of its destructive power, in Africa and beyond, become manifest, registered among senior officials on the continent, in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, and begun to generate serious action. Awareness has grown that in many high-prevalence countries the worst is yet to come, as the explosion of new infections in the 1990s translates into mass illness and death in this decade, along with a steep rise in demand for treatment. Further, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with a combined population of more than 200 million, stand at risk of rapidly escalating prevalence rates that, if not effectively stanching, could radically raise the numbers of persons in Africa living with the HIV virus.

Also in the 1990s, Africa—and U.S. interests in Africa—came to live under a mounting threat of terror, manifest most tragically in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. This threat did not materialize overnight. As in Afghanistan, it took root over several years in Somalia, a forgotten,

broken place left behind for others to exploit. Nor did the threat fade after the 1998 attacks. It endured, and September 11 and the Mombasa attacks in late 2002 forced the United States to reconsider what is truly at stake and how to reduce the threat effectively.

U.S. energy stakes in Africa climbed steadily through the 1990s because of the emergence of West Africa as a major supplier, current and future, to world markets. Today, as a historic boom phase of investment and production in Africa's energy sector unfolds, the United States is challenged to begin reckoning with a future energy relationship with Africa far bigger and more complex than in the past, concentrated among several poorly governed, unsteady states. The center of activity may be offshore, but distance does not insulate the energy sector from dysfunction or debility within Nigeria, Angola, and other energy-rich African states where internal chaos, malgovernance, and external threats abound.

Africa in the late 1990s and into this decade came to account for an estimated 75 percent of the world's most conflict-prone countries and has generated 65 percent of global demand for peacekeeping. African conflicts have placed a persistent and costly claim on the leadership, resources, and time of the UN Security Council, the UN Secretariat, African powers such as South Africa and Nigeria, and Western powers such as Britain and France, which have led military operations into violent African crises, often supported by ad hoc coalitions.

Centrality of High-level Leadership

A related, second theme is that Africa's elevated position grows out of high-level sustained U.S. leadership and choice. Recent years have demonstrated that direct presidential engagement, combined with activism by the secretary of state, the national security adviser, and other high-ranking officials, can move opinion, reshape the boundaries of expectations, erode old barriers in U.S. thinking, and raise pressures for demonstrable results.

President Bush, expanding on the precedent set by President Clinton, consciously chose to make Africa a higher priority and to mainstream it in U.S. foreign policy. President Bush has been aided by the activism and passion for Africa of Secretary of State Colin Powell. At critical moments, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has also boosted U.S. leadership on Africa. It has become clear at many points that the administration understands that heightened engagement in Africa is both sound foreign policy and sound domestic policy: whether it be to seek to end Sudan's 20-year war through a multilateral, negotiated settlement; to promote expanding trade and investment through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); to combat HIV/AIDS; or to strengthen conservation. Important also, the upper levels of the administration have come to recognize that Africa is relatively free of partisan wrangling, that Congress is generally open to White House innovation and leadership on Africa, and that popular opinion in the United States has shifted toward greater support of expanded foreign assistance and new innovative approaches like the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). HIV/AIDS and MCA in particular offer rare opportunities for concerted bipartisan action.

White House activism is also indirectly reflective of the intensified mobilization of new domestic constituencies that have acquired an ever-bigger stake and ever more influential voice on matters pertaining to Africa. These include religious conservatives, nongovernmental groups, environmentalists, the private finance sector, corporate interests, newly formed groups like the International Crisis Group and DATA, and health advocates, among others. Established U.S. foundations have significantly enlarged their investment in African education and health, and in the case of the Soros Foundation, dramatically increased the attention paid to transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights within oil-rich African countries. Since its founding in 2000, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has acquired influence with respect to HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases that heretofore were chiefly the domain of bilateral donors and international organizations.

On Sudan, an exceptional coalition, comprising evangelical Christians, antislavery activists, human rights advocates, humanitarians, and an array of members of Congress, has sustained pressure on the administration to provide high-level leadership to end Sudan's war through a just, negotiated settlement.

Recent developments attest to the momentous shift that is under way. PEPFAR, the MCA, and increases in development assistance to Africa have more than doubled official bilateral flows to Africa. Washington's high-level commitment to a negotiated settlement to Sudan's war has been the single most critical factor in moving the two antagonists to the very edge of a final accord. The president and secretary of state have often, and forthrightly, condemned the tyranny of Robert Mugabe and Charles Taylor.

Elements of a Strategic Approach

A third theme is that the shift to a strategic view of Africa requires a commensurate shift in policies, programs, human skills, and finances. At present, there is a gap between our newfound understanding of how vital Africa has become and the substance and action needed to make this realization concrete.

The strategic view requires that far more be done, strategically, to invest in capacity building in Africa: in health infrastructure; management of oil wealth; counterterrorism; respect of human rights and rule of law; peacekeeping operations; and conservation.

It requires that in these same sectors the United States significantly increase the U.S. presence on the ground in Africa, through expanded recruitment (especially in the intelligence and diplomatic corps), new incentives to pursue career work in Africa, and expanded language training opportunities.

Closing the gap will only happen if there is sustained political will, changes in the institutional approaches Washington takes to Africa, and serious new funding for choice initiatives that could add \$1 billion or more to annual commitments. Given how much change in U.S. policy is currently under way, and given the risk that security and defense agencies may diverge in their approach from diplomatic and assistance agencies, it is becoming increasingly important that the White House and Department of State articulate, forcefully and clearly, how they intend to integrate diverse, evolving U.S. policy goals into a single coherent strategy.

A strategic approach cannot be undertaken willy nilly, on the cheap, or through adjustments around the edges to established practices. Should a peace agreement in Sudan be signed in early 2004, for example, it will require U.S. leadership to ensure an adequate approach to the security threats and peace consolidation challenges that will follow. A strategic approach will require long-term attention in Africa to education and to building health infrastructure. It will require a newfound priority focus on building Africa's private financial sector, engaging more systematically with Africa's 300 million Muslims, coming to terms with the terrorist threat in Somalia and West Africa, and ensuring effective peace operations that combine robust international and Africa-rooted capacities.

At home, a strategic approach to Africa will require reinvesting in diplomatic and intelligence capacities, giving special care to ensure that the U.S. global AIDS coordinator's office succeeds and advancing new policy approaches and initiatives in promoting conservation and managing rising U.S. energy equities in Africa.

Finally, a strategic U.S. approach to Africa will require that the United States leverage the resources, leadership, expertise, and political will of partners in Africa, Europe, and the Arab world. All the initiatives proposed in this report require close and persistent dialogue and cooperation with U.S. allies and multilateral institutions.

The recent story of heightened U.S. engagement in Africa is laudable and historic. It has put Africa more fully into the global context, it has spurred new enthusiasm and expectations among Americans and Africans alike, and it has created new U.S. institutions matched by significant new leadership and resources. The sustainment and advance of this emergent strategic approach would now benefit from an updated U.S. vision of where Africa stands today, what U.S. interests and goals are, and how the United States intends to carry forward its engagement into the critical next phase.

Crafting a U.S. Energy Policy for Africa

David L. Goldwyn and Robert E. Ebel

Executive Summary

Central/West Africa is in the early phases of an extended oil boom that will significantly enhance the global position of Nigeria and Angola and bring greater attention to emergent, unstable producers—Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and São Tomé and Príncipe, most importantly. With proven reserves of more than 60 billion barrels, the region today provides one in four new barrels of oil coming onto world markets from outside the Persian Gulf. In 10 years, if it remains attractive for investment, Central/West Africa could supply up to 20 percent of U.S. imported oil, bolstering vital U.S. energy security and commercial interests.

As the region adds 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day to world markets in the next 7 to 10 years, that expansion could bring prosperity or disaster to a fragile region and to complex and expanding U.S. interests there. If these nations achieve greater stability, invest wisely, improve governance, and respect the rule of law, the benefits will be felt throughout the entire region. At the same time, vital U.S. interests in regional stability, counterterrorism, human development, and promotion of democracy and human rights will be advanced. Alternatively, if these nations fall victim to the historical pattern of resource-rich developing nations, corruption will deepen, wealth will be squandered, competition for oil wealth will aggravate internal instability and cross-border violence, and the health, environmental conditions, and life chances of the region's 200 million citizens will remain stalled. The power of the region's notorious criminal syndicates will only grow, and U.S. security interests will deteriorate accordingly.

The United States should encourage those African leaders who have tolerated the misuse of oil wealth to change. It should give those with the courage to change the capacity to succeed by enabling them to procure skilled management. It should make transparency in governance a benchmark by obliging governments to tell

This chapter refers only to the oil-exporting nations of West/Central Africa that include Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, and Gabon.

their citizens, in a comprehensive, highly visible manner, what revenues the government earns and where it spends them. The United States should use diplomacy as its primary tool for engaging African heads of state, U.S. energy companies, and allies and competitors in Europe and Asia in a common effort. It should coordinate all the programs of the U.S. government in Africa, from military support and training to Department of Commerce and Department of Energy programs, to rule of law and relief programs, to foster better governance. It should use debt relief and aid where appropriate. No wealthy nation should receive charity; no poor country should enjoy financial relief before they have proven their performance through irreversible public steps. Energy policy is a tool by which the United States can promote its own vital interests, rather than an end in itself.

Recommendations

The leverage the United States can muster, in coalition with others, is not overwhelming and will diminish by the end of the decade. The following recommendations call for the construction of an effective, new U.S. energy approach to Africa that introduces a new policy structure and selects new bilateral and multilateral policies.

- Designate a special adviser to the president and secretary of state for African energy diplomacy, with ambassadorial rank, to lead interagency policy.

This person should be housed at the State Department but endowed with authority by the National Security Council to lead interagency policy. The special adviser must have a clear mandate with authority to interact with the G-8 process and other multilateral forums and to coordinate policy with the U.S. ambassadors of Central and West African nations.

- Devise a clear and transparent benchmark for regional behavior, complementary to the standards for the Millennium Challenge Account.

The touchstone should be a public commitment to transparency in public finance, signifying verifiable, public disclosure of government revenues and expenditures.

- Make committed nations eligible for bilateral and multilateral programs.
 - Bilateral programs could include a U.S.-hosted biannual African Energy Producer Summit, appended to the G-8 meeting or the annual African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) summit, singling out countries that manage their oil wealth well, and increasing peacekeeping training and International Military Education and Training (IMET) support for nations that adhere to transparency and good governance criteria.
 - Multilateral programs could include conditional long-term rescheduling or forgiveness of sovereign debt through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) process; financing for national electrification in exchange for transparency and development commitments; long-term capacity-building programs to train national officials in management of public finance and petroleum reserves; provision of conditional trade finance based on a commitment to use resources for national development and to agree to

transparent monitoring and auditing of project income; and ensuring that all national or correspondent banks that have relationships with G-8 banks disclose the beneficial owners of those accounts to prevent government officials from using Western banks to hide misappropriated funds.

■ Implement specific bilateral policies.

- NIGERIA. The United States should encourage current plans for implementation of a reformist economic plan, reimplementation of an anticorruption commission, and reforms at the natural resource ministry by showcasing these reforms at the 2004 G-8 Summit or the 2004 World Bank/IMF meetings.
- ANGOLA. The United States should establish the same consultative mechanism to encourage Angolan reformist efforts. The United States should also push the IMF to establish a shadow agreement with Angola that will ensure transparent spending of oil money, attaching conditions of transparency to its loans, donor assistance, and debt relief.
- EQUATORIAL GUINEA, CHAD, CAMEROON, AND SÃO TOMÉ. The United States and the international community should provide these countries with expertise and advice to manage oil funds with strong oversight and accountability, as well as funding to help build this capacity.
- SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE. The United States and the UK, together with the World Bank and IMF, should offer to swap bilateral and multilateral development assistance for a commitment to transparency.

Capital Market and Financial Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Paul V. Applegarth

Executive Summary

Capital market and financial sector development can be an important facilitator of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. It also supports U.S. strategic interests and is a prerequisite for the success of other U.S. bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including counterterrorism efforts, increased transparency, and improved governance. The U.S. government should recognize this by

- Establishing capital market and financial sector development as an explicit objective of U.S. development assistance efforts in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Institutionalizing assistance to capital market and financial sector development within the government; and
- Providing comprehensive U.S. government support for the essential components of capital markets through increased funding, technical assistance, and coordination with other donors.

ESTABLISH AN EXPLICIT OBJECTIVE. Establishing capital market and financial sector development as an objective does not mean that it should be given the highest priority to the exclusion of other development objectives and programs. However, it should not be deliberately excluded either, as it may have been at times in the past. Promoting capital market development in a country should complement other efforts to promote that country's development. It should be recognized as an important and legitimate component of a country's development program

Ranjani Sankaran and Maureen Harrington contributed significantly to the development of this chapter. The author gratefully acknowledges their contribution. In addition, the chapter has benefited from review and comment by a broad array of qualified individuals and institutions, many of whom are listed in the chapter's appendix.

and should receive the support of U.S. government departments and agencies through allocations of their staff and financial resources. Fortunately, an attractive aspect of including capital market development in a country's development program is that financial sector improvements should be less expensive than, for example, infrastructure or traditional poverty alleviation efforts. Much of the effort will likely take the form of technical assistance and training. The development benefit relative to dollar of expenditure should be high.

INSTITUTIONALIZE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. Several steps can be taken to institutionalize financial sector development assistance within the U.S. government, including

- Bringing more people with capital market skills and experience into the government by, for example, establishing a separate salary scale within the government for financial markets experts;
- Establishing an interagency working group devoted to capital market and financial sector development issues;
- Encouraging the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to take a leadership role by including financial sector and capital market development programs within its activities; and
- Using U.S. influence with the G-8 and with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to increase their efforts in support of capital market and financial sector development.

PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE ASSISTANCE FOR CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT. Because formal savings channels do not capture a large amount of local wealth—held, for example, in cattle, houses, and land—there is a particular need for initiatives to boost domestic savings and investment in sub-Saharan African markets.

Successfully mobilizing these local funds can yield amounts that are multiples of the amounts provided from traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) and from foreign direct and portfolio investment. It can also improve resource allocation by placing capital in the hands of local stakeholders who are better positioned to make informed decisions than foreign investors operating at a distance.

Important actions that the U.S. government can take to mobilize local capital and to build key components of sub-Saharan countries' financial sectors are

- Significantly increasing technical assistance, particularly from the U.S. Treasury and other government organizations with financial expertise;
- Strengthening domestic banking institutions, payment systems, credit bureaus, and private pension funds;
- Consolidating the excessive number of sub-Saharan stock exchanges;
- Expanding current State Department initiatives to promote sovereign credit ratings and to establish benchmark yield curves;

- Establishing dedicated Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) funds, and
- Working with U.S. universities and the private sector to strengthen university and vocational financial, legal, and regulatory training.

Capital Market and Financial Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Paul V. Applegarth

Executive Summary

Capital market and financial sector development can be an important facilitator of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. It also supports U.S. strategic interests and is a prerequisite for the success of other U.S. bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including counterterrorism efforts, increased transparency, and improved governance. The U.S. government should recognize this by

- Establishing capital market and financial sector development as an explicit objective of U.S. development assistance efforts in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Institutionalizing assistance to capital market and financial sector development within the government; and
- Providing comprehensive U.S. government support for the essential components of capital markets through increased funding, technical assistance, and coordination with other donors.

ESTABLISH AN EXPLICIT OBJECTIVE. Establishing capital market and financial sector development as an objective does not mean that it should be given the highest priority to the exclusion of other development objectives and programs. However, it should not be deliberately excluded either, as it may have been at times in the past. Promoting capital market development in a country should complement other efforts to promote that country's development. It should be recognized as an important and legitimate component of a country's development program

Ranjani Sankaran and Maureen Harrington contributed significantly to the development of this chapter. The author gratefully acknowledges their contribution. In addition, the chapter has benefited from review and comment by a broad array of qualified individuals and institutions, many of whom are listed in the chapter's appendix.

and should receive the support of U.S. government departments and agencies through allocations of their staff and financial resources. Fortunately, an attractive aspect of including capital market development in a country's development program is that financial sector improvements should be less expensive than, for example, infrastructure or traditional poverty alleviation efforts. Much of the effort will likely take the form of technical assistance and training. The development benefit relative to dollar of expenditure should be high.

INSTITUTIONALIZE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. Several steps can be taken to institutionalize financial sector development assistance within the U.S. government, including

- Bringing more people with capital market skills and experience into the government by, for example, establishing a separate salary scale within the government for financial markets experts;
- Establishing an interagency working group devoted to capital market and financial sector development issues;
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To Guarantee the Peace

An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Sudan

Dina Esposito and Bathsheba N. Crocker

Executive Summary

Ongoing peace negotiations offer the best opportunity in decades to end Sudan's civil war—the longest-running such conflict in Africa. A negotiated settlement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army would be a historic achievement.

Stabilizing Sudan and moving ahead with postwar reconstruction will be a daunting task. The accord's core bargain will invite tension and confusion, simultaneously building national institutions to preserve the unity of Sudan while creating an autonomous southern entity. Sudan's needs are immense, and the reconstruction period will be complicated by tremendous challenges. These include pervasive mistrust and uncertainty that will inhibit north-south collaboration on reconstruction efforts; north-south asymmetries in terms of institutional capacities and skilled workers; the presence of many potential spoilers, multiple “hot spots,” or unstable areas requiring civilian or military responses; large-scale population movements; massive debt; issues related to poor governance practices and misuse of resources; and possibly meddling neighbors.

- An accord will also raise the question of what posture the United States and other external guarantors will take in the postwar period to ensure a true end to hostilities, build confidence among long-warring parties, and produce tangible benefits for the Sudanese people. The United States has worked in close partnership with Britain, Norway, Kenya, and the United Nations to end Sudan's war. This unique multilateral model must be expanded and sustained throughout the reconstruction phase in order to guarantee Sudan's peace.
- Ending the north-south war in Sudan is just the beginning of a six-year experiment leading toward a referendum on self-determination in southern Sudan. It

This chapter originally appeared as a report, under the same title, of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, directed by Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker. Dina Esposito, a consultant to the project, and Bathsheba Crocker wrote the report. John Love, Daniel Werbel-Sanborn, and Lance Lesher contributed to the research and writing. See this chapter's appendix B for further information about the work of the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project.

will be a long and tense period during which myriad events could tempt the parties to renege on their commitments. In addition, conflicts elsewhere in Sudan, including the intense conflict ongoing in Darfur, potentially could bring down the entire peace effort if war there spreads or gains support among spoilers on either side.

- This analysis does not cover the full range of reconstruction needs in Sudan, which are vast. It focuses on four priorities that must be addressed by the U.S. government and the international community to protect against reversion to war or failed-state status in Sudan.
 - First, the international community must work with the Sudanese to provide sufficient security to protect against the resumption of hostilities and allow reconstruction efforts to move forward.
 - Second, the United States, other major powers, and the United Nations must demonstrate resolve by expediting new diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to reinforce the peace.
 - Third, donors must begin to press for the liberalization of autocratic governing structures in both southern and northern Sudan.
 - Fourth, reconstruction programs should promote the opening and integration of Sudanese societies, building connections between northerners and southerners and among various groups in the north and south.
- Even before a peace agreement is signed, the international community should be preparing to take the following steps to further this four-part vision:
 - Under the UN's chapter VII authority, deploy an international quick response force and peacekeeping/monitoring force
 - Ensure the success of the joint/integrated units of Sudan's post-peace armed forces
 - Ensure appropriate, coordinated, high-level political authority over international security functions
 - Sustain robust diplomatic engagement
 - Offer substantial economic assistance
 - Support peacekeeping operations during the life of the interim period
 - Establish benchmarks to measure both the unity and southern regional governments' progress toward improved governance
 - Build capacity throughout Sudan and open up its political processes
 - Develop transparent oversight mechanisms over oil wealth and other national and regional revenue streams
 - Use a "connection lens" when identifying priority reconstruction tasks, including through encouraging expanded people-to-people dialogues
 - Prepare for a constitutional convention.

The authors take no position on whether Sudan should remain united or be divided into two separate states. Regardless of that outcome, the goal of a more peaceful and open Sudan in which the spirit of the Machakos Protocol and the elements of the peace agreement are respected remains the same. The United States, the United Nations, and other major donors must take the steps outlined here for that goal to be achieved.

The stakes in Sudan are enormous, from combating terrorism, persistent conflict, and failing states in Africa to introducing democracy and openness in the Middle East and improving U.S. goodwill in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Succeeding will require the United States and its partners to begin preparing now to commit the time, resources, and attention necessary to guarantee the peace in Sudan.

A Natural Resource Conservation Initiative for Africa

Nicholas P. Lapham

Executive Summary

U.S. foreign policy toward Africa should place greater emphasis on natural resource conservation, both as a priority in its own right and as a critical factor in achieving U.S. objectives related to preventing conflict, reducing poverty, and promoting democracy, economic growth, and public health. This would respond to a key challenge in Africa's development and would benefit the United States in numerous ways, including through building closer bilateral ties, achieving important global environmental benefits, and more effectively addressing existing policy goals.

The United States has a distinct comparative advantage—above and beyond Europe, Japan, and other industrialized countries—in helping Africa address conservation concerns. Secretary of State Colin Powell recognizes this and has taken several positive steps through his leadership on the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the President's Initiative against Illegal Logging. The challenge now is to build on these efforts.

The Africa Policy Advisory Panel's Natural Resource Conservation Working Group has identified three areas for enhanced U.S. engagement and leadership: transboundary natural resource conservation; governance of natural resources; and unsustainable commercial wildlife exploitation. The following recommendations respond to these issues and taken together constitute an African Conservation Initiative that Secretary Powell could consider announcing on Earth Day 2004.

- Scale up and sustain U.S. assistance (diplomatic, technical, and financial) to regional partnerships aimed at conserving key transboundary ecosystems.

The author wishes to acknowledge the following contributing authors: Richard Carroll and Judy Oglethorpe (World Wildlife Fund), James Deutsch and Steve Osofsky (Wildlife Conservation Society), Heather Eves (Bushmeat Crisis Task Force), Nancy Gelman (Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group), Harry Van der Linde (African Wildlife Foundation), and Peter Veit (World Resources Institute).

A vital component of regional cooperation is the conservation of shared ecosystems that extend beyond national borders. U.S. leadership can catalyze economic, security, health, and environmental benefits from efforts undertaken jointly with the countries concerned to conserve these natural systems.

- Specifically, the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should sustain their support of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership and pursue similar initiatives for the Miombo-Mopane Woodlands complex in Southern Africa and the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem off the West African coast.
- Prioritize improved natural resource management as a key component in U.S. efforts to promote good governance.

The mismanagement of natural resources such as forests, wildlife, and water drives corruption, conflict, and rural poverty in Africa. Giving these issues greater weight in U.S.-Africa policy is essential to achieving long-term strategic interests.

- Specific and immediate actions include prioritizing forest-sector reform in efforts to promote peace and stability in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, affording a higher priority to community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) as a tool for promoting democracy, good governance, and rural development, and working with key governmental and NGO partners to strengthen African judicial systems to better develop, understand, and enforce natural resource laws.
- Expand and better coordinate U.S. government activities to address the African bushmeat crisis.

The commercial exploitation of African wildlife for human consumption threatens to increase the transmission and spread of deadly diseases affecting people, livestock, and wildlife; create regional food security problems; and cause the extinction of highly valued wildlife species, most notably, great apes. An effective U.S. government response requires the coordinated and strategic deployment of assets from a variety of agencies.

- The secretary of state, through the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, should coordinate an integrated U.S. response to the bushmeat crisis that includes specific actions from the Departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Interior as well as USAID, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Trade and Development Authority, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
- Develop stronger programs and incentives to more effectively engage the U.S. diplomatic corps in Africa on natural resource conservation issues.
- The State Department should implement specific educational, training, recruiting, and performance evaluation measures to improve the capability of the Foreign Service to address conservation issues.

- Restore and expand U.S. technical assistance programs that build the capacity of Africans—from practitioners to political leaders—in natural resource conservation.

Professional training is essential for effective natural resource conservation. Africans have few opportunities to access such training, and existing conservation capacity is being eroded by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. With its unparalleled breadth of conservation expertise, the United States is uniquely positioned to address this need.

- The U.S. government should restore and expand cost-effective programs run by the State Department, USAID, the Department of Interior, and other agencies to train African students, management professionals, and political leaders in natural resource conservation.

- Increase U.S. investment in African parks and protected areas.

Parks and other protected areas are critical to conserving Africa's natural resources. The United States, with the world's largest and most diverse protected areas network, has a distinct comparative advantage in supporting their management.

- The secretary of state should encourage passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA III) legislation now pending in the House of Representatives, which includes language directing the president to invest in park protection; engage other major donors, conservation NGOs, and interested private-sector parties in catalyzing greater support for African protected areas, perhaps through a Partnership for Africa's Parks; strengthen incentives for creating and properly managing protected areas by giving special recognition to Madagascar, Gabon, and other nations that take strong conservation action; and ensure adequate funding for the President's Initiative against Illegal Logging, which targets protected areas in Africa.

Countering the Terrorist Threat in Africa

J. Stephen Morrison and Princeton N. Lyman

Executive Summary

The threat of terror to U.S. interests in Africa is concrete, rising, and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high. The United States has begun to recognize this reality and to give counterterrorism higher priority in U.S. foreign policy approaches to the continent. To be effective, policymakers will have to contend seriously with the very factors that attract terrorists: weak state partners, deep economic marginality and alienation, ethnic and religious fissures on a continent that is home to 300 million Muslims, and fragile governance with often weak protections of democratic and human rights. For this reason, the U.S. response cannot be driven by security programs alone; it also requires sustained attention to economic development, human rights, and democratization.

Specific Recommendations

- The administration should articulate a coherent, compelling framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa.

That effort should define the strategic context for the president's multiple initiatives in Africa as well as the active reassessment of Africa's place in global security now under way in the U.S. European Command and NATO. The framework should take account of the special challenges—and opportunities—present in Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria. It should involve wider disclosures of successes in counterterrorist efforts. It should speak directly to raising Africa as an intelligence priority and include commitments to close diplomatic gaps in important places and dramatically expand human intelligence and language training. It should include a renewed focus on curbing the proliferation of surface-to-air missiles in Africa and propose that the Kimberley Process be used to tighten controls over terror financing through diamond channels. It should move the Pan Sahel Initiative forward through a major increase in multiyear funding of \$100 million or more, while

simultaneously advancing a major U.S.-Muslim outreach initiative of \$200 million a year.

- The administration should reorganize itself internally.

It is essential to overcome divided responsibility for Africa among the Department of Defense's regional commands. Africa's almost seamless borders and networks of both trafficking and conflict demand a more unified command structure in the United States for military training, intelligence, and, as necessary, deployment. Similarly, an empowered antiterrorism task force is needed to overcome the internal divide in the State Department that separates North Africa from the Africa Bureau, links these more effectively with the Counterterrorism Coordinator's office, and strengthens the place of public diplomacy.

- The administration should propose to Congress a major continent-wide Muslim outreach initiative on a dramatically large scale. It should be a multiyear effort involving new additional funding of at least \$200 million a year.

With a Muslim population of well over 300 million, Africa provides a large pool for recruitment by Muslim extremists and, at the same time, provides a unique opportunity for the United States to engage the Muslim world. The approach should emphasize constant engagement with Muslims representing the full spectrum of opinion, with special attention to communities' vulnerabilities. Specifically the administration should

- Increase pressure on the Saudi government to regulate financial flows by Saudi charities to madrassas in Africa at the same time that the United States demonstrates the seriousness of its commitment to expand educational opportunities.
- Increase diplomatic engagement with Muslim leaders, with special priority to northern Nigeria, coastal communities of Kenya and Tanzania, and countries served by the Pan Sahel Initiative.
- Expand humanitarian and development assistance to Muslim communities, including direct support to Somaliland.
- The administration should pursue a credible policy for ending Somalia's role as a collapsed state that continues to provide a base of support and transit opportunities for Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

In 2004, the administration should systematically test the feasibility of supporting a new multipronged, multilateral approach to Somalia. The following are specific steps the administration should take in 2004:

- Formulate a three-to-five year road map for the restoration of civilian rule, the marginalization of armed militias, and the restoration of elementary social services.
- Impose enhanced pressure upon Somalia's militias, making use of new instruments including the Coalition Maritime Task Force and the U.S.-led

Combined Joint Task Force to strengthen naval interdictions and other means of enforcing an international arms embargo.

- Create new channels of humanitarian and developmental assistance.
- The administration should advance cooperation on counterterrorism with Sudan, with or without a peace settlement.

Sudan is motivated to avoid retaliatory action by the United States and to win Sudan's removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror. The U.S.-Sudan dialogue on counterterrorism, however, remains vulnerable to breakdown. It is subject to strong cross-pressures related to efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Sudan and the influence of U.S. interest groups acting in support of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Specifically, the administration should

- Clarify and reaffirm the specific conditions, expectations, and timeline for removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terror, incorporated into a precise action plan.
- Open consultations with appropriate members of Congress.
- Take special measures to preserve the integrity of the counterterrorism track and keep it separate from other dimensions of U.S. engagement on Sudan.
- Devise a phased plan for expanded programmatic cooperation on counterterrorism with Sudan, should there be a peace settlement.

Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations

Jeffrey Herbst and Princeton N. Lyman

Executive Summary

African conflicts are one of the most critical threats to U.S. interests. On no other continent is the question of order so problematic. Currently there are serious crises in nine countries, and potential crises loom in many others. Yet we are not staffed, resourced, or oriented to integrate African exigencies into our policies or our diplomatic structure. Hesitation, inattention, and timidity in some cases, diminish our capacity to capitalize on those opportunities.

A special opportunity now presents itself with the opening to Libya, a major supporter of the wars in West Africa. Relations with Libya should not be normalized until it ends its interventions in West Africa.

Specific Recommendations

Early Warning

The State Department should place a high premium on officers developing competency in the skills necessary to prevent and address long-term crises in Africa. All embassy staff in Africa should have training in crisis diplomacy and effective peace intervention.

Diplomatic Presence

The State Department lacks a presence and relevant language skills in some of the most important places on the continent where instability is unfolding, and where terrorist infiltration or other foreign influences are working. The department must increase its physical presence, reversing years of closing posts and cost-cutting steps.

Active Peacemaking

The department must engage with more diplomatic strength in peacemaking.

- **CORE STAFF:** The Africa Bureau should create a staff of 6 to 10 officers devoted to crisis diplomacy. This staff would supplement regional offices where significant conflicts are being addressed. They would also provide support to special envoys, to joint allied efforts of conflict resolution, and to embassy-directed peace efforts.
- **MULTIPLYING CAPACITY:** The Africa Bureau should develop the means to draw more directly on existing resources external to the department, such as expertise within organizations such as the International Crisis Group, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and others.
- **MORE FLEXIBLE USE OF U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES:** The United States needs to utilize its assistance programs, both traditional humanitarian assistance and special programs such as the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Transitional Assistance (OTI), with greater flexibility, over longer periods of time, and with attention to issues such as police and security-related training.

Peace Intervention

- **BUILDING AFRICAN CAPACITY:** The United States should abandon its allergy to direct military assistance. Funding for military training in Africa should be increased from the \$10 million allocated in FY 04 to \$100 million. Assisting African armies need not require us to abandon human rights concerns either. Furthermore, the training has to reflect the reality that in most cases, peacekeeping in Africa will be closer to the requirements of chapter VII than chapter VI of the UN Charter.
- **UN PEACEKEEPING:** U.S. efforts to fund UN peacekeeping in Africa are among the highest priorities that we have on the continent. The administration and Congress must overcome current budget restrictions that do not address unanticipated crises and demand unrealistic exit strategies.
- **ASSISTING AFRICAN PEACE INTERVENTION:** Funding for this purpose has dropped dramatically in the last few years, with roughly a 40 percent cut for African programs from FY 03 to FY 04. This fund should also be raised to \$100 million.

U.S. Involvement with Peace Intervention

Timely and forceful U.S. military presence, even on a limited basis where the United States has a special interest, would promote an enhanced security environment for follow-on work by UN peacekeepers, as well as post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

These weapons have proliferated throughout Africa—5 million in East Africa and the Horn alone. The United States must reassess its resistance to stronger UN or other international controls over this trafficking.

Continuing U.S. Leadership to Combat HIV/AIDS in Africa and Globally

Todd Summers

Executive Summary

The establishment by President Bush of the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) marked a critical increase in U.S. engagement on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. With new resources, political commitment, supporting legislation, and public support, there is an historic opportunity to turn the tide on an epidemic that grows stronger by the hour.

Many have come to join the effort, including many different U.S. government entities: the Department of State; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); National Institutes of Health (NIH); Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA); and the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Labor. For policymakers, this is a “multi-sectoral approach,” while for pundits it is a clamorous and at times chaotic effort ill prepared to face a monstrously complex epidemic. In truth, it is both. The responsibility for sorting it out, moving it forward, and making it succeed has been laid at the door of the Department of State. PEPFAR established a new coordinator for global HIV/AIDS activities reporting directly to the secretary of state, presenting the department with an exciting opportunity to expand significantly its leadership role on global HIV/AIDS and to improve communication and coordination within the U.S. government and among the many nongovernmental groups working at its side.

Because there is already a strong commitment to addressing the global epidemic, a willingness to act is assumed, and instead the Africa Policy Advisory Panel focused on providing specific recommendations to support the department in this effort to improve and expand U.S. leadership against HIV/AIDS. The recommendations focus on Africa as the epicenter of the epidemic, while at the same time acknowledging the need to engage in other countries that face burgeoning epidemics. They are based on five core principles:

- First, U.S. leadership has been, and will continue to be, central to global efforts on HIV/AIDS. President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Ambassador Randall Tobias, and others within the administration must continue their efforts to raise awareness of the threats posed by HIV/AIDS and to support increased U.S. engagement to respond to those threats.
- Second, the full armamentarium of U.S. resources should be brought to bear on the global war on HIV/AIDS. Only through a truly multi-sectoral approach, in which the strengths, expertise, and resources of various federal agencies are strategically mobilized, will the president's objectives be achieved. This is particularly true with respect to increasing our understanding of, and response to, the implications of the growing epidemic on U.S. national security interests.
- Third, despite its considerable financial generosity and global engagement, the United States cannot succeed in its efforts without partnering with other governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, faith-based groups, civil society, and affected communities. Building effective partnerships will allow the U.S. government to concentrate its people and resources where they are most needed and leverage the capacities of others to complement and strengthen its efforts.
- Fourth, the new Office of the Coordinator of Global HIV/AIDS within the Department of State offers an incredible opportunity to strengthen and lead U.S. efforts and to build more effective communication among U.S. agencies and nongovernmental counterparts engaged on the global epidemic. This office should focus on coordination, communication, and strategy, and not seek to replicate capacity that already exists within the U.S. government, and in particular, within USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
- Finally, the United States must promote an approach to HIV/AIDS that reflects a comprehensive, balanced approach of prevention, care, treatment, and research that complements and supports local needs, conditions, and priorities. The United States must tailor its assistance country by country, and in some cases village by village, tempering its authority and responsibility to coordinate with appreciation and respect for the diversity of approaches that exist. It must also focus its efforts on programs that are proven to be effective and avoid diverting precious resources to approaches based not on science but on political or religious ideologies.

Specific Recommendations

- The secretary of state should continue and expand his personal engagement on HIV/AIDS.
- The coordinator, working closely with the Department of Defense and various intelligence agencies, should conduct a serious and comprehensive analysis of the implications of HIV/AIDS on U.S. national security interests and integrate a response within its broader HIV/AIDS strategy.

- The State Department should use its authority, especially of its new global HIV/AIDS coordinator, to improve communication, cooperation, and synergy with USAID, and between USAID and HHS agencies involved (CDC, NIH, HRSA, and the Office of the Secretary).
- The secretary of state should ensure that the department's operations reflect his prioritization of HIV/AIDS by establishing mechanisms to systematically monitor and evaluate achievements throughout the department.
- The secretary of state should build and encourage diplomatic activism and competency on HIV/AIDS and related issues throughout U.S. embassies.
- The United States should build partnerships with foundations, nongovernmental organizations, faith-based groups, schools of public health, private-sector groups, and people living with HIV/AIDS. Best practices from existing partnerships should be identified and circulated to other partnerships.
- The United States should systematically make multilateralism a central feature of its global HIV/AIDS efforts. With State Department leadership, it should help mobilize UN assets and ensure the success of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria.
- The U.S. government should devise a systematic approach for determining and coordinating its positions relative to non-U.S. agencies, most importantly toward UNAIDS and the Global Fund.
- The U.S. government's strategy on global HIV/AIDS, under development by the coordinator as mandated by Congress, should identify and respond to challenges in scaling up prevention and treatment programs.