

**Beyond the
Mid-term Elections
Mexico's Political Outlook
2003–2006**

George W. Grayson
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Western Hemisphere Election Study Series



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George W. Grayson

Chapter 1

Elections for the Chamber of Deputies

Introduction

As the theme from *Rocky* blared in the background, Isidro Pastor Medrano—the mystical, militaristic *über* chief of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico state—doled out tennis shoes and Biometrix vitamins to 36 local congressional candidates. The bald-headed Pastor, whose office is filled with his collection of wood, plastic, silver, and gold eggs or *huevos*, then commanded these men and women to sprint to victory in the July 6, 2003, electoral battle. In these contests, voters selected all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies, all 16 of Mexico City's mini-mayors, governors and state and municipal officials in 6 of the nation's 31 states (Campeche, Colima, Nuevo León, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora), and state and municipal officials only in the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Morelos.

Several “firsts” characterized the 2003 election for the Chamber of Deputies: (1) the first election without a PRI incumbent president, (2) the first in which the president of the PRI was selected in an internal election rather than by the nation’s chief executive, (3) the first in which the PRI established a broad-based coalition, (4) the first during the Fox administration, (5) the first with 11 registered parties, and (6) the first since Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected mayor of Mexico City.

This election also stood out as the last organized by the Federal Electoral Institute’s outgoing nine-member National Council, the terms of whose incumbents expired in late October 2003.

These contests came three years after reform-minded Vicente Fox Quesada—paladin of the center-right National Action Party (PAN)—captured the presidency that the PRI had monopolized since 1929.

In the run-up to this summer's voting, Fox saturated the air waves with commercials designed to expand the PAN’s legislative bloc to more than the 208 seats it won in 2000. By disseminating hundreds of thousands of spots, the president transformed the off-year election into a virtual referendum on his performance over the past two-and-a-half years.

This chapter benefits from George Grayson’s, “Mexico under Fox,” San Diego Union-Tribune, July 6, 2003, www.signonsandiego.com.

Electoral Reforms

Until the early 1990s, it was said that "democracy exists 364 days a year in Mexico—it is only missing on Election Day." Mexico remains a far cry from a Jeffersonian democracy, especially at state and local levels and in terms of human rights and its judicial system. Furthermore, outgoing state executives still connive to anoint their successors. Governors and mayors scoff at laws that ban the unveiling of pork-barrel projects in the run-up to elections. Supposedly neutral bureaucrats furnish manpower and public assets to favored candidates. And, just as takes place north of the Rio Grande, wily politicians find ways to skirt campaign-spending restrictions.

If, however, a latter-day Rip Van Winkle awoke after a prolonged slumber, he would rub his eyes in astonishment over the giant strides that Mexicans have made in opening up their once-autocratic, single-party-dominant system. He would marvel at such innovations as:

- a citizen-run Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) that has supplanted PRI warhorses in organizing, regulating, monitoring, and determining the outcome of federal elections;
- the advent of extremely sophisticated voter identification cards that discourage multiple "carousel" voting, proxy voting, ballot-box stuffing, and other quaint practices that flourished under the ancien régime;
- the readiness of candidates or parties aggrieved by adverse vote tallies to make a beeline for state and federal electoral courts, instead of rallying their supporters to barricade the city hall or block central thoroughfares;
- the advent of generous—many say "overly generous"—public campaign funding that affords even small parties a chance to make their pitches; and
- the growth in the number of muckraking journalists eager to expose the abuses of politicians and political parties.

In light of these changes, how well did Fox, the PAN, and other parties fare? Who were the winners and losers? What generalizations spring from the federal elections?

An Overview

Of the 500 seats up for grabs, voters selected 300 deputies from single-member or "majority" districts.¹ The other 200 were filled through proportional representation based on lists prepared by the competing parties for each of five regions or *circunscripciones* (see table 1.1).² As examined in chapter 5, the

¹ The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) certified only 496 deputies, because the institute voided contests in Torreón, Coahuila (District 6) and in Zamora, Michoacán (District 5); citizens will revote in these districts later in the year.

² For an excellent examination of election districts, rules, and procedures, see Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, *Mexico Alert: July 6, 2003, Midterm Elections—Preelection Analysis*, Hemisphere Focus, vol. 11, Issue 24, Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 3, 2003.

abstention rate soared to its highest level in modern Mexican history as only 41.8 percent of eligible voters participated. Meanwhile, some 957,410 citizens who did show up at the polls either intentionally or inadvertently spoiled their ballots. Those who did cast valid votes registered their discontent with the performance of the incumbent chief executive. Even as Fox retained a high level of personal popularity (64 percent in mid-May 2003),³ citizens punished him and his National Action Party for their inability to propel the “change” trumpeted during the 2000 presidential contest. Fox and his advisers overestimated the importance of quantifiable achievements—macroeconomic stability, low interest rates, and high foreign-exchange reserves—that, for average Mexicans, bore little relevance to their everyday lives.⁴ Similarly, the PAN’s campaign theme—“*Quítale el freno al cambio*” (literally, “remove the brake on change”)—which blamed his shortcomings on an intractable Congress—failed to resonate with voters.

Low turnout invariably benefits the PRI, which allied with the Mexican Green Ecological Party (PVEM) in 97 legislative districts. While recording its lowest vote total in recent history, this coalition—which was particularly helpful in Mexico state—enabled the Institutional Revolutionary Party to enlarge its bloc of deputies from 208 to 222. Still, the party did not attain the number of seats it boasted in 1991 (320), 1994 (300), or 1997 (239). Moreover, the PRI failed to win a single direct-election seat in Baja California, Baja California Sur, and Mexico City.

Nevertheless, party president Roberto Madrazo Pintado’s National Operating Program for Electoral Strategy 2003 paid dividends. Under this scheme, the PRI reorganized its cadres in the five national electoral zones, renovated its 300 district committees, and concentrated human and financial resources on the 108 electoral districts that constitute its “hard vote” and encompass 1,672 of the country’s 2,430 municipalities.⁵ This approach enabled the PRI to emerge from the contests as Mexico’s best-organized and only truly national party. It has been argued that if the PRI had spent less on media and more on its grassroots’ effort, it might have picked up enough seats in the Distrito Federal (Federal District) or D.F., Jalisco, and several other states to attain a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.⁶ Needless to say, the party did especially well in states controlled by PRI governors (see table 1.2).

³ Departamento de Investigación de Reforma, “Encuesta trimestral: evaluación al presidente,” *Reforma*, July 21, 2003, www.reforma.com.

⁴ Oscar Aguilar Ascencio, “¿Por qué la popularidad no siempre es lucrativa electoralmente? Una lectura de los saldos de la elección 2003,” *Bien Común* 104 (August 2003): 44.

⁵ For an analysis of this program, see Fernando del Collado, “Así ganó el PRI... y piensa ganar el 2006,” *Reforma*, August 17, 2003, www.reforma.com.

⁶ For an elaboration of this point within an excellent post-election analysis, see Federico Berrueto, “Desdén Ciudadano,” *Voz y Voto* 125–126 (July–August 2003): 8–16. Berrueto, a PRI activist from Coahuila who has crossed swords with the party’s leadership, attributes the misallocation of resources to Madrazo’s presidential ambitions.

Table 1.1 Results of Chamber of Deputy Elections, 1991–2003

Party	Votes won	%	Directly elected seats	%	Proportion- ally elected seats	%	Total seats	%	No. senators
2003 Election									
PRI + PVEM	9,334,844	36.46	160	53.7	62	31.3	222	44.8	60
PAN	7,842,862	30.64	80	26.8	71	35.9	151	30.4	46
PRD	4,520,598	17.66	55	18.4	40	20.2	95	19.2	16
PVEM	1,016,335	3.97	3	1.0	14	7.1	17	3.4	5
PT	614,851	2.40	0	0	6	3.0	6	1.2	0
Convergencia	581,683	2.27	0	0	5	2.5	5	1.0	
Others	731,050	2.86							
Null votes	957,410	3.74							
Totals	25,599,633	100.00	298	99.9	198	100.00	496	100.00	128
2000 Election									
PRI	13,734,140	36.9	132	44.0	76	38.0	208	41.6	60
PAN	14,227,340	38.3	134	44.7	71	35.5	205	41.0	46
PRD	6,954,016	18.7	24	8.0	30	15.0	54	10.8	16
PVEM	Allied w/ PAN	0.0	7	2.3	10	5.0	17	3.4	5
PT	Allied w/ PRD	0.0	2	.7	6	3.0	8	1.6	0
Others	2,297,083	6.1	1	.3	7	3.5	8	1.6	1
Totals	37,212,579	100	300	100.00	200	100.00	500	100.00	128
1997 Election									
PRI	11,311,963	39.11	165	55.00	74	37.00	239	47.80	95
PAN	7,696,197	26.61	64	21.33	57	28.50	121	24.20	25
PRD	7,436,477	25.71	70	23.33	55	27.50	125	25.00	8
PVEM	1,105,922	3.82	1	.33	14*	7.00	15	3.00	0
PT	749,231	2.59							0
Others	627,359	2.17							0
Totals	28,927,149	100.01	300	99.99	200	100.00		100.00	128
1994 Election									
PRI	16,851,082	50.20	273	91.00	27	13.5	300	60.0	95
PAN	8,664,384	25.81	20	6.67	99	49.5	119	23.8	25
PRD	5,590,391	16.65	7	2.33	64	32.0	71	14.2	8
PVEM	470,951	1.40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PT	896,426	2.67	0	0	10	5.0	10	2.0	0
Others	1,092,676	3.26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	33,565,910	99.99	300	100.00	200	100.00	500	100.00	128

* PVEM+PT Deputies

(continued)

Party	Votes won	%	Directly elected seats	%	Proportion- ally elected seats	%	Total seats	%	No. senators
1991 Election									
PRI	14,119,361	61.48	290	96.67	30	15.00	320	64.00	63
PAN	4,071,100	17.73	10	3.33	79	39.50	89	17.80	1
PRD	1,895,133	8.25	0	0	41	20.50	41	8.20	0
PVEM	Not yet formed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PT	266,247	1.16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	2,613,710	11.38	0	0	50	25.00	50	10.00	0
(Parm, PPS, PST)									
Totals	22,965,551	100.00	300	100.00	200	100.00		100.00	64

Sources: Instituto Federal Electoral, PAN Web site, *Reforma*, and Georgetown University, *Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas*, www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Mexico.

Table 1.2 PRI's Performance in PRI-governed States, 2000 and 2003

State	PRI % (2003)	Direct-election seats won in 2000			Direct-election seats won in 2003			Abstention rate 2003 %
		PRI	PAN	PRD	PRI	PAN	PRD	
Campeche*	40.09	2	0	0	1	1	0	37.7
Chihuahua*	47.35	3	6	0	7	2	0	64.9
Coahuila	45.25	3	4	0	6	1	0	66.8
Colima	39.67	1	1	0	1	1	0	44.8
Durango	44.26	3	2	0	5	0	0	62.0
Guerrero	40.97	9	0	1	6	0	4	66.6
Hidalgo	46.25	7	0	0	7	0	0	61.4
México*	35.26	11	22	3	17	13	6	63.3
Oaxaca	44.49	10	1	0	11	0	0	60.9
Puebla	44.26	9	6	0	10	5	0	62.1
Quintana Roo	37.71	1	1	0	2	0	0	66.4
SLP*	37.87	4	3	0	3	4	0	55.0
Sinaloa	50.86	7	0	1	7	1	0	59.5
Sonora*	39.83	3	4	0	4	3	0	47.5
Tabasco	48.16	4	0	2	6	0	0	58.7
Tamaulipas	48.61	5	3	0	6	2	0	59.7
Veracruz	45.67	14	7	2	14	9	0	57.1
Total	43.33	96	60	9	113	42	10	58.5

Source: IFE and "Decisión 2003/Nuevo Mapa Político," *Reforma*, July 9, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

*Denotes states in which the PRI formed an alliance with the PVEM (Four of these states—Campeche, Chihuahua, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora—held gubernatorial contests).

Exit surveys found certain traits associated with PRI voters: male, 30 to 49 years of age, interested in politics, urban dweller, professional, and public-sector employee. In view of this shift of middle-class voters from the PAN in 2000 to the revolutionary party this year, the PRI would have done even better had more of its traditional constituents—notably, peasants and workers—cast ballots on July 6.

As anticipated, it ran well ahead of the PAN among blue-collar workers (see table 1.3).⁷

Table 1.3 Groups that Voted for the PRI and PAN, 2000 and 2003

Group (and % of sample)	2000		2003	
	Voted PRI (%)	Voted PAN (%)	Voted PRI (%)	Voted PAN (%)
All voters	39	37	32	37
Men (52%)	42	32	32	38
Women (48%)	39	40	32	36
Age 39–49 (48%)	40	35	31	39
Urban residents	46	30	32	36
Middle-class urban	55	24	48	25
Working-class urban	40	33	30	37
Attended university (16%)	50	24	38	24
Professionals (5.9%)	49	27	30	36
Public-sector professionals (1.5%)	45	32	23	44
Expressed "Much Interest" in campaigns (28%)	45	33	31	38
Decided for whom to vote on Election Day (10%)	40	34	29	34
Decided for whom to vote before campaign (57%)	40	38	32	41
Independents (28%)	46	21	28	30
Voted for Fox in 2000 (42%)	84	5	58	14
Catholics	42	36	34	37

Source: Alejandro Moreno, "El viraje de las urnas," *Reforma*, July 13, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

The PVEM not only held on to the 17 seats that it boasted going into the election, but it showed its continuing appeal in middle-class urban and suburban districts. This fact highlights Fox's error in refusing to propitiate the Greens after they had formed part of his successful coalition in 2000. The rise in the PRI's percentage of ballots captured in 2003 compared with three years ago—and the concomitant decline in the PAN's share—springs mainly from the PVEM's switch of allegiance. Without this shift, the PRI's and PAN's slice of the electoral pie remained virtually unchanged.

The president's media blitz aside, the PAN suffered a major setback in the races for the Chamber of Deputies. Rather than build on its base of more than 200 seats, Fox' party wound up losing 54 seats. While it will begin the 2003 legislative session with more deputies (151) than it had six years earlier (121), its decreased numbers mean that the chief executive's initiatives will prosper only if they attract support from the PRI and/or the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The PAN held on to most of its base in the Bajío and in the North, while registering gains in Campeche, a PRI stronghold. Like the PRI, the PAN fared better in states where it held the governorship (see table 1.4).

⁷ Alejandro Moreno, "El viraje de las urnas," *Reforma*, July 21, 2003, www.reforma.com.

Table 1.4 PAN's Performance in PAN-governed States, 2000 and 2003

State	2000	2003	Difference
Aguascalientes	44.78%	42.31%	-2.47%
Baja California	42.31	41.68	-0.63
Guanajuato	48.50	43.43	-5.07
Jalisco	42.83	39.06	-3.77
Morelos	38.49	29.02	9.47
Nayarit	23.65	23.92	+0.27
Nuevo León	41.45	35.80	-5.35
Querétaro	42.60	42.99	+0.39
Yucatán	38.94	43.00	+4.06
Average	40.39	37.91	-3.10

Source: "Primer balance de resultados de la elección del 6 de julio," analysis by National Action Party, July 11, 2003.

The PAN endured shutouts in 10 states, most of which have PRI or PRD governors and abound in low-income rural inhabitants: Baja California Sur, Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas. To a lesser extent, National Action also lost ground in Colima, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, and Veracruz. Compared with those who voted for the PRI, individuals who voted for the PAN tended to be younger, better educated, Fox voters in 2000, and members of the urban middle class.⁸ Still, the PAN slipped in large cities, as discussed in chapter 4. In the aftermath of its debacle, the PAN revised its structure, creating four "super-secretaries" (government action, campaigns, strategic planning, and social communications) to prepare for the 2004 elections in which citizens in 14 states will go to the polls.⁹

Of the three major parties, the leftist-nationalist PRD achieved the most dramatic legislative gains, as its number of deputies shot up from 54 to 95. A major element in the PRD's success was that—unlike in 2000—it did not have to share seats with small-party allies (the Workers Party/PT, the Nationalist Society/PSN, the Social Alliance/PAS, and the Convergencia (CPPN). Despite its recent surge in the number of lawmakers, however, the PRD fell far short of the 125 seats it captured in 1997, when voters punished President Ernesto Zedillo's government for the 1994–1996 recession. The PRD, which trounced opponents in Mexico City (27 deputies), found its support outside the capital limited to several states where the party controls the statehouse—namely, Baja California Sur (2 deputies), Tlaxcala (1), and Zacatecas (5). In addition, the PRD picked up seats in Mexico state (6), Guerrero (4), and Guanajuato (1). Much to its leaders' chagrin, the party proved unable to win a single seat in 24 states, which lie throughout the length and breadth of the country. Indeed, it fell more than 2 points below the 20 percent threshold that Rosario Robles Berlanga pledged to obtain or else step down from her post as party president.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Alejandro Torres, "Reestructuran al CEN panista," *El Universal*, August 24, 2003, www.el-universal.com/.

Complementing the “Big Three” parties are the “Small Three” or *chiquillada* that retained their registrations. These are the PVEM and the PT, which selectively allied with the PRI, and Partido de Convergencia por la Democracia (CPPN) or Convergencia, which—like the PT—concentrated its resources in “winnable” districts. For instance, the PT keyed on Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas, while the Convergencia zeroed in on Veracruz, which gave rise to one-quarter of its national vote.¹⁰

Pre-election surveys (table 1.5) and exit polls (table 1.6) proved reasonably accurate—with Consulta, Paramétrica, and Reforma earning the highest marks.

Generalizations

Several generalizations flowed from the outcome:

First, the vertiginous rate of absenteeism combined with the record level of ballot spoilage reflected citizen discontent with the ability of President Fox and the major political parties to accomplish the change that was trumpeted in 2000.

Second, although Fox retained robust public approval, he was unable to parlay his personal popularity into votes for the PAN. As a result, the PAN behaved more like an opposition party than one whose stalwarts occupied the presidency—this characteristic originated in part from Fox's coolness toward his party until recently, and in part from the disdain toward the president shown by Senator Diego “El Jefe” Fernández de Cevallos and other members of the PAN's traditional or “doctrinaire” wing.

Third, major groups that had voted for the PAN three years ago—particularly, professionals, public employees, urban residents, independents, and politically attentive citizens—switched to the PRI this year. These shifts betokened the PAN's inability to consolidate the base that gave rise to its 2000 victory.

Fourth, at first blush the above-cited shifts appeared to corroborate findings that voters supported “divided government” by a 48 to 39 percent ratio—with the legislative branch controlled by one party and the executive by another. This may be the case, but it seems unlikely that citizens who hurriedly answered exit polls apprehended that they were endorsing the political deadlock and drift that has afflicted their nation since the last half (1997-2000) of Zedillo's term. The response may be explained by the mounting hostility of voters to political elites, whether in the Los Pinos presidential palace or in the San Lázaro legislative chamber. Further contradicting the divided-government thesis is political scientist Alejandro Poiré's discovery that voters at the district level gave near majorities (47.48 percent) to a single party, and the winning party averaged a 15.63 percent advantage over its nearest competitor.¹¹

¹⁰ Berrueto, “Desdén Ciudadano,” p. 14

¹¹ Alejandro Poiré, “Congreso: ¿un mandato sin mayorías,” *Reforma*, July 20, 2003, www.reforma.com.

Table 1.5 Results of Pre-Electoral Polls (June), Chamber of Deputy Elections

Party	Official Results	Alducín	Arcop	Mitofskyf (Televisa)	Demotecnia	Gea-Isa (Channel 40)	Paramétrica	Reforma	El Universal
PAN	30.64	36	41	33	36	39	34	33.0	36
PRI+	36.47	35	35	36	36	32	37	38.0	35
PVEM									
PRD	17.66	19	18	21	21	20	20	19.0	19
PT	2.40	2	0	0	2	0	0	2.0	3
PVEM	3.97	4	5	0	5	5	5	4.5	3
Convergencia	2.27	2	0	0	0	0	2	1.5	1
Others	2.76	2	1	10	4	0	2	2	3

Source: Francisco Abundis, "El tino de las encuestas," *Voz y Voto* 125–126 (July–August 2003): 24.

Table 1.6 Results of Exit Surveys, Chamber of Deputy Elections

Party	Official Results	Alducín	Arcop	Bimsa	Mitofskyf (Televisa)	Gea-Isa (Channel 40)	Paramétrica	Reforma	Mendoza Blanca y A (TV Azteca)
PAN	30.64	30.8	32.0	32.0	30.0	32.0	32.0	31.0	32.5
PRI+	36.42	35.0	37.0	36.0	34.0	37.0	36.0	39.5	37.1
PVEM									
PRD	17.66	20.0	19.0	19.0	19.6	19.0	20.0	18.0	19.8
PT	2.40	3.2	2.1	2.1	2.5	3.0	2.0	2.6	2.5
PVEM	3.97	8.2	6.5	6.5	8.0	5.0	6.0	3.5	5.8
Convergencia	2.27	0	2.1	2.1	3.0	2.0	1.0	2.7	0
PSN	.27	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.1	0
PAS	.70						0.9	0.5	0
MP	.91	0	0	0	0	0	0.8	1.1	0
PLM	.41	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0.3	0
FC	.47	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.7	0

Source: Francisco Abundis, "El tino de las encuestas," *Voz y Voto* 125–126 (July–August 2003): 23; these results do not take into account votes that were either voided or cast for unregistered candidates.

Fifth, the leaders of small parties found that their organizations were endangered species unless they allied with a major party (PVEM, PT) and/or devised a shrewd electoral strategy (Convergencia/CPPN).

Sixth, the tsunami of political advertisements that swept the country may have helped provide some information about candidates and their platforms, but it also contributed to a belief by 50 percent or more of the electorate that the campaigns were "boring, aggressive, and useless."¹² The multimillion-dollar war of spots

¹² Investigación Grupo Reforma, "Critican ciudadanos campañas políticas," *Reforma*, July 17, 2003, www.reforma.com.

proved irrelevant for most Mexicans because of a “kind of divorce” between citizens and a political leadership. After all, ousting the PRI in favor of the change-mongering Fox had not improved their lives. Gobernación Secretary Santiago Creel Miranda denied the existence of a political stalemate, but “in so doing reinforce[d] the fact that such a paralysis exists.”¹³

Seventh, another breach was obvious between the “red circle” (the media’s talking heads and other opinion leaders concentrated in the Federal District) and the “green circle” (average people throughout the country). For example, while the red circle continuously, extensively, and feverishly excoriated the funneling of money from the state oil monopoly via the Oil Workers Union to the PRI’s 2000 presidential nominee, this much-ballyhooed “Pemexgate” (and the heavy fine imposed on the PRI) had no discernable impact on voters. Rather than being punished in mid-2003, the PRI scored a victory.¹⁴

Finally, the \$1 billion cost of the recent campaigns suggested that the IFE, the president, congress, and state legislatures should act to (1) reduce the length of campaigns, (2) curb the amount of money disbursed to political parties, (3) require small parties to return unused assets to the IFE once they lose their registrations, (4) reduce the number of legislative seats, and (5) carry out other reforms addressed in chapter 6.

¹³ Professor Oscar Aguilar Asencio, quoted in electronic mail to author,” July 28, 2003.

¹⁴ For this point, I am also indebted to Professor Aguilar Asencio.

Chapter 2

Fox's Possible Legislative Strategies

President Fox can pursue several different strategies (or combinations of these strategies) in his relations with the 59th Congress that began work on September 1, 2003, after Fox delivered his “state of the nation” address.

1. *Business as usual*: This approach entails the chief executive’s continuing to barnstorm the country as if he were still campaigning for Los Pinos, while making frequent trips abroad. He would continue to mend fences with Washington in hopes that President Bush, who will visit Mexico in early 2004, could ameliorate the country’s problems by backing both a comprehensive immigration accord and modifications to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As in the last two-and-a-half years, Fox would make desultory efforts to attract support for his ever-changing legislative priorities. When his initiatives ran into a legislative buzz saw, he would (1) attempt to mobilize public support through public speeches and television and radio spots, (2) accuse his opponents of acting irresponsibly, (3) blame the media for criticism of his behavior, and (4) privately say that he had already fulfilled his mission by removing the PRI from the presidency. After all, on the eve of the mid-2003 balloting, he claimed to have made “no errors” since taking office; after the election, he shrugged off the results, saying: “I wasn’t a candidate.”¹ Furthermore, in addressing PAN deputies-elect after his July 6 shellacking, he optimistically (or naively) said with all the verve of a motivational speaker: “If we add the strong position that we have in the Senate, the enthusiastic and energetic position that we now have in the Chamber of Deputies...and add the Executive and work together, we have much more capability than our opponents possess.”²

Fox’s lack of accomplishments may account for the renewed media interest in former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), who—despite being forced into voluntary exile in 1995 in the wake of scandals, alleged corrupt practices, and economic mismanagement—was a no-nonsense, take-charge chief executive who revised the nation’s economic strategy, reordered relations with the Roman Catholic Church, launched the Solidarity antipoverty program, jailed the notorious boss of the Oil Workers Union, allowed the PAN to assume

¹ The “*ningún error*” comment was reported in Camilo José Ramos, “Fox celebra triunfo sobre PRI pero enfrenta posible castigo electoral en México,” *Agence France Presse*, July 2, 2003, www.afp.com/.

² Quoted in Rosa Elvira Vargas, Georgina Saldierna, and Mariana Chávez, “Fox se reasume panista y pide unidad a la bancada,” *La Jornada*, August 1, 2003, www.jornada.unam.mx/.

governorships, strengthened the IFE, propelled Mexico into NAFTA, and recorded other major achievements.³

A “business as usual” strategy would not only diminish Fox’s image; it would ensure his party’s loss of the presidency in 2006.

2. *Court the Left*: A second option would be to make common cause with the Left. After all, an alliance of the PAN Deputies (153) with their PRD (95), PT (6), and Convergencia (5) counterparts would yield an absolute majority in the lower house. (See table 2.1 at the end of the chapter for a listing of the key players in the Congress.) Fox could even bring several PRD leaders into his cabinet, as he proposed doing in 2000.⁴ He did, however, name Alejandro Gertz Manero Secretary of Public Safety. Although hostile to electricity, hydrocarbon, and labor reforms, the Left could throw its weight behind social programs that lavished additional resources on health care, education, low-income housing, and job creation.

Fox might find a useful ally in Mexico City’s mayor, presidential aspirant López Obrador, who—after bashing the chief executive in 2001—has more often than not extended the olive branch. The central government, which is participating with the D.F. and the private sector in rehabilitating the capital’s historic center, has even committed to locating the Foreign Affairs Ministry building in this zone. The quid pro quo for the populist mayor’s assistance to Fox would be a bigger slice of the federal budget for the capital.

Working with the PRD would constitute the political version of *The Perils of Pauline*. For starters, “leftist unity” is an oxymoron under the best of circumstances. The August 2003 resignation of party president Rosario Robles has produced even greater fragmentation. With a half-dozen PRD notables eager to toss their hats in the 2006 presidential race, the likelihood of attracting cohesive PRD support for Fox’s initiatives is zero to nil. In addition, the selection of hardliner Pablo Gómez Alvarez as the PRD’s coordinator in the Chamber of Deputies bodes ill for that party’s cozying up to a budget-balancing “neoliberal” government. If, however, a miracle were to occur and the PRD marched in lockstep, many *panistas*—especially members of the doctrinaire wing—would refuse to cooperate with the PRD. As one observer noted: “That toad would be too huge, horny, and sour for PAN traditionalists to swallow.” Even if such a coalition were to crystallize, it would not enact the fiscal, energy, and labor reforms deemed crucial by many observers. Finally, any legislation springing from a PAN-PRD accord would come a cropper in the Senate where the PRI (60)

³ For the elaboration of this point, see Denise Dresser, “¿El regreso del rey?,” *Proceso*, August 3, 2003, www.proceso.com.mx/.

⁴ The president-elect offered to name three party activists to cabinet posts: party president Amalia García Medina (Social Development), outgoing Mexico City mayor Rosario Robles Berlanga (Comptroller), and Alejandro Encinas (Environment). The PRI rejected his proposal; see, “Gobierno Izquierda Rechaza Oferta de Fox de Integrarse en Nuevo Gobierno,” Spanish Newswire Service, November 15, 2000, <http://efe.com/>.

and the Greens (5) command 65 votes and the PAN and the PRD only 62. Fox's conciliatory speech toward the PRI accompanied by inviting two *panista* notables into his cabinet in early September makes any move to court the Left a purely hypothetical option.

3. *Go with the Red, White, and Green*: During his first two-and-a-half years in office, Fox vacillated on whether to declare an all-out war on the PRI for past corruption or extend the olive branch to his still-powerful foes. At times, he appeared to extend the olive branch; on other occasions, he condemned such PRI chicanery as "Pemexgate"—the funneling of millions of dollars from the state oil monopoly, via the Oil Workers Union, to the PRI's 2000 presidential campaign. Such an on-again, off-again approach contributed to the PRI's hostility toward the administration's legislative initiatives.

After suffering a setback on July 6, the president moved to improve his relations with Congress and the PRI. He called for cooperation in his State of the Nation address on September 1, 2003. At the same time, Fox reshuffled his cabinet, which was partly recruited by headhunters, placing politically adroit *panistas* at the head of the Ministry of Energy (former party president and legislative leader Felipe Calderón Hinojosa) and the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (former Jalisco governor Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez). The appointments of Calderón and Cárdenas also brought greater coherence to Fox's entourage, whose members have often feuded in public rather than engage in teamwork. The names of the new secretaries immediately appeared on the list of potential PAN presidential candidates along with those of Gobernación secretary Santiago Creel Miranda and coordinator of deputies Francisco Barrio Terrazas.

In addition, Fox made changes in Los Pinos. He accepted the resignation of Francisco Ortiz Ortiz, who was the architect of the administration's reliance on the mass media to communicate with the public rather than engaging in old-fashioned bargaining with opposition parties. Just when the president had begun to play the political game, his former legal adviser and current chamber president, PAN deputy Juan de Dios Castro, proposed eliminating the legislative immunity of a PRI senator and officer in the Oil Workers Union because of the latter's presumed participation in Pemexgate. The surprising move outraged PRI officials, who immediately flew to their ally's defense and made it clear that ousting the shady senator would imperil bipartisan cooperation. PAN coordinator Barrio finally got the message and participated in a covert scheme to kill Dios Castro's initiative.

Such a breakdown in communication between Los Pinos and conservative PAN deputies enhances the importance of Elba Esther Gordillo, the immensely rich and powerful chief of the teachers' union and a Fox ally. Gordillo, who also serves as the PRI's secretary general, became coordinator of the party's 222 deputies. Her presence in this post encouraged the president to believe that he might be able to strike a deal with the PRI.

Gordillo's adversaries blasted her as a "collaborationist" on the eve of her free-spending, bitterly fought battle against Manlio Fabio Beltrones for the

leadership position. Later, she excoriated her detractors as “Stalinists” and threatened to resign if brickbats continued to fly her way. Nevertheless, the cunning Beltrones managed to get himself elected leader of the party’s 126 “Popular Sector” legislators, who—combined with the 60-plus “Peasant Sector” lawmakers—will have an important voice in crafting the party’s agenda.⁵ Gordillo, who raised hackles over her refusal to step down as the party’s secretary general upon assuming the legislative post, sought to propitiate her troops by handing out new laptops to all *priista* deputies. Such largess notwithstanding, she will excite disgruntlement within her delegation if she appears to be Fox’s handmaiden.

At an August 12 conclave in Los Pinos, Fox called on PAN officials to “close ranks” to advance their legislative agenda. Such exhortations may raise morale, but the president will have a better chance of attaining his legislative goals by allowing the PRI to draft and introduce key bills. In fact, he and PAN coordinator Barrio seem well-disposed to acquiesce in Gordillo’s and party president Madrazo’s packaging vital measures in red, white, and green—the PRI’s colors. In the 2000–2003 period, the PRI (208) and PAN (205) had virtually the same number of seats in the lower house. Not only were PRI leaders seething at having lost the presidency (considered their birthright); they bristled at the likelihood that Fox and the PAN would claim credit for any measures that passed. The revolutionary party’s 69-seat advantage over the PAN ensures to the PRI bragging rights for any legislative achievements. The big debate within the party, however, is whether to promote moderate reforms that would assist the PRI if it recaptures Los Pinos in 2006 or to practice PRD-like intransigence in order to completely discredit Fox’s administration. Further complicating the situation is the animus between Gordillo and Madrazo, both of whom would seek greater power.

What bills might be passed? The PRI recoils at the idea of extending the value-added tax (IVA) to food and medicine. This was clear in the immediate and sharply negative outcry elicited by Deputy-elect Francisco Suárez Dávila’s proposal to eliminate the zero rate on these items in favor of selected exemptions.⁶ Also verboten are measures that even hint at privatizing state-owned oil and electricity companies. Closing loopholes in the tax code and enacting incremental changes in existing energy and labor legislation might prosper, although an issue such as the legalization of casinos could overshadow more important initiatives.

If Gordillo rolls up her sleeves and works with the president on ambitious reforms, she will have to convince 100 or so of her colleagues to vote with the PAN to attain a majority. How many PRI deputies will actually break ranks remains to be seen. Betraying the official party position on key matters could complicate—if not end—the political careers of apostates. Should Fox and

⁵ The Labor Sector has only 13 deputies: 5 from the Confederation of Mexican Workers or CTM, 6 from other Labor Congress (CT) affiliates, and 2 external legislators.

⁶ Alicia Díaz, “Rechaza en senado propuesta hacendaria,” *Reforma*, July 30, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx/.

Gordillo prevail in the lower house, their initiatives must evade a veritable guillotine in the Senate, where veteran politician Manuel Bartlett Díaz is salivating at the thought of decapitating Fox's measures, especially those relating to the electricity sector. Even though Madrazo has pledged to support reformist legislation in this area, he still must contend with the extremely proud Bartlett, whose public service will probably end when he leaves the Senate in three years. He wants to be remembered as the protector of Mexico's national patrimony, *not* as the government secretary who masterminded Carlos Salinas's shadowy 1988 presidential victory. In addition, Bartlett argues that opening the energy field and other vital sectors to international investors will place the already-weakened Mexican state at the mercy of powerful multinational interests. Only a concerted effort by major players—the president, his cabinet, Gordillo, Madrazo, the PAN leadership, big-state governors, mayors, the private sector, and segments of the media—can overcome the formidable obstacles posed by Bartlett et al. in the upper chamber. In late October, momentum was building in favor of modifications in laws affecting the generation and sales of electricity within the context of continued government control of this vital sector. Fox would be wasting his time by proposing sweeping constitutional amendments, which require a two-thirds vote by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate followed by ratification by a majority of Mexico's 31 states (and the DF). The fate of Fox's program rests with Gordillo and other PRI leaders. Thus Fox, Barrio, and Calderón have extolled the benefits of a PAN-PRI-government common front in the fall 2003 congressional session. Such cooperation would have been more likely if Fox had attempted it immediately after winning the presidency, but better late than never if the legislative stalemate is to be broken. The need for a heart valve operation on October 22 required Barrio to leave the Chamber of Deputies for five weeks, removing from the legislative scene a *panista* who was anathema to many PRI leaders.

Table 2.1 Key Players in the 59th Congress (2003–2006)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
PRI			
Elba Esther Gordillo Morales (Born Feb. 6, 1945, Comitán, Chia.).	Coordinator of Deputies (Defeated Beltrones Rivera 124 to 92 for this post).	Fox, SNTE Teachers' Union; big-state governors; loyalists in Ministry of Education and ISSSTE; Carlos Slim and other powerful entrepreneurs; she has a skilled chief of staff, Miguel Angel Jiménez; among her key operators are deputies Roberto Campa Cifrián, Homero Díaz Rodríguez, Francisco Rojas Gutiérrez, Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, Wintilo Vega Murillo, Miguel Angel Yunes Linares, and Tomás Ruiz González.	Serve as a link between Fox and the PRI; convince 100 PRI and small-party deputies to back one or more major reforms; enhance even more her enormous power to the point that she could be the "kingmaker" in 2006 and in years to come.
Roberto Madrazo Pintado (Born July 30, 1952, D.F.).	Party President.	Scores of deputies, especially those whom he selected to run for proportionally elected seats; Southeast governors; party bureaucracy.	Change party's image from corrupt obstructionist to modern innovator; prevent being eclipsed by Gordillo; promote presidential candidacy.
Manlio Fabio Beltrones Rivera (Born Aug. 30, 1952, Villa Juárez, Son.).	Veteran politician who has legislative experience as well as having been Sonora's governor; leader of the 126-member Popular Sector deputies.	Madrazo, old-line deputies; the Popular Sector, which he headed; governors; and supporters of former presidential candidate Francisco Labastida.	Promote the PRI's interests so they will also advance Madrazo's presidential ambitions. Looks forward to holding other elective offices.
Carlos Jiménez Macías (Born May 1, 1950, San Luis Potosí).	Veteran politician, having served twice as senator and once before as federal deputy.	The Popular Sector; a key Madrazo operator along with Salvador Sánchez Vázquez (B.C.), Miguel Angel Yunes Linares (Veracruz), Angel Augusto Buendía Tirado (Tabasco), Sami David David (Chiapas),	Promote the PRI's interests so they will also advance Madrazo's presidential ambitions. Would like to be governor of San Luis Potosí.

(continued)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
		and María Esther Scherman Leaña (Jalisco/D.F.).	
Roberto Campa Cifrián (Born Jan. 11, 1957, D.F.).	Skilled, effective low-keyed negotiator.	Gordillo's top political operator, who also enjoys close ties to Sen. Enrique Jackson.	Interlocutor with PRI and PAN leadership.
Fernando Elías Calles Alvarez (Born 1940, Hermosillo, Son.).	Veteran politician who has served in Congress and in high-level posts in the PRI and in the Education and Gobernación ministries.	One of Gordillo's key political operators along with Enrique Burgos García (Querétaro), Francisco Rojas Gutiérrez (D.F.), Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas (Puebla), and Sonia Rincón Chanona (Chiapas).	Assist Gordillo.
Emilio Chuayffet Chemor (Born Oct. 3, 1951, D.F.).	Veteran politician who has legislative experience as well as having been secretary of Gobernación and governor of Mexico state.	Gov. Montiel and Mexico state deputies.	Discreetly obstruct reforms deemed "anti-nationalist."
Tomás Ruiz González (Born March 23, 1963, D.F.).	Strong background in finance and economics landed him a seat on the Budget and Public Accounts Committee.	Gordillo; respected for technocratic skills, but also boasts political experience; ally of Bank of Mexico head Guillermo Ortiz Martínez.	Possible major role in crafting reform legislation; pursuing PRI nomination for governorship of Veracruz.
Francisco Suárez Dávila (Born April 20, 1943, D.F.).	Former undersecretary of Finance; strong background in finance and economics helped him win a seat on the Budget and Public Accounts Committee, but his call for revising the IVA may have prevented his obtaining a chairmanship.	Gordillo.	Possible major role in crafting reform legislation; suffered backlash from fellow <i>priistas</i> when he advocated a change in the IVA on food and medicine.

(continued)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
Manuel Bartlett Díaz (Born Feb. 23, 1938, Puebla, Pue.).	Former cabinet secretary (Gobernación and Education) and former governor of Puebla.	Dinosaurs.	Block bills backed by Fox, including electricity, hydrocarbon, and tax reforms.
Enrique Jackson Ramírez (Born Dec. 24, 1945, Los Mochis, Sin.).	Coordinator of senators.	A general without an army; must practice conciliation among his colleagues.	Advance moderate reforms to show that he is " <i>presidenciable</i> ."
PAN			
Francisco Barrio Terrazas (Born Nov. 25, 1950, Chihuahua, Chih).	Coordinator of deputies.	Fox: party's "Northern Barbarian" wing.	Form alliances with other parties—especially the PRI--to promote Fox's agenda. On the one hand, boasts experiences in cutting deals with Salinas; on the other hand, viewed as anathema by many PRI stalwarts because of his perceived "persecution" of the their party via "Pemexgate."
Germán Martínez Cázares (Born June 20, 1967, Morelia, Mich.).	Previous service as deputy, party representative to IFE, and (currently) director-general of the PAN think-tank, Fundación Rafael Preciado.	Calderón's right-hand man.	Promote Calderón's agenda.

(continued)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
Gabriela Ruiz del Rincón (Born May 7, 1956, Guadalajara, Jal.).	PAN treasurer since 1995; knowledgeable in budget matters.	Niece of the late presidential candidate Manuel Clouthier del Rincón, who attracted modern businessmen like Fox to the PAN.	Protect the PAN's finances.
Juan de Dios Castro Lozano (Born March 25, 1942, Torreón, Coah.).	Veteran politician who has served five times in Congress; a first-rate legal scholar.	Although a <i>panista</i> since 1963, served as adviser to Fox; bridge between Northern Barbarian and "doctrinaire" wings of the party; accentuated tensions between PAN and PRI when, during the first week of the current session, he unsuccessfully sought to strip a PRI senator of his legislative immunity.	
Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa (Born Aug. 18, 1962, Morelia, Mich.).	Secretary of Energy.	Twice served in Chamber of Deputies, where he enjoys respect not only from his PAN colleagues but from opposition legislators; he is overcoming an ideological bias against working with the PRI.	Advance as ambitious an energy reform as possible.
Margarita Zavala Gómez del Campo (Born July 25, 1967).	Experienced politician and lawyer; served in ALDF and as adviser for the "Women's Project" on Fox transition team; and wife of Energy Secretary Felipe Calderón Hinojosa.	Although from party's doctrinaire wing, she is quite progressive.	Will seek to advance PAN's interests.
Juan Molinar Horcasitas (Born Dec. 18, 1955, Chihuahua, Chih.).	Academic background with extensive experience in IFE.	Fox and Medina.	Will focus on political and economic reforms.

(continued)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
Diego Fernández de Cevallos Ramírez (Born March 16, 1941, D.F.).	Coordinator of senators.	Party's doctrinaire wing; business community.	Despite feuds with Fox and senators who resent his authoritarian style, will seek to advance the PAN's interests.
Carlos Medina Plascencia (Born Aug. 14, 1955, León, Guan.).	Leader of anti-Fernández faction of PAN senators.	Fox and party's "Northern Barbarian" wing.	Promote greater collegiality in decision making among PAN senators; regain lost momentum for presidential nomination.
PRD			
Pablo Gómez Alvarez (Born Oct. 21, 1946, D.F.).	Coordinator of deputies (Defeated Amalia García 56 to 39 for this post).	Party's "ROSCA" faction that includes supporters of Rosario Robles and Cuauhtémoc and Lázaro Cárdenas; also close to the party's traditional Left.	Stridently oppose "anti-nationalist" reforms, especially in oil and electricity sectors; seek greater social spending.
René Arce Islas (Born Oct. 22, 1953, Oaxaca, Oax.).	Vice coordinator of deputies.	Mexico City politicians, as well as the party's "New Left" and "Amalios" factions.	Advance the D.F.'s interests.
José Agustín Ortiz Pinchetti (Born 1937, D.F.).	Has served as IFE councilor and as D.F. government secretary under López Obrador.	López Obrador.	Likely to concentrate on issues related to D.F., as well as reforming the relations among the branches of government and federal-state relations.
Manuel Camacho Solís (Born March 30, 1946, D.F.).	Experienced politician who--as a PRI activist--served as mayor of Mexico City, secretary of foreign relations, and in other posts.	López Obrador with whom he worked when the current mayor of Mexico City was PRD president; viewed as a newcomer and opportunist by many <i>perredistas</i> .	Reemerge as a major player in Mexican politics; one of López Obrador's chief operators in lower house; long wanted to be president of Mexico.

(continued)

Player	Position	Allies	Goals
Jesús Ortega Martínez (Born Nov. 5, 1952, Aguascalientes, Aguas.).	Coordinator of senators.	Party's "New Left" or "Chucho" faction; party's "Amalios" faction concentrated in Zacatecas.	Although more moderate, spouts a hard nationalistic line to retain the leadership of the eclectic group of PRD senators.
PVEM			
Jorge Antonio Kahwagi Macari (Born May 28, 1968, D.F.). A boxer with a law degree who should add some color to the legislative session).	Coordinator of deputies.	PRI will count on Greens for support; he has extremely close ties with Gordillo.	Use 17 deputies in his bloc to bargain in a manner that will enhance the party's interests, as well as the interests of the González family.
PT			
Alejandro González Yáñez (a.k.a. Gonzalo Yáñez) (Born Sept. 9, 1956, D.F.) Product of far left groups that organized slum dwellers in Torreón Coahuila and Durango.	Coordinator of deputies.	Old-line leftists.	Use six deputies in a manner that will enhance the party's interests.
Convergencia			
Jesús Emilio Martínez Alvarez (Born Sept. 18, 1944, Oaxaca, Oax).	Coordinator of deputies.	Party president Dante Delgado Rannuro; political groups in Oaxaca where he served as mayor of the state capital (1978-80), secretary-general of the state government (1980-85), and interim governor (1985-86); followers of Gilberto Rincón Gallardo's Social Democratic Party.	Serve as a responsible interlocutor between and among major parties—with a view to advancing (1) reasonable initiatives and (2) expanding the influence of his party, which has its sights on the 2004 gubernatorial race in Veracruz; Martínez Alvarez could seek the statehouse in Oaxaca.

Source: In addition to talking with a dozen individuals, including professors Aguilar Asencio, Jeffrey Weldon, and Luis Carlos Ugalde, the author relied on Jorge Teherán, "Figuras clave de la 59 legislatura," *El Universal*, August 4, 2003, www.el-universal.com/, and Jorge Arturo Hidalgo et al., "Impone Gordillo línea; margina a madracistas," *Reforma*, October 1, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

Chapter 3

2003 Gubernatorial Races

When the PRI presidents occupied Los Pinos, governors were subordinated to the will—even the whim—of the national leader. The chief executive selected, removed, praised, ridiculed, rewarded, and penalized governors as he saw fit. In the case of large states or those confronting serious problems, the president sought out trusted politicians with good management skills. Otherwise, he appointed party apparatchiks, generals, labor leaders, cronies, and others who would painstakingly toe the indelible line drawn in Mexico City.

A number of developments have weakened the office of the presidency: the shift from protectionism and statism to a liberal economic model; the country's vulnerability to the global economy; mounting antipathy toward authoritarian rule; the growing pluralism of society; the change from politician-control to citizen-control of elections via the IFE; the PRI's loss of Los Pinos in 2000; increased media aggressiveness; the emergence of a Congress that seeks co-responsibility with the executive in governing; and the ineffectiveness of Vicente Fox and most of his cabinet.

Perhaps things will change in the current 59th Congress. Until now, though, the legislative branch has served to block or modify the most important presidential initiatives without advancing a positive program on major issues. In addition, legislators have taken advantage of their positions to vote themselves bonuses, expand their perquisites, take fancy trips abroad, and absent themselves from sessions. The public scorns such behavior.

Governors have partly filled the leadership vacuum created by a weakened executive and an intransigent Congress. No longer in thrall to the chief executive, many state leaders have assumed the lead in attracting investment, creating jobs, building schools, improving health care facilities, constructing roads, and—in some cases—launching their own foreign policies. PRI and PRD state executives have even formed a National Governors' Conference (Conago) to magnify their clout, particularly when it comes to the allocation of federal resources to the states. In 2003, PAN governors began to attend meetings of Conago, which has organized a major conference on federal-state tax reform.

Under the PRI, presidential nominees usually came from the cabinet. The Gobernación ministry long served as a stepping-stone to Los Pinos until serious economic problems in the 1970s precipitated the selection of candidates versed in domestic and international economic matters. As will be discussed in chapter 7, governors and ex-governors dominate the list of prospective PRI, PAN, and PRD

presidential standard-bearers in 2006. Greater freedom of action combined with political opportunities has made governorships highly desirable offices. That governors manage their own budgets has also enhanced the appeal of the office, particularly because fines for violating electoral laws have reduced the resources available to the PRI, PAN, and other parties. Consequently, the six gubernatorial contests held on July 6, 2003, attracted many competent individuals, most of whom had served in the state legislature, the state bureaucracy, as mayor of a major city, or in the private sector.

Although the opposition is contesting PRI victories in Sonora and Campeche, it appears that the revolutionary party held on to three states (Campeche, Colima, Sonora), lost San Luis Potosí, and picked up Nuevo León. Meanwhile, the PAN held fast to the Querétaro statehouse, unseated the PRI in San Luis Potosí, and suffered a humiliating defeat in its bastion, Nuevo León. (See table 3.1.)

What explains this outcome? In general, when citizens approved of the job performance of the current governor, they rewarded him by selecting a member of his party to fill his seat. This appeared to have been the case in Querétaro, where PAN nominee Francisco Garrido Patrón defeated the PRI's Fernando Ortiz Arana. The incumbent, Ignacio Loyola Vera, had zoomed around the capital on a high-powered motorcycle, had been involved in a serious traffic accident, and had raised eyebrows by convincing the state legislature to elevate his salary to some \$21,000 (214,180 pesos) per month—believed to be more than was legally paid to any other elected official in the country. Many observers thought that the pay hike and the state executive's zany behavior would allow the PRI to recapture the governorship. As it turned out, the politically incorrect state executive's popularity rating exceeded 70 percent—partly because Querétaro is a relatively safe and prosperous state that has attracted investors and former residents of Mexico City and partly because Loyola had proved to be a highly respected administrator. Moreover, PAN candidate Garrido Patrón was by no means the governor's puppet. When serving as the mayor of Querétaro, he had often butted heads with Loyola, who unsuccessfully backed a loyalist for their party's nomination. Nonetheless, citizens correctly credited the mayor as having achieved the impossible—namely, the removal of street vendors from the downtown area of the state capital. This election underlined the growing importance of local issues in gubernatorial elections. PRI candidate Ortiz Arana, who had narrowly lost the governorship the last time around, had no record of achievements to match those of Loyola and Garrido Patrón. Indeed, he appeared more like a dinosaur than a dynamic leader. After his loss, he announced his retirement from politics.

In contrast to the modernizing state of Querétaro, Campeche remains a political museum piece. Governor José Antonio González Curi still practices old-style politics. This found him manipulating the party's November 24, 2002, primary to select Jorge Carlos Hurtado Valdez, a family business associate with underwhelming credentials, as the party's gubernatorial standard-bearer. Access to ample official resources notwithstanding, Hurtado Valdez won a heated election by only a 3,948-vote margin. The PAN and other parties are challenging

**Table 3.1 Preliminary Results in Six Gubernatorial Elections Held on July 6, 2003
(by state and percentage of precincts within state)**

	Campeche (100%)		Colima (100%)		Nuevo León (100%)	
PRI Candidate	Jorge Carlos Hurtado Valdez		Gustavo Alberto Vázquez Montes		José Natividad González Parás (Also backed by PVEM and Fuerza Cívica)	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	106,657	44.27	83,995	41.62	824,56	56.7
PAN Candidate	Juan Carlos del Río González		Enrique Michel Ruiz		Mauricio Fernández Garza	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	93,850	38.96	69,180	34.28	491,973	33.8
PRD Candidate	Alvaro Arceo Corcuera (Also backed by México Posible)		Jesús Orozco Alfaro		Roberto Benavides González	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	8,865	3.68	32,626	16.16	14,934	1.0
Minor-party Candidates	Layda Elena Sansores (Convergencia)		PT, ADC, PSN, México Posible, and Fuerza Ciudadana		PT, PAS, PSN, and México Posible	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	31,536	13.09	12,027	5.96	80,881	5.6
Nullified Votes	N.A.		4,009		42,989	
Total Votes	240,908 (valid votes)		201,837		1,455,344	
% Abstentions	37.7%		44.8%		46.5%	
	Querétaro (100%)		San Luis Potosí (100%)		Sonora (100%)	
PRI Candidate	Fernando Ortiz Arana		Luis García Julián (Also backed by PVEM and PSN)		Eduardo Bours Castelo (Also backed by PVEM)	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	205,690	42.0	242,578	37.64	372,465	46.44
PAN Candidate	Francisco Garrido Patrón		Marcelo de los Santos Fraga		Ramón Corral Avila	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	223,784	45.70	275,942	42.82	364,544	45.45
PRD Candidate	Celia Maya García (Also backed by México Posible)		Elías Dip Ramé (Also backed by PT, PAS, and Convergencia)		Jesús Zambrano (Also backed by PAS and México Posible)	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	32,473	6.63	96,870	15.03	51,447	6.41
Minor-party Candidates	PT, PSN, PAS, Fuerza Ciudadana, and Convergencia		Gonzalo Andrade Reyes (Conciencia Popular)		PT, PSN, and Fuerza Ciudadana	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
	16,053	3.28	9,747	1.51	13,621	1.67
Nullified Votes	11,651		19,252		N.A.	
Total Votes	489,651		644,389		802,077	
% Abstentions	43.0%		55.01%		47.5%	

Source: IFE, the electoral institutes of several states, and the newspapers *La Reforma*, *El Imparcial*, and *La Jornada*.

the outcome on the grounds that a “Green Wave” of PRI activists intimidated voters and that the state executive meddled egregiously in the campaign. Even as he exuded support for President Fox, González Curi brushed off such criticism as an “excess of passion” that spilled over from the congressional contests.¹ Still, the governor enjoyed widespread approval largely because of his productive ties with the business community. As a result, he managed to handpick his successor.

Different situations prevailed in San Luis Potosí and Nuevo León, where voters punished incumbents by rejecting their parties’ nominees. San Luis Potosí’s unpopular governor, Fernando Silva Nieto—a Machiavellian leader and one-time private secretary to former PRI mayor of Mexico City and now PRD deputy Manuel Camacho Solís—weighed in to select the PRI standard-bearer. Just 15 days before the party’s primary, Silva Nieto joined ex-governor Horacio Sánchez Unzueta (1993–1997) and tycoon Miguel Valladares García in delivering the nomination to Luis García Julián. Such heavy-handedness incited anti-Silva Nieto demonstrations, which found several PRI officials chaining themselves to the entrance of the party headquarters. Amid this folderol, Deputy Elías Dip Ramé, a prosperous businessman, bolted the PRI to become the standard-bearer of the PRD, the PT, the PAS, and Convergencia. For its part, the PAN chose Marcelo de los Santos Fraga, a one-time national soccer star who had distinguished himself as mayor of San Luis Potosí. De los Santos had almost won the statehouse six years earlier, and benefited from the state’s growing industrialization, urbanization, and job opportunities. Thanks to Silva Nieto’s missteps, the PRI’s disarray, and the penetration of the PAN or *empanización* of the region, voters selected de los Santos to lead their state for the next six years.

Meanwhile, in Nuevo León, Governor Fernando Canales Clariond, who left office to enter Fox’s cabinet in January, had presided over an administration marred by inefficiency, scandals, and a surge in narcotics-related executions. Although Canales Clariond enjoyed a relatively high approval rating, a leading banker castigated his lack of “social sensitivity” and impersonal management style. “The PAN lost overwhelmingly in Nuevo León because the people are disillusioned with business-style governments,” stated Othón Ruiz, director-general of Grupo Financiero Banorte.²

Much to the dismay of the powerful Monterrey Group, the PAN selected Mauricio Fernández Garza as its gubernatorial competitor. Many entrepreneurs knew Fernández Garza personally, and cringed at the thought of a pro-Castro advocate of marijuana legalization taking the reins of one of the nation’s most dynamic states. Thus, Nuevo León’s power elite cast its lot with José Natividad González Parás, a longtime politician who had continued to campaign since losing the 1997 governor’s race to Canales Clariond. González Parás ran in tandem with the PRI’s mayoral candidate, Senator Ricardo Canavati Tafich, himself a well-to-

¹ Quoted in Arturo Zárate Vite, “Hubo exceso de pasión electoral: González Curi,” *El Universal*, July 11, 2003, www.el-universal.com/.

² Quoted in Anabel Hernández, “Culpan a Fox y Canales de ‘paliza’ al PAN en Nuevo León,” *El Universal*, August 1, 2003, www.el-universal.com/.

do businessman. Not only did González Parás defeat the hapless Fernández Garza by 23 percentage points, but his victory in this PAN stronghold vaulted him onto the list of possible PRI presidential candidates. He offers a relatively “new face” on the national scene, enjoys close ties to the redoubtable Elba Esther Gordillo, and can serve as a link between the Monterrey Group and his party. Needless to say, his prospects will rise or fall with the quality of his administration.

The PRI also captured the governorships of Colima and Sonora.³ Both states had relatively popular—but not outstanding—PRI incumbents, which may have contributed to the success of their party's nominees.

Ten states will elect governors in 2004. Among these is Veracruz, where the alignment of forces—a divided PRI, a competent PAN contender, and a popular outsider (Dante Delgado Rannauro)—could serve as a harbinger of the 2006 presidential contest. The names and party affiliations of possible candidates in next year's state elections are given in table 3.2.

³ On October 29, Mexico's highest electoral court voided the victory of PRI candidate Gustavo Vázquez Montes as governor of Colima. This decision sprang from the intervention of the incumbent governor and other PRI state officials in the campaign.

Table 3.2 Possible Gubernatorial Candidates in 2004

State	Registration	Election Day	Inauguration Day
Aguascalientes	June 15–30	September 5	December 1, 2004
Incumbent	Felipe González González—PAN (born Aug. 1, 1947, Aguascalientes, Aguas.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Fernando Gómez Esparza (born Aug. 21, 1953, Aguascalientes, Aguas.); 2. Ex-deputy Oscar González Rodríguez (born Sept. 13, 1951); and 3. Ex-senator Oscar López Velarde (born Dec. 4, 1952, Aguascalientes, Aguas.). 		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aguascalientes mayor Ricardo Magdaleno Rodríguez (born Sept. 24, 1957, Aguascalientes, Aguas.); 2. former Aguascalientes mayor Luis Armando Reynosa (born Aug. 15, 1957, Aguascalientes, Aguas.—received bouquets and brickbats for bringing the major-league soccer team Atlante to the state); 3. Sen. Alfredo Martín Reyes Velásquez (born Dec. 15, 1953, León, Gto.); and 4. Ex-deputy candidate Miguel Angel Ochoa Sánchez (born May 5, 1955, D.F.—close to Gov. González). <p>Comment: The state constitution requires that governors be born in Aguascalientes. Unless this fundamental law is amended by change-averse local legislators, neither Sen. Reyes Velásquez nor Ochoa Sánchez will be able to run; Aguascalientes has become a PAN bastion.</p>		
PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Jesús Ortega Martínez (born Nov. 5, 1952, Aguascalientes, Aguas.); 2. former local deputy Antonio Ortega Valdivia; and 3. ex deputy Manuel González Díaz de León (born Feb. 14, 1948, Aguascalientes, Aguas.). <p>Comment: Given the weakness of the PRD in this state, Sen. Ortega's brother may serve as the party's sacrificial lamb.</p>		
Other	None		
Chihuahua	May 1-15	July 4	October 4, 2004
Incumbent	Patricio Martínez García—PRI (born March 17, 1948, Chihuahua, Chih.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy José Reyes Baeza Terrazas (born Sept. 20, 1961, Delicias, Chih.—good mayor of Chihuahua, nephew of ex-Gov. Fernando Baeza Meléndez (1986-1992), backed by Gordillo, and leading in early polls); and 2. State PRI leader and local deputy Víctor Emilio Anchondo Paredes (born Jan. 22, 1956, Matchí, Chih.—Compadre and associate of Gov. Martínez; however, the governor became upset with Anchondo for allegedly exceeding his authority when the latter ran the government during Martínez's lengthy convalescence from a bullet wound). <p>Comment: Ex-senator and old-fashioned dinosaur Artemio Iglesias Miramontes, who lost the PRI nomination in a primary to Martínez in 1998, may be the best person to mediate between the party's factions to produce a unity candidate; Reyes Baeza Terrazas is clearly the man to beat for the nomination.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Javier Corral Jurado (born Aug. 2, 1966, Ciudad Juárez, Chih.); 2. Sen. Sergio César Jáuregui Robles (born Oct. 6, 1961, Chihuahua, Chih.); and 3. Sen. Jeffrey Max Jones Jones (born Oct. 6, 1961, Chihuahua, Chih.). <p>Comment: With the decision of Public Function/Secodam secretary Eduardo Romero Ramos not to seek the governorship, Corral is virtually assured the nomination—unless a backlash against politicians generates support for a business candidate like Samuel Gustavo Kalish Valdez, president of the Fundación del Empresario in the state (born May 23, 1942, Chihuahua, Chih.).</p>		
PRD	None		
Other	None		

Durango	March 15-30	July 4	September 15, 2004
Incumbent	Angel Sergio Guerrero Mier--PRI (born Aug. 18, 1935, Durango, Dur.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-senator Samuel Aguilar Solís (born June 17, 1956, San Juan de Guadalupe. Dur.); 2. Sen. Ismael Hernández Deras (born Feb. 20, 1964, Cd. de Mezquital, Dur.); 3. Sen. Adrián Alanís Quiñones (born March 5, 1949, Durango, Dur.); 4. Former Gómez Palacio mayor and deputy Carlos Antonio Herrera Araluce (born around 1932); and 5. Durango mayor José Rojas Aispuro Torres (born Oct. 16, 1961, Las Trancas, Dur.). <p>Comment: Aguilar Solís could emerge as the nominee if Madrazo and the dinosauric former governor Maximiliano Silerio Esparza (1992-98), who detests incumbent Mier, can forge an agreement. In an early October Fisher poll, Aguilar Solís (16.3%) led the large field of candidates; meanwhile, immediately after being sworn in as a federal deputy, Herrera Araluce resigned to launch his gubernatorial campaign.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fox's secretary of tourism Rodolfo Elizondo Torres (born July 18, 1946, Durango, Dur.); 2. State legislator María Rosario Castro Lozano (born Nov. 22, 1957, Torreón, Coahuila—and the PAN gubernatorial candidate in 1998); 3. Sen. Rómulo de Jesús Campuzano González (born Jan. 8, 1957, Durango, Dur.); and 4. Ex-deputy Andrés Galván Rivas (born Aug. 29, 1960, Canatlán, Dur.). <p>Comment: Although a skilled politician, Elizondo appears inclined to remain the D.F. in view of the PRI's sweep of Durango in the mid-2003 election; even though Elizondo and Deputy Juan Castro Lozana—Rosario Castro's brother—have had their differences, the PAN will unify behind its nominee.</p>		
PRD	Comment: The PRD is so weak in the state that it will attempt to forge an alliance with other parties.		
Other	None		
Oaxaca	April 1-15	August 1	November 1, 2004
Incumbent	José Nelson Murat Casab-PRI (born Oct. 18, 1949, Ixtepec, Oax.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Ulises Ernesto Ruiz Ortiz (born April 9, 1958, Chalcatongo, Oax.); 2. State legislature leader Juan Ramón Díaz Pimentel (born Oct. 16, 1951, Oaxaca, Oax.); and 3. Deputy Lino Celaya Luria (born Sept. 23, 1949--candidate of CNC leader Heladio Ramírez López, who has openly fought with Madrazo). <p>Comment: Thanks to his closeness to both Madrazo and the authoritarian Murat, Ruiz Ortiz is the overwhelming favorite.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-deputy Pablo de Jesús Arnaud Carreño (born Jan. 8, 1947, Oaxaca, Oax.); and 2. Deputy Luis Andrés Esteva Melchor (born Aug. 26, 1951, Oaxaca, Oax.). <p>Comment: Esteva Melchor is unlikely to leave Congress to run for governor; the PAN could back a single candidate in concert with the PRD, PT, and Convergencia.</p>		
PRD	Ex-senator Héctor Sánchez López (born Aug. 27, 1950, Juchitán de Zaragoza, Oax.).		
Other	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy and ex-PRI leader Jesús Emilio Martínez Alvarez (born Sept. 18, 1944, Oaxaca, Oax.); and 2. Mayor of Oaxaca city Gabino Cué Monteagudo (born Feb. 23, 1966, Oaxaca, Oax.). <p>Comment: Cué, an ex-PRI leader, has good ties to ex-governors Heladio Ramírez and Diodoro Carrasco; Cué served as undersecretary of Gobernación under Carrasco, who supports him; Cué and Carrasco are acerbic foes of Gov. Murat; however Martínez Alvarez, who served as interim governor --1985-86-- has the better chance of landing the nomination of Convergencia inasmuch as he heads this party's faction in the Chamber of Deputies.</p>		

Puebla	August 22-28	November 14	February 1, 2005
Incumbent	Melquiades Morales Flores—PRI (born June 24, 1942, Santa Catarina los Reyes, Pue.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy and ex-state finance secretary Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas (born June 30, 1968, Puebla, Pue.); 2. Sen. Germán Sierra Sánchez (born Sept. 27, 1956—In senate race, he won the state but lost the capital); 3. Supreme Court president Guillermo Pacheco Pulido born Feb. 8, 1933, Puebla, Pue.); 4. Ex-mayor of Puebla Mario Marín Torres (born June 28, 1955, Nativitas Cuautempan, Pue.); 5. State legislator Víctor Manuel Giorgana (born Aug. 8, 1957, Huauchinango, Pue.); and 6. Banobras director and ex-deputy José Luis Flores Hernández (born Jan. 7, 1950, Cuetzlan, Pue.—although close to ex-governor Manuel Bartlett, unlikely to run). <p>Comment:</p> <p>Pacheco Pulido would be a good unity candidate; however, the cosmopolitan, well-connected Moreno Valle Rosas is close to Gordillo, as well as the rumored favorite of Gov. Morales Flores.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Antonio Francisco Fraile García (born Sept. 19, 1948, Huajuapán de León, Oax. --Close to Fox); 2. Puebla mayor Luis Paredes Moctezuma (born Oct. 14, 1951, Tehuacán, Pue.—founder of far-right FUAS); 3. DIF director Ana Teresa Aranda Orozco (born Jan. 26, 1954, León, Gto.); 4. Goberación undersecretary Humberto Aguilar Coronado (born March 25, 1963, Poza Rica, Ver.—close to Creel but has his hands full serving as liaison to Congress). <p>Comment:</p> <p>Aranda, a strong leader who ran unsuccessfully in 1998, will only make the race again if there is a filtering process such as public-opinion polls to prevent the state committee from choosing the nominee. She is also at odds with Marta Sahagún. Meanwhile, the local party has criticized Paredes for beginning his “pre-campaign” before party rules permit.</p>		
PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy Luis Miguel Jerónimo Barbosa Huerta (born 1959, Tehuacán, Pue.); and 2. Ex-deputy Rosa Márquez Cabrera (born Aug. 22, 1952, Puebla, Pue.). <p>Comment:</p> <p>The weakness of the potential PRD nominees may lead the party to line up behind an external candidate.</p>		
Other	U. of Puebla rector Enrique Doger Guerrero (born Aug. 19, 1957, Puebla, Pue.—if he fails to obtain the PRI’s nomination, he might run as the candidate of another party).		
Sinaloa	July 1-31	November 7	January 1, 2005
Incumbent	Juan S. Millán Lizárraga—PRI (born June 14, 1943, El Rosario, Sin.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. State legislative leader Jesús Alberto Aguilar Padilla born Feb. 24, 1952, Cosalá, Sin.); 2. Ex-senator and longtime CNC leader Víctor M. Gandarilla Carrasco (born Nov. 20, 1944, Culiacán, Sin.); 3. Deputy Abraham Velázquez Iribe (born March 17, 1953, El Caimancito, Novolato, Sin.); 4. Culiacán mayor Enrique “Chuquiqui” Hernández Chávez (born Jan. 7, 1944, Cosalá, Sin.); and 5. Deputy Guadalupe de Jesús Vizcarra Calderón (born March 17, 1960, Culiacán, Sin.—extremely prosperous cattle rancher and president of the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario). <p>Comment:</p> <p>Labastida’s man in 1998 was the wealthy Lauro Díaz Castro, a senator who recently died from lung cancer; the extremely popular Millán--whom Labastida and Díaz Castro opposed five years ago—will dominate the selection process. Aguilar Padilla and Velázquez are especially close allies of the governor, who is playing his cards close to his vest; the CTM, which has no other prospects for a governorship in 2004 favors Aguilar Padilla; the CNC leans toward Gandarilla.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-mayor of Mazatlán and Deputy Alejandro Higuera Osuna (born Feb. 17, 1963, Mazatlán, Sin.); 2. Ex-mayor of Rosario Sadol Osorio Salcido (born March 17, 1940, Cosalá, Sin.); and 3. Newspaper owner Manuel J. Clouthier Carrillo (born Aug. 24, 1960, Culiacán, Sin.). <p>Comment:</p> <p>In view of recent loss, the PAN will probably look for new blood; Higuera, who enjoys strong grassroots’ support, has yet to gain the thumbs up from the party’s conservative state committee; Clouthier is the son of the late Manuel J. Clouthier, a PAN legend who ran for president in 1988.</p>		

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PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy Gregorio Germán Urias (born Dec. 29, 1955, El Fuerte, Sin.); 2. PRD secretary of elections Juan Nicasio Guerra Ochoa (born Nov. 26, 1954, Culiacán, Sin.); and 3. State legislator José Antonio Ríos Rojo (born Feb. 16, 1954, Culiacán, Sin.).
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Other	<p>Leyva mayor Saúl Rubio Ayala (born April 20, 1957).</p> <p><i>Comment:</i></p> <p>Although elected mayor on the PAN ticket, Rubio Ayala could form an alliance with elements of the PAN, PRD, Convergencia, and PT. Another possible coalition candidate in this strongly PRI state is longtime PRI activist and former Education Secretary José Angel Pescador Osuna (born 1945, Mazatlán, Sin.).</p>
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Tamaulipas	July 10-20	October 3	January 1, 2005
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Incumbent	Tomás Jesús Tomás Yarrington Ruvalcaba—PRI (born March 7, 1957, Reynosa, Tam.).		
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PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Oscar Luebbert Gutiérrez (born Dec. 24, 1958, Reynosa, Tam.); 2. Deputy (2003-06) Homero Díaz Rodríguez (born April 12, 1959, Cd. Victoria, Tam.); 3. Deputy Baltasar Hinojosa Ochoa (born Sept. 15, 1963, Matamoros, Tam.); 4. State legislator and ex-PRI state president Enrique Cárdenas Del Avellano (born Sept. 4, 1957, Matamoros, Tam.); 5. Ex-mayor of Tampico and ex-state party leader Alvaro Garza Cantú (born March 21, 1944, Reynosa, Tam.); 6. Cd. Victoria mayor Eugenio Javier Hernández Flores (born Oct. 17, 1959, Cd. Victoria, Tam.); and 7. Sen. Laura Alicia Garza Galindo (born Nov. 27, 1947, Ciudad Victoria, Tam.). <p><i>Comment:</i></p> <p>Tamaulipas has four key areas: Matamoros, Tampico/Cd. Madero, Cd. Victoria, and Nuevo Laredo. Leaders in Matamoros, the home of Yarrington and his predecessor Manuel Cavazos Lerma (1992-98), would like to retain the governorship, which bodes well for Deputy Baltazar Hinojosa, who is close to Yarrington, and for Cárdenas Del Avellano; nevertheless, a late September Fisher poll found Luebbert (17.8%) leading a large field.</p>		
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PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy and ex-mayor of Tampico Diego Alonso Hinojosa Aguerrevere (born Dec. 2, 1945, D.F.—honest, hardworking businessman who has a short fuse); 2. Sen. Gustavo Adolfo Cárdenas Gutiérrez (born Jan. 25, 1958, Matamoros, Tam); 3. Sen. Lydia Madero García (born July 21, 1950, Monterrey, N.L.); and 4. Deputy Francisco García Cabeza de Vaca (born Sept. 17, 1967, Reynosa, Tam.). <p><i>Comment:</i></p> <p>PAN insiders insist that Sen. Madero García and Deputy-elect García Cabeza de Vaca have no chance of winning; Sen. Cárdenas, considered the frontrunner, has drawn attacks from Hinojosa and the state party committee.</p>		
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PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cd. Madero mayor and ex-deputy Joaquín Antonio Hernández Correa (born April 28, 1957, Cd. Madero, Tam.); 2. Ex-Cd. Madero mayor Juan Manuel Hernández Correa; and 3. Ex-deputy Carlos Antonio Heredia Zubieta (born in April 2, 1956, Tampico, Tam.). <p><i>Comment:</i></p> <p>The articulate, extremely intelligent Heredia, who now advises Michoacán Gov. Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, is the only PRD prospect with a chance of winning; his problem will be getting the nomination on terms that allow him to control his campaign. Joaquín Antonio and Juan Manuel Hernández are sons of the infamous “moral leader” of the extremely corrupt Petroleum Workers Union.</p>		
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Other	None		
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Tlaxcala	June 27-July 12	November 14	January 15, 2005
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Incumbent	Alfonso Sánchez Anaya—PRD (born Jan. 23, 1941, Apizaco, Tlax.).		
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PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. Mariano González Zarur (born April 3, 1949, Apizaco, Tlax.); 2. Tlaxcala mayor and ex-deputy Héctor Israel Ortiz Ortiz (born July 28, 1950, Tejuapan, Oax. or San Pedro Apetatitlán, Tlax. – archives show two difference places of birth); and 3. Sen. Joaquín Cisneros Fernández (born May 25, 1941, Tlaxcala, Tlax.). <p>Comment:</p> <p>Ortiz Ortiz could emerge as an important player if PRI notable, former governor (1987-1992) Beatriz Paredes Rangel, throws her weight behind his candidacy.</p>																				
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Huamantla mayor José Alejandro Aguilar López (born April 24, 1964, Huamantla, Tlax.); and 2. Sedesol delegate Aurora Aguilar Rodríguez (born 1967, Tampico, Tam.). 																				
PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. María del Carmen Ramírez García (born March 8, 1956, Mexico state); 2. Deputy Minerva Hernández Ramos; and 3. Deputy Gelacio Montiel Fuentes (born Nov. 21, 1951, Tetla, Tlax.). <p>Comment:</p> <p>Sen. Ramírez García, who enjoys the endorsement of her husband, the governor, is known as the Mexican “Hillary.” Fearing that Ramírez García could win the governorship, PRI state legislators have proposed amending Tlaxcala’s constitution to prohibit the wife or direct descendant of the incumbent from succeeding him.</p>																				
Other	None																				
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Other	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-governor Dante Delgado Rannauro (Convergencia) (born Dec. 23, 1950, Ciudad de Alvarado, Ver.); 2. Ex-PRD deputy Arturo Reyes Herviz (born July 12, 1954, Veracruz, Ver.); and 3. Xalapa mayor Reynaldo G. Escobar Pérez (born January 22, 1950, Xalapa, Ver.). <p>Comment: Delgado was a popular interim governor (1988-92), who could be a serious contender if the PRI engages in a bloody nomination struggle and fails to unify behind its nominee; he will take many more votes from disaffected <i>priistas</i> than from the PAN candidate.</p>		
Zacatecas	April 1-30	July 4	September 7, 2004
Incumbent	Ricardo Monreal Avila—PRD (born Sept. 19, 1956, Fresnillo, Zac.).		
PRI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sen. José Eulogio Bonilla Robles (born Fresnillo, Zac.); 2. Deputy Víctor Infante González (born Nov. 9, 1959, Zacatecas, Zac.); 3. Ex-deputy Josefina Hinojosa Herrera; and 4. PRI oficial and former Miss Zacatecas, Volga del Rio. <p>Comment: The allies of Senator and former governor Genaro Borrego Estrada (1986-92) might seek to nominate Hinojosa Herrera or Volga del Rio because (1) a female candidate could serve as a counterweight to Amalia García and (2) both female <i>priistas</i> have enjoyed close ties to Gov. Monreal.</p>		
PAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-candidate for deputy and senator Sergio Gabriel Olvera Acevedo (born March 10, 1943, Jerez, Zac.); and 2. Villa de Coss mayor Francisco Javier López García (born Oct. 3, 1956, El Bordo Guadalupe, Zac.). <p>Comment: In light of Monreal's dominance over state politics, the PAN may seek to back a candidate in concert with other parties</p>		
PRD	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Deputy Amalia García Medina (born Oct. 6, 1951, Zacatecas, Zac.); 2. Sen. Raymundo Cárdenas Hernández (born Feb. 3, 1950, Villanueva, Zac.); 3. Government secretary and ex-deputy Tomás Torres Mercado (born Dec. 15, 1960); 4. Deputy Guillermo Huizar Carranza (born in Fresnillo, Zac.); 5. Deputy Arturo Nahle García (born 1961, Rio Grande, Zac); and 6. Deputy Magdalena del Socorro Núñez Monreal (born 1959, Zacatecas, Zac.). <p>Comment: Although Amalia García is the favorite within the PRD, the crafty Monreal is eager to select an ally like Torres Mercado to succeed him. In an early October Fishers poll, Torres Mercado was preferred by 17.5% of respondents compared with 11.9% for García. Meanwhile, in late October, five parties—the PRI, PAN, PT, PVEM, and Convergencia—announced that they would back a single candidate against the PRD's nominee.</p>		
Other	PT party president José Narro Céspedes (born Jan. 17, 1959, Ciudad Mante, Tam.).		

Chapter 4

Selected Local Elections

In addition to the federal and gubernatorial contests, voters in nine entities selected state legislators, mayors, and chiefs of Mexico City's 16 boroughs known as *delegaciones*. Several outcomes highlighted these contests: (1) the PRI picked up support in urban areas; (2) the PAN made inroads into rural zones; and (3) Federal District mayor López Obrador tightened his control over the city's politics.

1. PRI Gains in Urban Areas

Profiting from greater support from professionals, public-sector employees, and other middle-class voters, the PRI increased its control from 3 (Ecatepec, Culiacán, and Villahermosa) to 12 among the country's 34 municipalities with 500,000 inhabitants or more (excluding the PRD-dominated D.F.). Among the trophies on party president Madrazo's shelf are Ecatepec on the outskirts of Mexico City,¹ crime-ridden Ciudad Juárez, and Monterrey, where the party's candidate for governor of Nuevo León piled up a double-digit advantage over his ineffectual PAN opponent. The revolutionary party also recovered Chihuahua, Durango, and Saltillo (Coahuila) even as it staved off *panista* threats in Culiacán, Sinaloa, and Villahermosa, Tabasco. The latter is Madrazo's hometown. (See table 4.1.)

The PAN successfully fended off PRI challenges in Puebla, León, Tijuana, Baja California, and Guadalajara. In the last city, the PRI candidate Jorge Arana Arana unsuccessfully disputed the results that found him the loser to the PAN's Emilio González Márquez by fewer than 8,000 votes. *Priísta* leaders were particularly keen on winning León, which is the largest city in Fox's home state. They lost there—as well as in Celaya, Irapuato, and Salamanca—but found solace in outpolling the PAN in San Francisco del Rincón, the municipality that embraces the president's ranch.

2. PAN Makes Progress in Rural Areas

The PAN made notable headway in rural areas—with Campeche being its greatest success story. Several factors—the recruitment of attractive nominees, intramural PRI candidate-selection battles, endemic corruption in the state government,

¹ In fact, the election in Ecatepec took place on March 2; however, electoral authorities did not resolve the PRI-PAN dispute over the winner until mid-year.

Table 4.1 PRI and PAN Votes in Largest Municipalities (in percent)

Municipality	Population	2000 (%)		2003 (%)	
		PRI	PAN	PRI	PAN
Ecatepec**	1,644,302	39	28	32	29
Guadalajara	1,571,228	31	53	37	41
Puebla	1,440,914	29	54	31	44
León	1,287,604	34	68	34	53
Ciudad. Juárez**	1,242,859	39	49	41	36
Tijuana	1,224,602	36	50	30	43
Nezahualcóyotl	1,219,497	34 (PRD)	31	24	45 (PRD)
Zapopan	1,094,600	34	56	39	41
Monterrey**	1,042,484	38	48	51	33
Naucalpan	883,863	30	48	29	42
Acapulco	822,243	35	39 (PRD)	22	42 (PRD)
Mexicali	805,308	40	46	33	42
Culiacán*	786,951	58	30	52	23
San Luis Potosí	781,966	31	55	30	46
Chihuahua**	774,727	37	51	44	38
Guadalupe, NL **	751,561	36	52	48	37
Mérida	740,663	36	57	38	49
Morelia	734,996	31 (PRD)	37	27 (PRD)	28
Aguascalientes	733,731	31	54	37	43
Tlalnepantla	719,097	24	54	21 (PRD)	49
Querétaro	704,878	28	57	34	48
Hermosillo	691,111	30	60	36	53
Saltillo**	675,621	44	46	44	37
Toluca	656,562	36	47	34	47
Atizapán	604,379	25	53	24	45
Torreón**	586,249	35	51	43	36
Villahermosa*	566,988	33	32	44	34 (PRD)
San Nicolás de los Garza, NL**	561,528	31	58	44	43
Tlaquepaque**	562,315	36	50	39	38
Durango**	539,196	37	43	43	31
Cuautitlán	548,931	25	53	28	43
Tultitlán	511,823	31	44	29	37 (PRD)
Tuxtla Gutiérrez	534,892	23	63	26 (PVEM)	37
Irapuato	508,016	29	60	32	55

Source: "Tabla/Voto en municipios más poblados," *Reforma*, July 27, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

* Single asterisk signifies a city already held by the PRI.

** Double asterisk denotes a shift in dominance from the PAN to the PRI.

financial assistance from party loyalists in contiguous PAN-held Yucatán, and relatively low turnout by peasants—enabled the PAN to demonstrate impressive strength in a state long considered a rotten borough of the revolutionary party. Apart from this controversy, the PAN won 5 of the state's 11 municipalities, giving it control over more than half of the state's 713,000 inhabitants. (See table 4.2.) It continued its dominance in Ciudad del Carmen (the state's second-largest city) and picked up Champotón, Escárcega, Calkini, Hopelchén, and Hecelchacán. Still, the PAN lost badly in Campeche, the state capital, where Fernando Ortega

Table 4.2 Changes in Partisan Control of Municipal Governments, 2000–2003

State	No. of Municipalities 2003					No. of Municipalities 2000				
	PRI	PAN	PRD	Other	Total	PRI	PAN	PRD	Other	Total
Campeche	6	5	0	0	11	10	1	0	0	11
Colima	5	4	1	0	10	6	3	1	0	10
Guanajuato	24	14	5	3	46	28	14	4	0	46
Jalisco	61	50	8	5	124	64	50	6	4	124
Mexico state (+ PVEM)	66	24	23	11	124	69	30	21	2	122
Morelos	13	9	8	3	33	15	8	7	3	33
Nuevo León	40	9	1	1(PT)	51	35	15	1	0	51
Querétaro	11	6	1	0	18	14	4	0	0	18
Sonora	37	24	6	5	72	46	15	9	2	72
Total	263	145	53	28	365	287	140	49	20	496

Source: The results for Morelos, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora are preliminary; see "Mantiene PRI su influencia," *Reforma*, July 13, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

Bernés, the popular ex-leader of the state legislature and an up-and-coming figure, trounced Deputy Juan Cámilo Mouriño.

3. López Obrador and the PRD in Mexico City

The mid-year election dispelled any doubts about the center of PRD strength in the country (see table 4.3). Not only did López Obrador's party increase its control of Mexico City's *delegaciones* from 11 to 13; it gained an absolute majority (37 seats) in the 66-member Federal District Legislative Assembly (ALDF). These gains came at the expense of the PAN, which captured two *delegaciones* (Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo), and the PRI, which won only Milpa Alta. Local electoral authorities annulled the PAN victory in Miguel Hidalgo because the party's candidate exceeded the spending limit by \$36,000; but the PAN successfully appealed this decision. The PRI also suffered a decline from 16 to 7 deputies in its ALDF bloc. The election proved extremely costly as the 11 competing parties spent an average of \$7.00 (74 pesos) per vote—with the PRD getting the biggest bang for the peso (44.40 per vote) and the PSN (Nationalist Society Party) paying the princely sum of 460.55 pesos per vote.

The PRD landslide in Mexico City has several implications. First, López Obrador's success on July 6 demonstrated the PRI's dismal organization in the Federal District. One of Madrazo's most daunting tasks will be to revitalize his party in this capital of 8.6 million inhabitants where complaisance, weak

Table 4.3 Party Strength among ALDF Deputies and *Delegaciones*

Party	Deputies		<i>Delegaciones</i>	
	2003	2000	2000	2003
PRD	37	19	11	13
PAN	16	17	5 ¹	2 ²
PRI	7	16	0	1 (Milpa Alta) ³
PVEM	5	8	0	0
PDS	0	3	0	0
PCD	0	2	0	0
PT	0	1	0	0
Independent (elected as candidate of México Posible)	1	0	0	0
Total	66	66	16	15

Source: Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal Web site (www.asambleadf.gob.mx) and articles published in the newspapers *Reforma*, *El Universal*, and *La Jornada*; for background information on the new ALDF deputies, see Carolina Pavón, "Quién es quién en la ALDF," *Reforma*, August 18, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

Notes:

¹ Alvaro Obregón, Azcapotzalco, Cuajimalpa, Benito Juárez, and Miguel Hidalgo.

² Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo.

³ The PRI, whose structure is in tatters in the D.F., hopes to begin the rebuilding process with its new borough chief in Milpa Alta, Cuauhtémoc Martínez.

candidates, and vicious personal feuds have left the party in shambles. Second, the *pejelagarto*,² as the mayor is known, has demonstrated that he has long coattails for his loyalists, who swept to victory in *delegaciones* and the ALDF. Leticia Robles, who captured Alvaro Obregón, averred that López Obrador's support and popularity was "50 percent" of the reason she defeated a *panista* as borough leader.³ The "López Obrador Effect" will find 2004 gubernatorial candidates from the PRD (and other parties) borrowing elements of his populist agenda, which includes assistance to senior citizens, the disabled, single women who head households, poor children seeking scholarships, and small businesses. Third, the PRD has broadened the ranks of its cadres in the city now that dozens of its members boast experience heading *delegaciones* and serving in the ALDF.⁴ Fourth, during his first three years, the mayor continuously crossed swords with an opposition-dominated ALDF over budgetary, transportation, environmental, and freedom-of-information issues. When convenient, he followed the assembly's will; when inconvenient, he disregarded it. Now he can count on that body's enthusiastic support for his initiatives. (See table 4.4.)

² The *pejelagarto* is a popular fish in Tabasco, López Obrador's home state.

³ Quoted in Alejandra Bordon y Humberto Padgett, "Admiten ayuda de 'efecto AMLO,'" *Reforma*, July 10, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

⁴ Five PRD borough chiefs, who resigned their posts to run on July 6, won election to the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (René Bejarano's wife Dolores Padierna, Guadalupe Morales, and René Arce Islas) and ALDF (actress María Rojo, Guadalupe Chavira).

Table 4.4 Evaluation of Mexico City Government

	PRD	PAN	PRI	PVEM	Others	Total
Approve of López Obrador						
Disapprove	53%	22%	9%	9%	7%	88%
Received social benefits from city	5	47	26	8	14	11
Not received social benefits	49	25	11	9	6	49
	45	25	12	10	9	51
Beliefs about Public Security Conditions						
Improved	54	25	6	4	11	24
Remained the same	51	22	12	9	6	52
Worsened	33	29	16	16	6	22

Source: Reforma Group, "Avalan labor de AMLO," *Reforma*, July 27, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

René Bejarano Martínez, formerly the mayor's private secretary and a leader of the PRD's Democratic Leftist Current (CID), compiled the highest vote count of any assembly candidate. This landslide plus his ties to the mayor enabled him to cut a deal with moderates from the New Left (IN) faction that ensured his heading the PRD bloc in the Assembly. In addition to approving the *pejelagarto's* programs, the PRD majority will also squelch proposals to investigate alleged irregularities in the city's housing fund and in other municipal programs. Meanwhile, borough heads can also organize weekend parties (*pachangas*) and other events that are extremely popular with working-class families. Finally, with the backing of the ALDF and additional borough chiefs, the city will provide an even bullier pulpit for López Obrador to attract the national recognition that he will need to become a successful presidential contender in 2006.

Fox has maintained his popularity (64 percent), but appears ineffective; in contrast, López Obrador enjoys a sky-high approval rating (88 percent) and is perceived as a good leader. While the president seems increasingly dispirited, the *pejelagarto* exudes enthusiasm and self-confidence. Of course, the PRD mayor runs a city whose citizens traditionally have voted for leftist candidates; in contrast, the PAN chief executive must administer a country whose electorate is markedly more diverse. And while the *pejelagarto* can concentrate on municipal affairs, Fox has responsibility for both domestic and foreign policy. Table 4.5 highlights differences between the two men in their approach to governing, decisionmaking, and other aspects of leadership.

Table 4.5 Leadership Approaches of Fox and López Obrador: A Comparison

Element	Fox	López Obrador (AMLO)	Comment
Approach to governing	Business principles. Although a skilled vote-winner, disdains the heavy lifting of schmoozing with politicians to achieve objectives.	Political principles combined with a near-messianic belief that he is destined to govern Mexico; when convenient, has disregarded actions of ALDF.	Fox headed Coca-Cola for Mexico and Central America; AMLO, who has never worked in the private sector, cut his political teeth organizing at the grassroots' level.
Respect for rule of law	Respectful of the law and human rights.	Circumvents the law when convenient.	AMLO's approach is that of a messianic leader.
Cabinet selection	Relied on his allies from Guanajuato, headhunters, and individuals from the private sector. His inner circle consists of a small group of trusted individuals (Marta Sahagún, super-private secretary Alfonso Durazo Montañó, organizational specialist Ramón Muñoz Gutiérrez, and economist Eduardo Sojo Garza-Aldape).	Relied heavily on building a politically-astute team. His inner circle consists of a half-dozen trusted individuals, including ALDF leader René Bejarano Martínez, Official Mayor Octavio Romero Oropez, business genius Carlos Slim Helú, Government Secretary Alejandro Encinas Rodríguez, Government Undersecretary Martí Batres Guardarrama, and architect David Serur.	Preference of Fox's entourage for freelancing over teamwork has earned it the sobriquet "Montessori Cabinet."
Initial organization of Administration	Coordinators in President's Office to whom cabinet secretaries would report.	Top-down—with AMLO relying heavily on a small coterie of confidants.	Fox has abandoned the system of coordinators, which never worked.
Cabinet meetings	Few and far between.	Meets daily with Government and Security Cabinet and weekly with the other cabinets: (1) Administration and Finances, (2) Political/Social, and (3) Economic Growth	AMLO exhibits a high degree of self-discipline, which is manifest in how he manages his time and team.

(continued)

Element	Fox	López Obrador (AMLO)	Comment
Determining success of his subordinates	As in the corporate world, relies on “targets” and “goals.” Ample time to achieve their assignments.	Political criteria; removal of individuals who fail to carry out assignments successfully and in a fixed period.	Although there have been resignations, Fox seems change-averse until recently with respect to his administration. Indeed, individuals who left his entourage before Sept. 1, 2003—e.g., Rafael Rangel Sostmann (Education Coordinator), José Sarukhán Kermez (Social Development adviser), Jorge Castañeda Gutman (SRE), Leticia Navarro Ochoa (Tourism), Francisco Barrio Terrazas (Secodam), and Ernesto Ruffo Appel (Northern border czar)—did so on their own terms. The president removed neither Government Secretary Santiago Creel Miranda nor Communications and Transport Secretary Pedro Cerisola y Weber for mishandling the location of a new capital-area airport in Mexico State. In early September, Fox sought to bring more coherence to his cabinet by appointing seasoned <i>panistas</i> to the ministries of energy (Felipe Calderón) and environment (Alberto Cárdenas).
Attitude toward mistakes	Claimed to have made “no errors” during his first two-and-a-half years in office; often appeared oblivious to the shortcomings of his administration before delivering a frank—partially self-critical—State of the Nation address on Sept. 1, 2003.	Reluctantly learns from mistakes; for example, stopped attacking Fox when this confrontational strategy hurt him in the polls.	

(continued)

Element	Fox	López Obrador (AMLO)	Comment
Personal schedule	Short workdays in office; prefers to be out and about, traveling within country or abroad.	Long workdays in office; confines out-of-office activities to visiting projects or neighborhoods in D.F.	
Personal security	Substantial as befits a head of state.	Small, unobtrusive—even when visiting crime-ridden delegaciones like Iztapalapa.	
Reliance on mass media.	Heavy: via spots that tout achievements of the federal government.	Heavy: masterful at garnering free media coverage, thanks in part to early-morning press conferences known as <i>mañaneros</i> that allow him to dominate the morning news cycle throughout the country.	Fox was the darling of the media during his campaign, but now bristles at their criticism. Most beat reporters resonate to AMLO, whose Teflon wrapping seems to deflect criticism about mistakes. Some pundits have begun calling him “indestructible”—partly in jest and partly because his errors don't seem to diminish his popularity.
Relations with journalists	Adversarial: ready to blame the press for emphasizing his failures over his successes.	Congenial and accessible: interacts easily with TV, radio, and newspaper reporters who attend his morning press conferences.	
Lifestyle projected	A rugged cowboy who feels at home on his ranch, but who can establish rapport with world leaders.	A hard-working, honest, modest-living, down-to-earth guy who lives in a small dwelling and rides in a mid-sized Japanese car.	

(continued)

Element	Fox	López Obrador (AMLO)	Comment
Relations with his political party	Strained: The “doctrinaire” wing headed by Sen. Diego Fernández de Cevallos looks askance at “Northern Barbarian” business leaders who have flooded into the party since the late 1980s. Jefe Diego decries Fox as a creation of the media. The early September cabinet changes have improved Fox-party relations.	Strained: Although PRD candidates borrowed his ideas during the mid-2003 election campaign, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas wants the 2006 presidential nomination for himself or his son Lázaro.	
Relations with spouse	The peripatetic Marta Sahagún has emerged as one of the most popular figures in the country; she plays a key role as a presidential confidant, as well as the leader of the Vamos México foundation.	AMLO’s wife, Rocío Beltrán Medina, who died in January 2003, devoted herself largely to home and hearth.	
Relations with business community	Deteriorating because of Fox’s failure to demonstrate leadership, especially with respect to economic policy.	Improving because of AMLO’s convincing Carlos Slim and other entrepreneurs to become involved in various projects in the capital, including the restoration of the historic center; he has also cultivated the Jewish community. Nonetheless, many entrepreneurs resent AMLO’s strident opposition to the expensive, but crucial bank-rescue plan known as Fobaproa.	The private sector cares more about government actions that improve the business climate than it does about party affiliation.

(continued)

Element	Fox	López Obrador (AMLO)	Comment
Development of constituencies	Little effort to incorporate the one-million-member-plus "Amigos de Fox" into the PAN to expand the party's base.	Via government programs, courting (1) senior citizens, (2) the disabled, (3) single women who head households, (4) poor children seeking scholarships, (5) poor young people who seek university admission, (6) certain labor unions, and (7) small businesses.	AMLO learned about the importance of corporatist groups during his more than two decades as a PRI activist.
Foreign policy	Thrives on travel abroad; pushed for a major revision of U.S. immigration policy; successfully pursued a seat on UN Security Council.	Rejected advisers' advice that he attend Lula's inauguration in Brazil; refused to open Mexico City representational offices abroad; and his aides claim that he does not have a passport, which is not true. He recently welcomed the mayors of Bogota and Berlin to the D.F., but has yet to reciprocate their visits.	While Fox—especially when Castañeda was foreign secretary—advanced ambitious goals vis-à-vis the U.S., AMLO is an inveterate nationalist who would resist American intrusiveness and oppose American investment in Mexico's strategic sectors. The hiring of former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's high-priced consulting firm to advise on public safety matters was a stroke of genius, for it blurred his anti-capitalist, ultra-nationalist image, sent a positive message to foreign investors, and demonstrated that he was no Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's besieged president.
Vision	Since winning the presidency as the candidate of "change," he has frequently altered his priorities without articulating an over-all theme for his administration.	Emphasized that the D.F. is the "City of Hope" ("Ciudad de la Esperanza"), which may presage his becoming the "Candidate of Hope" if he seeks the presidency.	AMLO's subtle but powerful message may be that if he can revivify Mexico City's deteriorating historic zone, you can revitalize your fly-specked village in Oaxaca or even your own troubled household. ¹

¹ For this point, I am indebted to Antonio Ocaranza Fernández, an astute observer of Mexico's political system.

Chapter 5

Abstentions and Spoiled Ballots

One of the most striking features of the July 6 election was the exceptionally high abstention rate complemented by a sharp increase in spoiled ballots compared with the previous three general elections. Only slightly more than 4 out of 10 eligible voters participated in the contest to select the Chamber of Deputies (see table 5.1).

Although scholars have written scores of books and articles about turnout levels, no consensus has crystallized on why some people (and not others) take part in the most common and important act in a democracy.¹ Some analysts emphasize such legal impediments as poll taxes, residency requirements, literacy tests, registration deadlines, complicated voting systems, and the paucity or remoteness of polling places. Others advance the “strategic politician” hypothesis that elections perceived as closely contested draw citizens to the polls, often because incumbents or challengers allocate more resources to such races. A few analysts argue that a sense of “civic duty” and/or attachment to a political party determines whether individuals enter voting booths on election day. For their part, members of the “rational choice” school insist that the answer lies in whether the potential voters, based on their personal calculus, believe that the “benefits” outweigh the “costs” of casting ballots—with various academics measuring benefits and costs differently when making their cases.

Some of these theories may have relevance for Mexico. The Federal Electoral Institute has made Herculean advances in opening up the country’s electoral process. Still, a citizen must invest some time and energy in registering to vote. While polling places or *casillas* abound in cities and suburbs, they are often far apart in rural states like Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. Although a mature democratic “political culture” has yet to emerge in Mexico, public-opinion surveys show a decreasing attachment to political parties even as citizens increasingly voice cynicism toward parties and most politicians.

With respect to the strategic politician concept, the average abstention figure was lower in the six states that held gubernatorial elections (45.75 percent) than in the nation as a whole (58.32 percent).

¹ For a discussion of the pros and cons of various theories, see John H. Aldrich, “Rational Choice and Turnout,” *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (February 1993): 246–278.

Table 5.1 Directly Elected Deputies, 2000 and 2003, and Abstention Rate, 2003, State by State

State	Seats won in 2000			Seats won in 2003			Abstention Rate 2003
	PRI	PAN	PRD	PRI	PAN	PRD	
Aguascalientes	0	3	0	1	2	0	58.2
Baja California	0	6	0	0	6	0	68.1
Baja California Sur	1	0	1	0	0	2	61.7
Campeche	2	0	0	1	1	0	37.7
Chiapas	11	1	0	11	1	0	67.5
Chihuahua	3	6	0	7	2	0	64.9
Coahuila	3	4	0	6	1	0	66.8
Colima	1	1	0	1	1	0	44.8
Federal District	0	24	6	0	3	27	56.0
Durango	3	2	0	5	0	0	62.0
Guanajuato	1	14	0	2	12	1	51.0
Guerrero	9	0	1	6	0	4	66.6
Hidalgo	7	0	0	7	0	0	61.4
Jalisco	3	16	0	12	7	0	45.8
México	11	22	3	17	13	6	63.3
Michoacán	2	3	8	2	2	9	63.5
Morelos	1	3	0	2	2	0	51.6
Nayarit	3	0	0	3	0	0	62.8
Nuevo León	4	7	0	10	1	0	46.5
Oaxaca	10	1	0	11	0	0	60.9
Puebla	9	6	0	10	5	0	62.1
Querétaro	1	3	0	1	3	0	43.0
Quintana Roo	1	1	0	2	0	0	66.4
San Luis Potosí	4	3	0	3	4	0	55.0
Sinaloa	7	0	1	7	1	0	59.5
Sonora	3	4	0	4	3	0	47.5
Tabasco	4	0	2	6	0	0	58.7
Tamaulipas	5	3	0	6	2	0	59.7
Tlaxcala	3	0	0	2	0	1	66.3
Veracruz	14	7	2	14	9	0	57.1
Yucatán	3	2	0	3	2	0	51.5
Zacatecas	3	0	2	0	0	5	57.2
Total	132	142	26	162	83	55	58.2

Source: "Decisión 2003/Nuevo Mapa Político," *Reforma*, July 9, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

Such considerations aside, "efficacy" may be the factor that best explains the steep decline in turnout in mid-2003. In everyday language, this concept focuses on the perception of whether the government can resolve problems deemed salient to the person-in-the-street. When there is "low efficacy," citizens believe the government is unwilling or unable to improve their lives. As a distinguished political scientist observed:

Problems are too complex, politicians are too corrupt or incompetent, and the political system is too unwieldy to expect that the election of any single individual will make any appreciable difference, no matter how desirable the program of the preferred candidate. Perhaps this is partially a consequence of lengthening experience with divided government.²

Even though Professor Aldrich was writing about sagging involvement in American elections since 1960, he might have been addressing the situation in today's Mexico.

When researchers with Grupo Reforma inquired why respondents failed to cast ballots, the answers included not having a valid voting credential (28 percent), other commitments (17 percent), disinterest (13 percent), and lack of time (12 percent). When asked how they spent election Sunday, non-voters answered that they did household chores (60 percent), watched television (52 percent), visited family members (33 percent), attended a religious service (30 percent), went to work (27 percent), or went shopping (27 percent).³

These reasons seemed weak in view of (1) the IFE's highly acclaimed initiatives to acquaint the citizenry about the voting process, (2) the avalanche of election news and political spots, and (3) the opportunity to vote during 12 hours on a day when most people are not required to work.

When pollsters delved deeper, they discovered that half of the *abstencionistas* either believed the parties were Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee (49 percent) or they lacked full confidence in the elections (50 percent).⁴

These sentiments may reflect a growing disenchantment with the political paralysis besetting the country. Vicente Fox—candidate of the Alliance for Change or *Alianza para el Cambio*—promised that he would impel root-and-branch reforms of a political system that the PRI had controlled for seven decades. For reasons discussed elsewhere, the president has failed to make many changes and those that he has accomplished don't affect citizens' everyday lives. Sixty-four percent of the public claims to approve of the chief executive, but personal popularity is not the same as endorsing effective leadership.

The level of turnout is typically associated with income. This was true in the recent contest when middle- and upper-income voters turned out at about the same level as in 2000. However, the slice of the July 6 electoral pie composed of voters earning less than 2000 pesos (just under \$200) per month shrank from 32 percent (2000) to 23 percent (2003). In view of poor people's partisan preferences, the victory for the PRI and the defeat for the PAN would have been even greater had more low-income voters ventured to the polls.⁵

² Ibid., p. 275.

³ Grupo Reforma, "Impera disinter9s en abstencionistas," *Reforma*, July 12, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The data on participation and income appears in Grupo Reforma, "El viraje de las urnas," table 8, *Reforma*, July 28, 2003.

One hope for the future lies with the Children and Youth's Election (*Consulta Infantil y Juvenil*) that permitted youngsters aged 6 to 17 to vote on issues of concern to them. This unofficial contest, which was first held in 2000, coincided with the national election. Although several million fewer adults showed up in mid-2003 compared with the presidential showdown, the drop-off in youth participation was projected at only 10 percent.⁶

Less encouraging is that fact that nearly 1 million people who showed up at the *casillas* on July 6 submitted ballots that were nullified by voting officials. In the absence of careful research,⁷ it is only possible to say that the figure for the 2003 deputy contests (3.36 percent) eclipsed that of any year since the IFE's involvement in elections: 2000 (2.32 percent), 1997 (2.85 percent), 1994 (3.23 percent), and 1991 (2.84 percent). A medley of factors—multiple ballots, confusion over voting for alliance candidates, illiteracy, mistakes, fraud, etc.—may account for this upswing. It is also possible, however, that voters spoiled their ballots to give a kick in the derriere to Fox, members of Congress, and politicians in general. If this were the case, political elites from across the spectrum have yet another reason for engaging in productive cooperation rather than sterile confrontation in the 59th Congress.

⁶ Alhelí Lara, "Revelan participación de 90% en consulta," *Reforma*. July 10, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

⁷ The most recent article on the subject focuses on county-level voting in a U.S. presidential contest and bears little relevance to the Mexican case; see Stephen Knack and Martha Kropf, "Voided Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-Level Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 63 (August 2003): 881–897.

Chapter 6

Possible Changes in Mexico's Electoral System

Mexico has made miraculous advances in reforming its electoral system. Constitutional reforms enacted in 1989 established the Federal Code of Electoral Procedures and Institutions (COFIPE) in August 1990. COFIPE gave rise to the Federal Electoral Institute, whose powers have been expanded three times since it began functioning on October 11, 1990. A 1993 reform authorized the IFE to validate the election of federal deputies and senators and to establish maximum expenditures for campaigns for these offices. The 1994 reform increased the influence of the IFE's citizen councilors and expanded the authority of the institute at the state and district levels. The 1996 reform reinforced the IFE's autonomy and independence from the executive branch and recognized only the vote of citizen councilors in the institute's decisionmaking.

Most people have confidence in official tallies released by the Federal Electoral Institute. This conclusion springs from public-opinion polls and from the relatively small number of "second rounds" ("*segunda vueltas*") compared with contests in the 1980s and early 1990s. Second rounds involve marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, and other forms of protest against election results. Such anomalous activities led to President Carlos Salinas's removal of several governors and governors-elect.¹ Even though IFE's president José Woldenberg and his staff have provided advice to more than a dozen nations on how to improve voting procedures, there are ways in which the IFE, Congress, and state legislators could improve Mexico's system. Among these are—

1. Staggering the election of the president and eight "electoral councilors" who compose the IFE's General Council.
2. Shortening the length of campaigns by reducing the intervals between nominations and elections.
3. Reducing the funds lavished on political parties.
4. Raising the threshold (now 2 percent) for new parties to register.
5. Requiring small parties that lose their registrations to return their assets to the IFE.

¹ Ramón Aguirre Velázquez in Guanajuato (1991) and Eduardo Villaseñor Peña in Michoacán (1992), for example.

6. Stipulating that all states enact campaign-spending laws that are at least as rigorous as the laws governing federal contests.
7. Bringing states like Sonora, which vests authority over state contests in its state legislature, into conformity with IFE procedures.²
8. Regularly redistricting federal, state, and local legislative boundaries on a “one person-one vote” basis.
9. Permitting independent candidacies.
10. Providing for a runoff if no presidential candidate receives 50 percent of the vote in the first round.
11. Experimenting with the reelection of mayors, governors, and state and local legislators.
12. Reducing the number of members in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate³ as well as reducing the number of legislative committees.
13. Lengthening legislative sessions that were configured when Congress rubberstamped bills submitted by the chief executive.
14. Electing all federal deputies in single-member districts to enhance accountability to their constituents.
15. Expanding the technical, legal, and research assistance available to legislators.
16. Requiring parties to institute transparent nominating procedures.
17. Exploring the feasibility of allowing Mexicans living abroad to vote in their country of residence.
18. Bringing greater rationality to the electoral calendar, which finds gubernatorial and municipal elections spread throughout the *sexenio*—with little logic underpinning the dates.

² In Sonora, the 33-member state legislature constitutes itself as a kind of electoral college to decide the outcome of elections, although its decision can be appealed. At the time of the Bours-Corral disputed election in mid-2003, the body had 16 PRI members, 13 PAN members, and 4 PRD members. The PAN bloc, which absented itself until an electoral tribunal had reached a decision on the gubernatorial contest, only agreed to convene in mid-August.

³ Although unlikely to occur, this reform drew support from a sample of deputies-elect of the PAN (95 percent) and the PRI (48 percent); see “Encuesta/Prefieren panistas reducir el Congreso,” *Reforma*, August 1, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx. (the researchers interviewed 109 PAN members and 85 PRI members).

Chapter 7

Presidential Politics

PRI presidents' finely calibrated use of the *dedazo* or "big finger" to choose their successors limited overt campaigning by PRI presidential aspirants to approximately 10 months. Thus, for the first five years of his tenure, the incumbent possessed a powerful instrument for preserving discipline within his party's ranks. Running afoul of the chief executive ensured that you would not succeed him in Los Pinos; indeed, he might even "burn" his political career. Moreover, the quasi-official circulation of a list of a half-dozen possible candidates reinforced political control. Aspiring politicians risked wandering in the wilderness for the next six years should they offend the man who could wind up as the country's next big enchilada.

The PRI's loss of the presidency and Fox's inability to select his successor have changed the rules of the political game. As a result, with three years left in the *sexenio*, one can't swing a dead cat in Mexico City without hitting a presidential wannabe.

The PRI badly needs a figure to unite the party's disparate factions. One way to accomplish this feat would be for the eventual nominee to promise rivals and their followers that, if he or she wins the general election, they and their teams will be incorporated into the government.

The soaring costs of elections combined with the PRI's having to pay a hefty fine for its Pemexgate involvement argue for a standard-bearer who not only enjoys ties to the business community, but has the political deftness to accomplish major changes required to spur sustained economic growth. The PRI's success in the mid-2003 contests has propelled party president Madrazo to the front of the pack; however, decisive PRD gains in October 19 local elections in Madrazo's home state of Tabasco have taken some wind out of his sails. Without doubt, another strong contender will emerge from the ranks of the 16 PRI governors, several of whom are already burning up the campaign trail. As indicated in table 7.1, the coordinator of the PRI deputies, Elba Esther Gordillo Morales, acts as if she has also been bitten by the presidential bug. In the past, "*la profesora*," as she is called, seemed to aspire to becoming either party president or secretary of education. Having gotten to know Fox well, she may have reached the conclusion that she, too, could run the country. In addition, she commands the 1.2-million-member SNTE teachers' union, holds Croesus-like wealth, enjoys control over jobs and benefits through her influence in the State Workers Social Security Institute (ISSSTE) and the Education Ministry, operates her own foundation, and boasts powerful friends throughout the country. In view of her political savvy, she

may conclude that rather than make a bid for six years in Los Pinos, she will continue to amass power to act as a kingmaker in 2006 and thereafter. In this way, she could become a modern version of Fidel “Don Fidel” Velázquez, who was a powerful factor in Mexican politics for decades. To keep other players guessing, she has done nothing to spike rumors that she might head another party's ticket if the PRI's good old boys fail to give her a fair shot at the nomination. The late-August unauthorized dissemination of transcripts of 43 of her telephone calls raised hackles within the PRI inasmuch as she arrogantly demeaned Madrazo, Mexico state governor Arturo Montiel Rojas, Deputy Miguel Angel Yunes Linares, and others.¹ Of course, she could virtually guarantee her party's victory by throwing her weight behind Madrazo in 2006 in exchange for assurances that he would reciprocate in 2012. This is unlikely: she is now 58-years-old; six years is a long time; and her star may reach its zenith in the next several years if she does a good job in the Chamber of Deputies.

The fate of the PAN in 2006 depends on Fox's performance during the next three years. If he can forge an alliance with the PRI to pass several important initiatives, his party will recover some of the ground lost on July 6. Another plus for the chief executive would be a rebound in the U.S. economy, which would stimulate development in Mexico. If deadlock and drift persist, however, the PAN will return to its traditional (some say, “current”) role of opposition leader. Unless Fox shows greater adeptness, he may suffer the fate of Canales Clariond in Nuevo León: Upon leaving Monterrey to assume a cabinet post, the PAN governor received an approval rating of 7 on a 10-point scale; yet when it came to choosing his successor, the voters opted overwhelmingly for the PRI candidate, who seemed more sensitive to the needs of average people and better able to work with the Monterrey Group and other local interests.

At this point, Gobernación Secretary Santiago Creel and PAN Chamber of Deputies coordinator Francisco Barrio garner the most attention among political elites as possible PAN presidential candidates (see table 7.2). Nevertheless, Marta Sahagún eclipses both of them in terms of national name recognition and public-approval ratings and is a person who should not be underrated. In August and September, PAN big shots filled the capital's fetid air with statements that she would not be the party's nominee in three years. Sahagún herself said that she would not “seek” the presidency. Yet she continues to move around the country, dispensing computers and other items to schools, expanding her network of contacts, and making pronouncements on important issues. If late 2005 rolls around and polls show that she still commands a 20-point or 30-point advantage over Creel and Barrio, might some minds change? Another change would have to take place in the party's statutes, which stipulate that only card-carrying PAN members can select candidates. Sahagún's only chance for the nomination would be a primary or other process open to voters at large—and that's exceedingly unlikely. In view of the First Lady's active role in Los Pinos, humorists avow that

¹ “Filtran llamadas telefónicas de Gordillo,” *Reforma*, August 26, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

she is ineligible to seek the presidency inasmuch as the Constitution prohibits a person's serving twice in the nation's top office. PAN activists in Michoacán and Guanajuato have urged her to run for governor or senator from their states. Such a race would test her vote-winning skills.

Although she remains on most observers' presidential lists, Rosario Robles' fortunes plummeted with her August 2003 resignation as PRD party president amid the party's mid-year vote loss and a mountain of debt. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who popped open the trap door through which Robles fell, could affect the PRD's prospects. The party's "moral leader" regularly commutes between Mexico and Brazil. If the "Lula" phenomenon convinces him that he can also win the presidency on his fourth try, he will butt heads with his erstwhile protégé, López Obrador. Some *perredistas* insist that Cuauhtémoc may be posturing to give time for his son Lázaro, governor of Michoacán and another AdL ("Amigo de Lula"), to broaden his political base. In any case, a collision between the Cárdenas clan and López Obrador could shatter the faction-ridden PRD and spike the best chance that it has had to grab the presidential sash (table 7.3). López Obrador received a boost on October 19 when the PRD won the lion's share of the 17 mayorships and 21 directly elected legislative seats in his home state of Tabasco. The next mayor of Macuspana will be López Obrador's brother, José Ramiro.

Disappointment over Fox, the relatively unattractive list of aspirants who have expressed interest in the presidency, and disdain for the political elite have Mexico City's chattering class talking about outsiders (table 7.4). Among the individuals mentioned are former foreign secretary Jorge Castañeda, who is actively promoting his candidacy, and magnate Carlos Slim Helú, who—although involved with scores of political movers and shakers—has expressed no interest in becoming *Número Uno* in the political world to match his standing in the business sector. In addition, the name of Juan Ramón de la Fuente, rector of Mexico's National Autonomous University, comes up during coffeehouse conversations. This having been said, Mexico's next president will almost certainly emerge from the ranks of the PAN, PRD, or PRI, as suggested by public opinion polls (table 7.5).

Table 7.1 Possible PRI Presidential Candidates in 2006

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Miguel Alemán Velasco Born March 18, 1932, Veracruz, V.C.; law degree (UNAM); advanced studies at Sorbonne; senator (1991-97); president of Televisa (1985-89); governor of Veracruz (1998-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enormously wealthy; 2. Darling of the business community; 3. Experience governing a major state; and 4. Son of a former president. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Will be 74-years-old in 2006; 80 in 2012 (oldest modern president, Ruiz Cortines, was 62 when assuming office in 1952); 2. Remained on vacation in the U.S. during a major explosion in Veracruz; and 3. Not an enthusiastic campaigner. <p>Comment: Few enemies and—to break a stalemate—could present himself as a father-figure capable of bringing unity to the party. One of the longest of the long shots.</p>
<p>José Natividad González Parás Born March 30, 1949, Monterrey, N.L.; degree in law and social sciences (Autonomous U. of N.L.); M.A. in public administration (International Institute of Public Administration, France/1996); served in the federal government, including Office of the President and Ministry of Gobernación; federal deputy (1994-97), senator (2000-2003); and governor of Nuevo León (2003–).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relatively “new face” on national scene; 2. Superb organizer and fundraiser; close to “Monterrey Group” of business leaders; 3. Defeated the PAN candidate by 23 points in a <i>panista</i> bastion and enjoys good ties to both Gordillo and Madrazo; and 4. Displayed the ability to promote unity in naming a first-rate cabinet that included former opponents. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Brand new in office; 2. Faces formidable challenges in Nuevo León; and 3. Will have been in office less than a year before the campaign for the PRI nomination begins to heat up. <p>Comment: If he fails to attain the PRI nomination, he will play a major role in determining the party's candidate.</p>
<p>Elba Esther Gordillo Morales Born Feb. 6, 1945, Comitán, Chiapas; education certificate (Federal Institute of Teacher Education); de facto head of SNTE teachers' union; federal deputy (1979-82, 1985-88, 2003-); headed party's “Popular” sector (2000-2002); and party secretary general (2002-2003).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 1.2-million-member SNTE provides powerful organizational base, as do her allies in ISSSTE and the Education Ministry; 2. Politically shrewd and has access to ample funding; and 3. Numerous allies, including key governors, intellectuals, labor leaders, and President Fox. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Like most large unions, SNTE is associated with corrupt practices; 2. Close to ex-President Carlos Salinas Gortari, known as Mexico's “favorite villain,” and one of the country's most-discredited politicians; and 3. A strong woman in a country where <i>machismo</i> remains widespread. <p>Comment: More likely to be a kingmaker than to become the king (or queen). A president holds office for only six years; if her influence continues to grow, she could be a powerhouse for two decades.</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Jesús Enrique Jackson Ramírez Born Dec. 24, 1945, Los Mochis, Sinaloa; degree in public administration (UNAM); public servant in D.F., rising to secretary of government (1994); federal deputy (1997-2000); and senator (2000–present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Served the PRI in a half-dozen major posts; 2. Experience in both the D.F. and Congress; and 3. Gregarious and has become a respected leader of the PRI's 60 senators, who frequently work out their differences in caucus and vote as a bloc. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A survivor more than a strong leader; and 2. Faces the extraordinary challenge of trying to hammer out compromises between change-minded colleagues like Zacatecas senator Genaro Borrego Estrada and Puebla dinosaur Manuel Bartlett Díaz on issues like energy reform.
<p>Roberto Madrazo Pintado Born July 30, 1952, D.F.; law degree (UNAM); Tabasco party president (1988); federal deputy (1976-79, 1991-94); senator (1988-91); governor of Tabasco (1994-2000); and party president (2002-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Current PRI president and perceived frontrunner; 2. Media savvy and projects image of a strong leader; 3. Access to ample funding; and 4. Excellent organizer who has revitalized the party's organization from top to bottom and is credited with PRI gains in mid-July 2003 elections. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Presides over a faction-ridden party; 2. Known as a wheeler-dealer; 3. Controversial past that includes charges of corrupt electoral practices and spending tens of millions of dollars to win the Tabasco governorship in 1994; and 4. At odds with Gordillo over legislative leadership issues and with many key governors who resent his active role in selecting legislative candidates.
<p>Enrique Martínez y Martínez Born Nov. 10, 1948, Saltillo, Coahuila; degree in economics (ITESM); professor (Autonomous University of Coahuila and the Autonomous Agrarian University); president of several successful firms, including Grupo Empresarial Martínez and Camiones y Maquinaria de Coahuila; and governor of Coahuila (1999-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Attractive, progressive governor; 2. Good ties to the business community; and 3. Access to ample funding. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not well known nationally; 2. Openly feuded with party president Madrazo via state PRI activist Federico Berrueto; and 3. Has been accused of shady business practices in the past. <p>Comment: Possible compromise choice if there is no odds-on favorite in mid- to late-2005.</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Juan S. Millán Lizárraga Born June 14, 1943, El Rosario, Sinaloa; degree in economics (Autonomous University of Sinaloa); leader in the CTM labor movement; senator (1982-88, 1994-98), federal deputy (1991-94); PRI secretary general (1995-97); and governor of Sinaloa (1998-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recognized as one of the nation's most effective and innovative governors for having slashed kidnappings and boosted investment; 2. "Connects" well with average people; and 3. Enjoys ties to labor movement, SNTE teachers' union, the private sector with which he has promoted labor-management cooperation, sports groups, and with other governors. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. From a relatively small state; 2. Opposed by Labastida element in the party; 3. Less access to funding than many other contenders; and 4. Leaves office (and public spotlight) two years before the presidential election. <p>Comment: A long shot, who could attain the nomination if a stalemate arises, and the party turns to a competent individual who is on good terms with most PRI heavy-weights</p>
<p>Arturo Montiel Rojas Born Oct. 15, 1943, Atlacomulco, Mexico state; studied business administration and public accounting (UNAM); mayor of Naucalpan, federal deputy (1991-94); secretary of economic development (1987-88) and governor (1999-present) of Mexico state.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Has effectively governed Mexico's most powerful state—with particular success in attracting investment; 2. Access to ample funding; 3. Telegenic; and 4. Well-known abroad thanks to his numerous trips to the U.S. and Europe. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not a gifted speaker; and 2. Via state party president Isidro Pastor Medrano openly and bitterly feuded with party president Madrazo. <p>Comment: In a shrewd move, Pastor Medrano is actively recruiting political operatives so that Montiel can offer assistance to PRI candidates seeking the 10 governorships that are up for grabs in 2004.</p>
<p>Manuel Angel Nuñez Soto Born January 30, 1951, Actopan, Hidalgo; degree in economics (UNAM) and advanced study of public administration, commerce, and finance in Italy and France; served in Finance Ministry and in trade-related posts, including head of Mexican office in Canada for NAFTA negotiations (1991-93); federal deputy (1997-99); and secretary of finance (1995-97) and governor of Hidalgo (1999-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Has international experience, having served as a NAFTA negotiator in Canada; 2. Exhibits political shrewdness that complements his technocratic skills; 3. Recognized as a highly successful governor; and 4. Speaks English and frequently visits the U.S. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. From a relatively small state; 2. Not yet achieved national recognition; 3. The tragic loss of his wife in mid-2003 has slowed his campaigning; and 4. Although extremely competent, he has yet to overcome technocratic background to project the image of a strong leader. <p>Comment: A top contender and possible compromise candidate who, like Alemán, Millán, and González Parás, has relatively few enemies and is widely admired.</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
Tomás J. Yarrington Ruvalcaba Born March 7, 1957, Matamoros, Tamaulipas; degree in economics (ITESM); federal deputy (1991-94); and finance secretary (1994-98) and governor (1998-present) of Tamaulipas.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Progressive governor; 2. Well regarded by fellow state leaders; and 3. Sharp political operative. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not well known nationally; 2. On Aug. 10, 2003, the muckraking weekly magazine <i>Proceso</i> ran a cover article in which it linked him to the narco activities that have flourished in Tamaulipas during his term; and 3. Leaves office (and public spotlight) two years before the presidential election.

Table 7.2 Possible PAN Presidential Candidates in 2006

Candidate	Pros	Cons
Francisco Barrio Terrazas Born Nov. 25, 1950, Chihuahua, Chih; degree in accounting and MBA (Autonomous University of Chihuahua); regional administrator for Chihuahua state government, and for National Endowment Institute for Workers' Housing (1972-76); financial officer, National Endowment for Workers' Housing (1976-77), director, computer systems department for Chihuahua state government (1977-80); vice president (1980-81) and president (1981-83) of the Centro Patronal de Cd. Juárez (1981-83); mayor of Cd. Juárez (1983-86); candidate in fraud-ridden 1986 gubernatorial campaign; PAN state executive committee (1986-88); general director, Administración Profesional de Negocios (1987-92); PAN governor of Chihuahua (1992-98); Comptroller General in Fox cabinet (2000-2003); and coordinator of PAN federal deputies (2003-).	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Extensive, high-level public service; 2. Visible as coordinator of PAN deputies in 59th Congress (2003-present); 3. Good links to northern business community; and 4. Photogenic and speaks well. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Modest accomplishments as mayor of crime-ridden Cd. Juárez, as governor of Chihuahua, and as comptroller-general; 2. Unable to land a "big fish" as Fox's "anti-corruption czar"; 3. Although he cut deals with President Salinas when governor of Chihuahua, has antagonized PRI over "Pemexgate" scandal; 4. Appears as "Fox's candidate" for the presidency, which exacerbates tensions with the traditional "doctrinaire" wing of party; and 5. His late October operation removed him from the political stage at a crucial time.
Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa Born Aug. 18, 1962, Morelia, Michoacán; law degree from Escuela Libre de Derecho in D.F.;	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Competent, intelligent, and energetic; 2. Well-liked by party's traditionalists; and 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Temporarily lowered his public profile when serving as head of Banobras; and 2. Low-keyed campaigner.

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>M.A. in public administration (Harvard's Kennedy School); postgraduate studies (ITAM); active in PAN since 1981, serving as national youth director (1987-89), national council member (1984-present), secretary general (1993), and president (1996-99); member of ARDF (1988-91); federal deputy (1991-94); candidate for governor of Michoacán (1995); coordinator of PAN deputies (2000-2003); director of Banobras (2003); and secretary of energy (2003-present).</p>	<p>3. Will boost his prospects if he can help the president move energy legislation through Congress.</p>	<p>Comment: Even though one of the most experienced and admired <i>panistas</i>, he is only 41-years-old and can wait for a more propitious time to seek the presidency. At Banobras, he held meetings with newly elected mayors to provide them technical assistance for obtaining loans; his presidential stock will soar if he succeeds in getting a major electricity reform through Congress.</p>
<p>Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez Born 1958, Zapotlán el Grande, Jalisco; degree in electrical engineering and electronics (Tecnológico de Ciudad Guzmán), M.A. in industrial organization and Ph.D. (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid); held various positions at local and state level in the PAN; mayor of Ciudad Guzmán; governor of Jalisco (1995-2001); director of National Forestry Commission (2000-2003); and secretary of the environment and natural resources (2003 to present).</p>	<p>1. Effective vote-getter in big, important state; 2. Able governor who attracted investment to Jalisco; 3. Access to resources; 4. Connects well with average Mexicans, especially peasants with whom he headed the National Forestry Commission; and 5. Enjoys ties both with Fox and PAN conservatives.</p>	<p>1. Relatively unknown; and 2. Critics claim that he is a rightwinger. Comment: Cárdenas and Calderón were named secretaries in August 2003 both to give the cabinet more PAN members and to broaden the field of prospective presidential candidates.</p>
<p>Santiago Creel Miranda Born Dec. 11, 1954, D.F.; law degree (UNAM), M.A. (U. of Michigan), diploma in law (Georgetown U.); taught law and political science at ITAM (1980-97), where he directed legal studies and served as department chairman; private law practice; IFE political counselor (1994-96); joined PAN on May 26, 1999; narrowly lost race for mayor of D.F. (2000); and secretary of Gobernación (2000-present).</p>	<p>1. Valuable personal qualities—honesty, decency, intelligence; and 2. Service as secretary of Gobernación has provided insights into the nation's political infrastructure.</p>	<p>1. A disappointment as Fox's number-one political operative; 2. Viewed as a "newcomer" in the PAN; and 3. Lacks both a strong team and a geographic base. Comment: His liabilities aside, could be consensus candidate inasmuch as he is a solid individual who has developed ties to both major wings of his party.</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Diego Fernández de Cevallos Born March 16, 1941, D.F.; law degree (UNAM), courses in economics (Iberoamericana U.); professor at Iberoamericana U. (1964-1994); successful attorney; federal deputy (1991-94); PAN candidate for president (1994); and senator (2000 to present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strong personality; 2. Excellent debater and speaker; and 3. Access to ample campaign funds. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Openly feuds with Fox; 2. Questions remain as to why he appeared to “drop out” of the 1994 presidential race; and 3. Involved in so many business arrangements that conflicts-of-interest would emerge.
<p>Ignacio Loyola Vera Born Sept. 10, 1954, Querétaro, Querétaro; degree in agricultural engineering (ITESM); general manager of Comercial Agropecuaria de Querétaro, which sells agricultural machinery and supplies; active in Conaco and president of Coparmex (1994); vice president of the Sociedad de Ingenieros Agrónomos Parasitólogos (1993-95); and Querétaro governor (1997-2003).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Excellent governor of Querétaro; 2. Kept Querétaro in PAN column in July 6, 2003, election; and 3. Good ties to business community. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. On the party's far Right; 2. His high salary and penchant for motorcycle riding make him politically incorrect; and 3. Relatively unknown nationally. <p>Comment: Would ensure PAN's loss.</p>
<p>Carlos Medina Plascencia Born Aug. 14, 1955, León, Guanajuato; degree in chemical engineering administration and M.A. in administration (ITESM); business career, including chairman of the board and consultant to Medina, Corderos, Martin and Associations (1995-97); joined PAN (1985); city councilman (1986-87) and mayor (1989-91) of León; governor of Guanajuato (1991-95); federal deputy (1997-2000); senator (2000-present); and coordinator of PAN campaign for mid-2003 election.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Excellent interim governor of Guanajuato; and 2. Works effectively with members of other parties. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. As campaign coordinator, shares blame for party's poor showing in July 6, 2003, elections—in fact the party just abolished the coordinator's position; 2. Will suffer from Guanajuato background—unless Fox's performance improves during second half of his <i>sexenio</i>; and 3. A lackluster provincial more than a strong national politician (Guanajuato is not Mexico!). <p>Comment: His political star is declining rather than rising because of PAN's poor showing in July 6 congressional elections. Is seeking a cabinet post to improve his chances for the PAN's presidential nomination</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Marta Sahagún Jiménez de Fox Born April 10, 1953, Zamora, Michoacán; M.A. in English (Cambridge U.); English instructor at U. of LaSalle Benavente; business venture with ex-husband (selling medicine to veterinarians); coordinator of Citizens Committee for Environmental Protection (Guanajuato); secretary of advance of women (Guanajuato); candidate for mayor of Celaya (1994); Guanajuato Social Development Committee (1995-99); Fox campaign's press secretary (1999-2000); Fox administration's coordinator of social communications (2000-2001); married Fox (July 2, 2001); and established "Vamos México" foundation (2001).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. High public-approval rating; 2. Good <i>olfato político</i>; 3. Effective and energetic campaigner; 4. Enjoys visibility via her "Vamos México" foundation; and 5. Ties to affluent members of Amigos de Fox organization, as well as links to conservative Catholic organizations. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Little leadership experience; and 2. Activist woman in a country where <i>machismo</i> is widespread. <p>Comment: Should never be underestimated; she—not the president—made the first comments from <i>los Pinos</i> on the outcome of the July 6, 2003, elections. Despite saying that she would not "seek" the presidency, she has yet to make a Shermansque statement (William Tecumseh Sherman was, of course, the popular Civil War general who, when asked to seek the presidency, replied: "If nominated, I will not run; if elected, I will not serve."). Meanwhile, she continues to travel throughout the country, making pronouncements on key issues More likely to run for Congress or a statehouse than seek the presidency.</p>
<p>Josefina Eugenia Vázquez Mota Born Feb. 22, 1961, D.F.; degree in economics (Iberoamericana U.), advanced studies at Instituto Panamericano de Alta Dirección de Empresas and ITAM; adviser to Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (Concanaco) and to the Confederación Patronal de República Mexicana (Coparmex); newspaper and radio journalist; founded the Center for Integral Development Comex; headed the female secretariat of Coordinadora Ciudadana; elected federal deputy 2000; and secretary of social development (2000-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Attractive and energetic; 2. Conservative economic views enhance her attraction to the PAN's doctrinaire wing; and 3. Boasts ties to business community, especially the tourism sector. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relatively unknown; 2. Few accomplishments as leader of the Fox administration's "Microregion Project"; and 3. Member of a party whose female activists have tended to focus on moral rather than economic issues. <p>Comment: One of the longest of the long shots for PAN nomination, but could be courted by a minor party.</p>

Table 7.3 Possible PRD Presidential Candidates in 2006

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Lázaro Cárdenas Batel Born April 2, 1964, Jiquilpan, Michoacán; studied ethnohistory at the Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia (1983-87); participated in his father's 1988 and 1994 presidential campaigns; founding member of PRD (1989) and served as a national and state councilor for the party; federal deputy (1997-2000); senator (2000-02); and governor of Michoacán (2002-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Off to a good start as governor of Michoacán; 2. Assembled a competent team; 3. Access to family financial resources; and 4. Possessed of a venerable family name. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intellectual lightweight; and 2. Political success based on his family name rather than his achievements.
<p>Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solorzano Born May 1, 1934, D.F.; degree in civil engineering (UNAM); studied in France under a scholarship awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Relations; headed Mexican student protest against U.S.-backed intervention in Guatemala (1954); member of the national committee of the Movement of National Liberation (1961-68); precandidate for governor of Michoacán (1973); undersecretary for forestry and fauna, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (1976-80); PRI senator (1976-82); governor of Michoacán (1980-86); head of the breakaway "Democratic Current" within the PRI (1986-87); presidential candidate of the National Democratic Front (1988); founder (1989), president (1990), and presidential candidate of the PRD (1994 and 2000); and mayor of Mexico City (1997-99).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respected figure in Mexican politics; and 2. Perceives a leftist tide sweeping Latin America impelled by the election of Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva as president of Brazil. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Declared loser in three presidential contests—1988 (30.9%), 1994 (17.1%), and 2000 (16.6%); 2. Hasn't devoted himself to the party's organization—he's a political Banyan tree that doesn't allow anything to grow in its shadow; 3. Near-messianic belief that he has a right to be the PRD standard-bearer; and 4. Openly feuding with López Obrador and other party notables. <p>Comment: Cárdenas cannot win the presidency; if he wages a fierce battle for the nomination, he could shatter his already-fragmented party. Even if the PRD fails to nominate him, he might run as the presidential standard-bearer of the PT (a party once subsidized by Raúl Salinas). The PRI would applaud (and possibly assist) Cárdenas's entering the race—a move that would divide the leftist vote.</p>

(continued)

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Andrés Manuel López Obrador Born Nov. 1, 1953, Tepatitlán, Macuspana, Tabasco; degree in political science and public administration (UNAM); director of Instituto Indigenista de Tabasco; director of social promotion for the Instituto Nacional de Consumidores (1984); president of PRI in Tabasco; a founder of PRD; candidate for governor of Tabasco in 1988 (FDN) and 1994 (PRD); PRD national president (1996-99); and mayor of D.F. (2000-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Connects well with average citizens; 2. Extremely popular mayor of Mexico City, thanks to infrastructure projects, social programs, and reputation for hard work and honesty; 3. Used early-morning broadcasts to increase his national visibility; and 4. Projects vision of "Esperanza" or "Hope" to the masses via rehabilitation of the capital's historic center. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Has powerful enemies within his party; 2. Maintaining his 81% popularity level will be difficult in running a city deemed "ungovernable"; 3. Bankers decry his strident opposition to the bank rescue program known as Fobaproa; 4. The PRD's strength is limited to the DF and a handful of states, although pro-López Obrador committees recently formed in 15 states; and 5. Should he get elected, he would face a hostile Congress. <p>Comment: A no-holds barred contest between the mayor and the Cárdenas clan could upset López Obrador's apple cart and return the presidency to the PRI.</p>
<p>Ricardo Monreal Avila Born Sept. 19, 1960, Fresnillo, Zacatecas; law degree and doctorate in administration and constitutional law; secretary general (1991) and president (1991-92) of state PRI; alternate senator (1991); member of the PRI's National Political Council (1992-97); senator (1991-97); and, after being rejected by the PRI, ran successfully for governor with PRD backing (1998-present).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Excellent governor of Zacatecas; 2. Boasts lots of friends within the PRI, his former party; and 3. Works well with governors from PRD and other parties. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Little access to resources; 2. Relatively unknown nationally; 3. Old-line <i>perredistas</i> view him as an opportunistic PRI activist, who only joined the PRD five years ago; and 4. Only has a chance for nomination if López Obrador falters (Has promised to back AMLO if the latter is the frontrunner in mid/late 2005).
<p>Rosario Robles Berlanga Born Feb. 17, 1956, D.F.; degrees in economics and M.A. in rural development (UNAM); executive committee of STUNAM (1988-93); founding member, national councilor, and secretary of Social Movement of PRD; organized the <i>Brigadas del Sol</i> for July 6, 1997, election; interim mayor of Mexico City (1999-2000); and party president (2001-early-August 2003).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sparkling personality contributes to photogenic qualities; 2. Favorite of the "ROSCA" wing of party if neither Lázaro nor Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas throw their hats in the ring; and 3. Access to resources. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A popular interim mayor of DF, who spent public monies disproportionately on enhancing her image rather than addressing the capital's needs; 2. No solid political base; 3. Strong woman in a country where <i>machismo</i> is still widespread; and 4. Her August 2003 resignation as party president has virtually eliminated her chances for the PRD nomination.

Table 7.4 Possible Non-Major-Party Candidates for President in 2006

Candidate	Pros	Cons
<p>Jorge Castañeda Gutman Born May 24, 1953, D.F.; political science degree (Princeton) and Ph.D. (U. of Paris); professor at UNAM and at New York University; prolific writer; former member of communist party; worked in Cárdenas' 1988 and 1994 presidential campaigns; provided Fox with ideas, contacts, and a foreign policy agenda; and served as foreign secretary (2000-2003).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Excellent relations with academic/intellectual community in Mexico and abroad; 2. Extremely intelligent; 3. Access to resources; and 4. Close to Gordillo; Fox; and Marta Sahagún. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No experience as a candidate in elective politics; 2. Poor relations with the Mexican media, whom he once berated for not being able to read English; and 3. Does not suffer fools gladly and often picks fights gratuitously.
<p>Carlos Slim Helú Born Jan. 28, 1940, D.F.; son of a Lebanese migrant; at age 10, began selling snacks and beverages from a stand in front of his house; as he grew older, showed incredible business acumen; his friendship with President Carlos Salinas (1988-94) enabled him to purchase Telmex, the former state communications monopoly; Telmex is the flagship of Slim's Grupo Carso investment company, which owns CompUSA, Sanborn Hermanos, S.A., tire-manufacturer Hulera Euzkadi, and companies that produce and sell tobacco, aluminum, and copper products.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The wealthiest man in Latin America; 2. Boasts contacts across the political, economic, social, and cultural spectrum in Mexico and throughout the world; and 3. Has generously contributed to the arts, to poor peasants, and to the rehabilitation of Mexico City's historic zone, including an analysis of by Rudolph Giuliani's firm of the capital's crime problem. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Although no recluse, he prefers to work behind the scenes; 2. He has dismissed suggestions that he might run for elective office; and 3. After their experience with Fox and Gov. Canales Clariond (Nuevo León), voters may be reluctant to back another businessman.
<p>Dante Alfonso Delgado Rannauru Born Dec. 23, 1950, Ciudad de Alvarado, Ver.; law degree (U. Veracruzana); active in PRI during most of his career; Veracruz secretary of government (1983-85); federal deputy (1985-86); interim governor of Veracruz <i>Delgado</i>, (1988-92); ambassador to Italy (1993); and founded Convergencia (CPPN) in 1998.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access to financial resources; 2. A skilled campaigner; 3. A successful interim governor of Veracruz; and 4. Lots of PRI contacts. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jailed for 15 months (1997-98) on fraud charges (claimed he was a "political prisoner"); 2. Although it maintained its registration, his Convergencia party lacks a national presence; 3. Castañeda may seek the party's candidacy; and 4. If Delgado loses his bid for governor of Veracruz in 2004, he will have little hope of gaining support for a presidential race.

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Candidate	Pros	Cons
Juan Ramón de la Fuente Born Sept. 5, 1951, D.F.; medical degree (UNAM); post-graduate study in psychiatry at the Mayo Clinic; professor at U. of Minnesota; honored at home and abroad for his professional achievements; prolific author; secretary of health (1994-99); and rector of UNAM (1999-present).	1. An ideal “non-political” candidate; and 2. Well-respected and telegenic.	1. Little government experience; and 2. Lacks a strong political team to boost his candidacy. Comment: Virtually no chance that his party, the PRI, which is overflowing with ambitious politicians, would choose a university president as its nominee. De la Fuente—like Jorge Castañeda—will have a better chance of obtaining Convergencia's endorsement. Rumors abound that de la Fuente has agreed to back Castañeda and vice-versa, should either obtain a presidential nomination.

Table 7.5 Opinions about Possible Presidential Contenders

Politician	Favorable (March 2003)	Unfavorable (March 2003)	Unknown (March 2002)	Favorable (March 2002)	Unfavorable (March 2002)	Favorable (February 2001)	Unfavorable (February 2001)
Marta Sahagún	46%	12%	21%	32%	15%	31%	5%
López Obrador	46	9	25	36	15	39	8
Diego Fernández	32	15	31	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Santiago Creel	26	11	43	21	13	38	5
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas	26	20	23	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Roberto Madrazo	24	22	27	25	22	26	20
Jorge Castañeda	15	15	47	15	12	18	5
Francisco Barrio	18	10	52	25	22	26	20
Rosario Robles	27	17	32	24	19	35	10

Source: Alejandro Moreno and Roberto Gutiérrez, “Encuesta/Bajan bonos de los políticos,” *Reforma*, March 2, 2003. For the March 2003 figures, the interviewers questioned a stratified sample—urban, rural, mixed—of 1,498 adults between February 15 and 17; the survey has a +/- 2.5 percent margin of error with a 95 percent confidence level.

Chapter 8

Significance of the July 6, 2003, Elections

The mid-2003 elections had remarkable significance for the Mexican political system. *First*, the *abstencionazo* (58.2 percent)—combined with the spoilage of 957,410 ballots—represented a stinging slap in the face not just to President Fox, but also to the nation’s political elite *across the spectrum*. The people indicated that they were fed up with unfulfilled promises, legislative paralysis, fancy living by do-nothing politicians, and a peripatetic chief executive who—at least during the three years since his election—seemed incapable of setting a short list of priorities and mobilizing support to achieve them. His ineffectiveness aside, Fox remains personally popular. If he can overcome his arrogance—“I have made no mistakes in the last three years”—and avoid more fiascos like Deputy Dios de Castro’s out-of-the-blue attack on a PRI senator, he still has an outside chance of reaching out to the PRI and other opposition parties. He emphasized this strategy in a frank and conciliatory State of the Nation address, and he brought greater cohesion and political experience to the cabinet with the appointment of Calderón as energy secretary and Alberto Cárdenas as environmental secretary.

Second, the new composition of the Chamber of Deputies places the burden on the PRI to show whether it can make the shift from self-serving obstructionism to creative policymaking. In the past, the PRI depended on the chief executive to set a positive legislative agenda. Since 1997—and especially during the Fox administration—PRI legislators have given only lip service to promoting reforms in labor, electricity, natural gas, and other important sectors. If the hard-fought Gordillo-Beltrones battle for the leadership of its legislative bloc fragments and cripples the PRI, voters will hold them accountable in three years. Indeed, the major contenders for the party’s presidential nomination have a vested interest in showing that a new, “can-do” PRI has supplanted the dinosaurs who once roamed the halls of the San Lázaro legislative palace. Not only would enacting key reforms improve their party’s image; it would make it easier for one of their colleagues to govern should the PRI regain the presidency.

PRI leaders are now trying to determine whether supporting vital reforms will advance or retard their efforts to recapture Los Pinos. If the planets aligned and the lower chamber approved reformist legislation, a coalition of forces—President Fox, Madrazo, Gordillo, key cabinet members, big-state governors, media opinion-leaders, and the private sector—would have to bring pressure to bear on the dinosaur-infested Senate to act responsibly. The widest “window of opportunity” for action will be the September-December 2003 legislative session;

the next best chance will be in the spring of 2004. Most observers believe a modest electricity will be approved. Yet if no alliances crystallize by then, it will be extremely difficult to enact legislation during the remainder of Fox's term because of the political confrontations in the 10 gubernatorial elections in 2004 and the positioning of major figures for the upcoming presidential showdown.

Third, if the president and Congress fail to tackle serious social and economic problems, the voters may turn to Mexico City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2006. Although a card-carrying PRD member, the so-called *Pejelagarto* can present himself as a “Candidate of Hope.” Rather than the arid pledges of most politicians, López Obrador has delivered on promises regarding infrastructure, public works, and social programs. The last includes providing direct financial assistance to the elderly, the disabled, single women who head households, the homeless, and owners of small businesses, while lavishing scholarships on poor children and opening a Mexico City university that employs a lottery rather than examinations to admit students. The mayor's influence manifested itself in themes and slogans articulated by PRD candidates throughout the nation, most recently in the Tabasco state contests. Moreover, López Obrador enjoys a reputation for honesty, hard work, self-discipline, and a coherent team—a factor that contributes to his 80-plus percent approval rating in the Federal District. His centerpiece is the public-private restoration of the historic center of the capital, which he has christened the “City of Hope.” As political expert Antonio Ocaranza Fernández told me: “Hope is a powerful message. If the mayor can revivify crumbling downtown Mexico City, he will project the idea that peasants in Oaxaca can do the same for their village or that average Mexicans can revitalize their own households.”

Fourth, by holding primaries to select its gubernatorial candidates, the PRI chose standard-bearers linked closely to their states. Even though PRI governors in Campeche, Colima, and San Luis Potosí blatantly intervened in this nominating process, the revolutionary party's example put pressure on the PAN and the PRD to open up their nominating procedures. Indeed, PAN senators Javier Corral and Jeffrey Max Jones have convinced their party's leadership to hold a primary to select its gubernatorial candidate in Chihuahua next year—a move supported by *panista* groups in other states. According to critics, National Action has traditionally used the “*Método DC*” or *Dedazo Cúpular*—that is, the selection of candidates by the party's hierarchy.¹

Fifth, voters showed maturity on July 6. In casting (or not casting) ballots in federal contests, they signaled their discontent to big shots in Mexico City. At the state level, however, they rewarded competent governors (Querétaro's Ignacio Loyola, Campeche's González Curi) by electing successors from the incumbents' parties. Meanwhile, they punished poorly performing governors (Nuevo León's Canales Clariond, San Luis Potosí's Silva Nieto) by supporting opposition parties. The absence of a PRI president in Los Pinos complemented by Fox's inability to move his agenda forward under a divided government has elevated the

¹ F. Bartolomé, “Templo Mayor,” *Reforma*, August 1, 2003, www.reforma.com.mx.

importance of governorships. In contrast to the candidates who used to “parachute” into states a few months before an election, most parties nominated individuals who had served in state legislatures, state bureaucracies, and municipal governments or who otherwise had roots in their states. The attractiveness of governorships sparked knock-down-drag-out fights for nominations in most of the states. The higher political ante convinced several candidates to recruit top-flight political consultants from abroad.

Sixth, the conventional wisdom that Fox had won over the business community to the PAN proved false. As Professor Aguilar Asencio has observed, “The private sector emphatically prefers competence over partisanship.” Nowhere was this clearer than in Nuevo León where the redoubtable Monterrey Group rejected one of its own clan—PAN aspirant Mauricio Fernández Garza—whom many entrepreneurs liked personally but believed unqualified to head their dynamic state. As a result, the private sector threw its weight behind PRI nominee Natividad González Parás, who trounced his quixotic opponent. Charges that the PRI gubernatorial candidate in Campeche had engaged in fraudulent practices did not prevent the local private sector from backing him, largely because the retiring PRI governor had created a business-friendly environment.

Seventh, the mushrooming costs of campaigns complemented by the large fine imposed on the PRI encouraged parties to seek out affluent businessmen as candidates. For the PRI, this was especially evident in Sonora (Eduardo Bours) and Monterrey, Nuevo León (Canavati Tafich). The PAN reached into the private sector for its nominees in Campeche (Del Río González), Nuevo León (Fernández Garza), and San Luis Potosí (De los Santos). Even the PRD opted for a man with access to money in Colima (Orozco Alfaro), after the PRI spurned his bid to become its standard-bearer.

Eighth, thanks to a popular incumbent, the PRI may have won in Campeche with a “dinosauric” nominee. After all, traditional practices continue to characterize the Southeast’s political culture, much like parts of Louisiana remain a political museum piece in the United States. Yet what may have barely succeeded in Campeche in 2003 would not work in Querétaro. There, the voters emphatically turned thumbs-down on PRI veteran Fernando Ortiz Arana, who lost decisively to a much more attractive and modern PAN contender. One vestige of the traditional system prevailed nationwide—namely, the incumbent’s desire to select his successor. In some cases, he wanted to continue existing policies; in other instances, he sought to reward allies; and elsewhere, he endeavored to protect himself from future prosecution.

Ninth, leaders of the five small parties that lost their registration (México Posible, Fuerza Ciudadana, Sociedad Nacionalista, Alianza Social, and Liberal Mexicano) learned that it was tough to fight the big boys unless they entered into alliances or carefully targeted their spending. The most coherent and refreshing of the *chiquillada*—México Posible—waged an energetic, courageous, and issue-oriented campaign that accentuated human rights and drew widespread support from intellectuals. Several prominent church leaders castigated México Posible

for advocating abortion decriminalization and gay rights. In the final analysis, the hoped-for “Padre Amaro effect” either didn’t occur or backfired. This phenomenon refers to the audiences that packed theaters after several Roman Catholic bishops lambasted *El Crimen del Padre Amaro*, a 2002 film that revealed the frailties of priests. Dante Delgado Rannauro and his lieutenants in the National Convergence Political Party demonstrated how a small party could keep afloat by carefully selecting candidates and concentrating its resources in “winnable” districts.

Tenth, the PRD’s propensity for intraparty bloodbaths combined with its failure to offer credible policy choices kept the party from competing seriously for a single statehouse this year. In the past, the PRD captured the lion’s share of its governorships with ex-*priistas* (Baja California Sur, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas, Mexico City)—with the only exception being Michoacán’s Lázaro Cárdenas Batel. The strategy failed this year as *priistas* hoisting the PRD banner suffered ignominious defeats in Campeche, Colima, and San Luis Potosí. The resounding loss of Jesús Zambrano in Sonora delivered a dramatic blow to the party’s moderate “New Left” wing, which could break up—with its leaders aligning with López Obrador. Although the PRD came out of the balloting with a sharp increase in its number of deputies, it failed to compete effectively outside of Mexico City and a handful of states—Baja California Sur, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Zacatecas. The party did not win a direct-election deputy seat in 24 states. This limited base means that López Obrador or whoever runs as the party’s presidential contender in three years will have to devise appeals to voters in Central and Northern Mexico. For its part, the PAN enlarged its inroads into the former *priista* stronghold of Campeche. The mid-2003 race highlighted the *empanización* of areas of the Bajío, where the enlargement of the middle class amid urbanization and relative prosperity and safety are strengthening the PAN. This is true in Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Querétaro, and—to the north—portions of San Luis Potosí.

Eleventh, its increase in legislative seats notwithstanding, the PRI continued to lose ground nationally. Not only did it face nip-and-tuck battles with the PAN in the Southeast, but it again endured a horrendous defeat in the Mexico City area, where one-fifth of the nation’s voters live. Nevertheless, the PRI waged winning campaigns in the pro-PAN North, greatly strengthened its grassroots organization, and remained the only party with a truly national trajectory.

Twelfth, based on the number of complaints to electoral authorities, more irregularities marred the 2003 contest than in 2000. As a result, the president, Congress, state legislatures, and the Federal Electoral Institute should consider (1) curbing the length of campaigns, (2) reducing the sums of money disbursed to political parties, (3) requiring parties that lose their registrations to return assets to the IFE, (4) ensuring that states have political finance laws as rigorous as the ones governing federal elections, (5) allowing independents to seek public office, and (6) devising fair and transparent processes for accomplishing party nominations and various other reforms cited in chapter 6. No matter what legal steps are taken, the progress of democratization will occur at different rates in different regions.

Finally, the recent voting sounded the starting gun for the 2006 presidential race. Deputies-elect from the PRI (Elba Esther Gordillo) and PAN (Francisco Barrio) successfully sought to head their respective party blocs to burnish their national standing. And Gobernación Secretary Santiago Creel, Energy Secretary Felipe Calderón, and Environment Secretary Alberto Cárdenas will be judged on how effectively they can advance the president's legislative program in the new Congress. Various PRI governors—Manuel Angel Nuñez Soto (Hidalgo), Arturo Montiel Rojas (Mexico state), Tomás J. Yarrington Ruvalcaba (Tamaulipas), Juan S. Millán Lizárraga (Sinaloa), and Enrique Martínez y Martínez (Coahuila)—pointed to their party's triumphs in their states as evidence of their leadership qualities. And González Parás's landslide victory in the PAN bastion of Nuevo León immediately landed him high on the list of PRI "pre-candidates." The PAN's victory in Querétaro and the PRD's success in Zacatecas also gave a boost to the presidential hopes of the governors of these states, respectively Ignacio Loyola Vera and Ricardo Monreal Avila. Meanwhile, Roberto Madrazo gained an advantage by improving the machinery that helped the PRI hold on to four governorships, pick up the Nuevo León statehouse, and increase its number of legislative seats. Finally, Mexico City mayor López Obrador and First Lady Marta Sahagún bask in lofty name-recognition and approval ratings in national polls.

About the Author

George W. Grayson, the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, has made more than 100 research trips to Mexico since 1976. He is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; a member of the board of advisers of the *Latin American Advisor* (Inter-American Dialogue), and senior adviser on Mexican affairs for the Washington, D.C.-based Capital Insights Group. Grayson lectures regularly at the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, at the National Defense University, and at universities throughout the United States and Mexico. In addition to preparing studies for CSIS, he has written a dozen books on international affairs, including *Mexico: The Changing of the Guard* (Foreign Policy Association, 2001), *Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East* (University Press of America, 1999), and *Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism?* (Harcourt Brace, 1998). He is currently writing a book comparing the governance of Mexican president Vicente Fox with that of Mexico City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Grayson earned his Ph.D. at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and his J.D. at the College of William & Mary. He served as a member of the Virginia state legislature for 27 years and belongs to Phi Beta Kappa. <gwgray@wm.edu>

