Accidental Guerrilla

David Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).From the first page of Accidental Guerrilla it is obvious that David Kilcullen has been thinking about counterinsurgency for a very long time. The author has digested a complex set of problems and then successfully presented them in an easily accessible and lucid exploration of civil war and insurgency. Kilcullen is a former-Australian army officer with experience peacekeeping in East Timor and advising the Indonesian military in Aceh. However, to date, his most prominent position has been as an advisor on counterinsurgency to David Petraeus and Condoleezza Rice, where he was integral with the formulation and implementation of the so-called “Surge”. Last year, Kilcullen left government service and is now a consulate for Crumption Group and a fellow at the think-tank Center for a New American Security. In his latest offering, Kilcullen develops an explanation of the internal dynamics of civil wars. The theory contains two parts. First, the theory submits that there are two-levels to the current spread of insurgency. The upper level is represented by the overarching struggle of Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates. The lower level is captures the local of the conflict. That is, local people fighting over local issues. The lower level often grafts itself to the larger narrative for its own immediate micro-level reasons. The second part of the theory is the “accidental guerrilla syndrome”. This process begins by AQ establishing a base in isolated rural areas outside the government’s control. The author refers to this as infection. From these staging points AQ operatives move into neighboring areas, imposing their control and frequently marrying into local families. This is called contagion. The government then violently reacts to the spread of AQ by launching a military offensive. Kilcullen labels this as intervention. Finally, the local people see the military attack on their village, family and property and resist the government’s intervention. This solidifies the bond between the villages and the AQ, which at this stage become indistinguishable to outsiders. This stage is called rejection. Empirically, Kilcullen draws heavily upon his own personal experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq (although Chechnya, Thailand, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa are also discussed). He provides extensive and valuable micro-level insights into the dynamics of these conflicts. Overall, Accidental Guerrilla makes an important contribution to the study counterinsurgency and civil war. Yet, the text is not without its weaknesses. The theory does walkover ground that has been covered elsewhere. Over recent years there has been an upsurge in the study of the micro-dynamics of civil wars. Distinguished scholars such as Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher have long argued that civil wars are multi-layered conflicts, with local populations often mobilizing the macro-narratives of the conflict (e.g. communism, anti-colonization, or ethnicity) for their own purposes. This is not to say, however, that the book makes no contribution. The accidental guerrilla syndrome is a useful idea, albeit a little descriptive for an academic contribution. The presentation of the argument is done so skillfully and elegantly and worth reading based upon this alone. The author would justifiably counter these points by arguing that Accidental Guerrilla makes no claim to be either an academic text or specifically for popular consumption. Indeed, he excitedly notes that this is the case in the preface. However, by doing so, he makes the purpose of this book as elusive as his subject matter.