Aegis Assessment

Talk of the U.S. “scrapping” European missile defense and abandoning Eastern Europe is premature. While the Bush-era Third Site plan to place10 Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic has been nixed, the Obama administration plans to go ahead with a system based around Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor technology. Currently part of the sea-based Aegis missile defense system, manufacturer Raytheon recently announced development of a land-based counterpart. The newly unveiled system has several advantages over the previous plan, and if it goes forward as proposed in Thursday’s White House press release, it would address President Obama’s desire to “deploy techniques that are proven and cost-effective and will counter the current threat more effectively and do so sooner than the previous system.”

Among the reasons cited for the change in approach was an updated assessment of the type of threat Iran could pose. Rather than focus on a yet-to-materialize ICBM threat, Gates emphasized the greater-than-expected progress Iran has made in its short- and medium-range ballistic missile programs, and the increasing time horizon on long-range systems:

Since then (2006), two important developments have prompted a reassessment of our approach in Europe. First, a change in our intelligence community's 2006 view of the Iranian threat: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3, is developing more rapidly than previously projected. This poses an increased and more immediate threat to our forces on the European continent, as well as to our allies. On the other hand, our intelligence assessment also now assesses that the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006.

While the GBIs were touted as protection against an Iranian ICBM threat, no such threat has materialized, and estimates of Iran’s ability to develop such technology have been continuously over the horizon since the threat was warned of in the late 1990s. Only the P5 countries have ever developed ICBM capabilities, and a February ’09 CRS report on Iran’s missile program stated that any development of intermediate- or intercontinental-range missiles was “highly uncertain.”

Earlier that month, Iran launched its Omid satellite into space using a two-stage space launch vehicle, the Safir-2. Although its range was only about 155miles, the Pentagon had some concerns because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development of long-range missiles.” BUT (big but), as David Albright of ISIS told the Washington Times, the launch was not as big an accomplishment as it seems:

"The rocket is not that sophisticated," David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington think tank, told The Washington Times. "That Sputnik technology, a little metal ball that goes 'beep, beep, beep,' is not the same as a nuclear warhead or a telecommunications satellite. It's harder to send heavier objects and more sophisticated objects into space or across a continent." Mr. Albright added, "This test tells us they have not yet mastered long-range multistage rocket technology" of the kind needed to launch an advanced warhead.

EastWest Institute’s Joint Threat Assessment came to a similar conclusion, noting that the second stage of the launcher appeared “nearly optimally designed to launch a small satellite into orbit,” and that:

Fears have been expressed that the two-stage Safir SLV can serve as the prototype of a long-range Iranian ballistic missile. The Safir SLV upper stage placed a satellite weighing 27 kg into low earth orbit, but any nuclear warhead will be much heavier than that. The Safir upper stage is not likely to be suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead of roughly 1,000 kg weight because the thrust of its rocket motor may be too low and because its structure may not be strong enough to support such a heavy payload during flight.

Unlike any longer-ranged systems, Iran has made considerable progress on short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles. For the most part, its ballistic missile program has been heavily based on North Korea’s Nodong missiles, in turn based on old Soviet Scud technology. Currently, the most advanced and deployed arrow in Iran’s quiver is the Shahab-3, with a range of about 2000km. Missiles with slightly longer ranges, such as the solid-fuel Sejjil-2 are just now in testing.

The relative effectiveness of Aegis BMD versus GMD was also an important factor. Since 2002, Aegis has proved successful in 19 of 23 tests, a much higher rate than GMD’s 8 of 13. In addition to its higher success rate, Aegis is also designed to specifically target the short- and medium-range missiles that MDA Director Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly has said pose “Ninety-nine percent of the threat today.” The flexibility offered by an SM-3 based system also addressed other shortcomings of the GMD system. Even if it was directed at defending against SRBMs and MRBMs, at 10 interceptors, GMD would have been overwhelmed by even a small salvo. Furthermore, the GMD system as configured was unable to defend Turkey and southeastern Europe, the area that most vulnerable to current and projected Iranian capabilities. With plans for adding more advanced Block IIA, IB, and IIB SM-3 systems over the next decade, this new missile defense plan should evolve to cover threats from intermediate-range missiles as they arise.

Nukes of Hazard and ArmsControlWonk both have good posts up highlighting the benefits offered by the Aegis BMD.