Ambassador Oakley on Pakistan

Yesterday's event on developments in Pakistan and PCR’s new report A Perilous Course launch, featured Ambassador Robert Oakley among the distinguished panelists. Please read his informative speech below.   AMB Robert Oakley – CSIS Speech September 24, 2007 The CSIS Pakistan study is truly prescient.  All of the potential problems it foresaw in US relationships with Pakistan have come to pass, especially with the military’s overarching role in the country.  Rick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Craig Cohen and their collaborators deserve full marks.  Let us hope that policy-makers here and in Pakistan will pay close attention to their findings. The study contains a number of excellent recommendations that warrant careful review.  It also makes the key observation that despite all of our assistance, US influence is more limited than both we and the Pakistanis realize.  In looking at the future, we should keep this in mind.  We must also keep in mind that the Pakistani military is not as receptive to US persuasion and pressure as our level of support presupposes.  Many of them see the US as an erratic, fickle, fair-weather friend, who showers them with attention and largesse only when we are in times of crisis, but turns the other way once the crisis is over, leaving them alone to pick up the pieces.  I do not think this is the case today, and the study certainly argues against it.  But the Pakistanis are not convinced, particularly when some in Congress are calling for a reversion to sanctions, which have not served us well in the past.  The US, on the other hand, tends to see Pakistan as duplicitous, telling us what we want to hear, only to change course shortly after the outset as soon as the going gets tough.  That is why the study calls for a much closer US-Pakistan dialogue, starting with the army.  Such a dialogue should be undertaken as soon as the elections are over and new power structures are in place for both the civilian and military sectors of government. At present, there are too many variables for such a dialogue to be meaningful.  The Bush Administration is being forced to rethink its policy of all-out support for President Musharraf in the interests of stability and counter-terrorism.  His political blunders, the rather rapacious as well as authoritarian role of the army in Pakistani society and the continued growth of jihadi-inspired violence in many parts of the country, plus the imminent elections have precipitated a full-blown domestic political crisis.  In addition to the ongoing violence, some variables that will determine the outcome of the crisis include the following: 1) The new-found power of the Supreme Court and what it will say about the elections and other issues. 2) The burgeoning influence of civil society and the media, pressing for a fundamental redistribution of the power of the elite, civilian as well as military. 3) The political influence of the Islamists, both the mainstream parties and the more radical splinter groups, going beyond the number of seats in provincial and national parliaments, this includes their relationship with the army. 4) Attitudes toward the US and the perception of its role (i.e. the not-so-hidden-hand).  Will it continue to strongly support President Musharraf and the army, perhaps in an alliance with former Prime Minister Bhutto, or will the US take a step back from the situation and allow democracy to take its course? 5) What will President Musharraf decide? To take off his uniform or not?  Before or after elections?  Will he run for office even if the Supreme Court declares him ineligible?  Will he declare military rule in the face of strong popular opposition? 6) What will the Pakistan Army do?  The army is not necessarily unified behind its present Commander-in-Chief.  Will it continue to stand by him, even in the face of an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court or large scale popular protests?  Might the Army move to protect its own interests by making political deals that would be based upon the “retirement” of General Musharraf?  There have been recent signs of discontent and indiscipline within the army, particularly with respect to the belief it has been unwisely pushed into conflict with powerful Pashtun and Islamist forces in the border areas. Let me now, briefly, throw out a few ideas to stimulate discussion. Once the elections are over and a new power structure has emerged, the US will obviously need to enter into the sort of in-depth dialogue the study recommends, with the new President and Prime Minister, leaders of the Parliament and political parties, mainline Islamist groups, civil society and the military.  With respect to the military, of course we need to continue to expand military exchanges, with education and training, as well as the provision of essential weapons and equipment.  Obviously, US overt and covert assistance in the fight against extremism and terrorism in Pakistan must continue, including the vital tri-partite relationship with Afghanistan and US-NATO forces.  On the military, we need to be more careful about pushing the army to take action in areas it considers to be problematic.  Together, we should consider additional means of resolving the problems, as the Administration has been doing with regard to the tribal areas.  We must tackle, upfront and in a quiet manner, the role of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services in domestic politics, including relationships with Islamist organizations.  No more “business as usual.”  On the nuclear issue, the study raises the critical question of where to go with Pakistan’s nuclear program.  Here again, the centrality of the army must be recognized, both for the present moment and well into the future.  In addition to the major issue of security and extremism, the nuclear issue is another inescapable reason why the US needs to continue a high level of support for Pakistan’s army, and to try and maintain its confidence.  It seems to me that we have come to enjoy a considerable degree of quiet cooperation in this extremely sensitive area.  And President Musharraf has belatedly established a very effective structure for command and control of security.  It provides for substantial civilian oversight, as well as military control, for security as well as developmental and potential operational purposes.  We should do all we can to see that this continues.  In terms of the region as a whole, and looking beyond the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship in key issue areas, it seems to me extremely important that we establish several sets of dialogues with regional actors and other parties.  This is as important, if not more so, for Pakistan than it is for the US.  And a degree of cooperation and coordination among us will be essential to achieve what ought to be common objectives. With regards to Afghanistan, the issues are relatively clear and the US has been laboring mightily to bring about closer cooperation.  In addition to immediate security issues, we ought to continue discussions on better tribal and ethnic relationships, perhaps including the very sensitive subject of the Durrand Line and how it might be revived as a major irritant.  Obviously, regional economic cooperation and Pakistan’s role is an issue, including how to get Pakistan to open up trade between Afghanistan and India.  This would mean allaying Pakistani suspicions of India’s motives in Afghanistan.  I would hope that the US would reconsider its opposition to the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, in order to enhance regional economic cooperation while reducing regional political tensions. With India, we would obviously need to discuss the usual array of issues.  But a more forthcoming Indian posture, in close cooperation with the US, could have a major impact on Pakistan’s future after the elections.  We should press our Indian friends to adopt such a posture and take concrete steps to make it credible.  Obviously, this would include Kashmir.  China is absolutely critical for the future of Pakistan, and we should press them systematically, at all levels, in an effort to forge a common understanding.  I think it unrealistic to expect common action.  But on issues such as the future role of Pakistan’s army, as well as economic development and political relationships in Balochistan, China has tremendous influence.  Pakistan-India-China nuclear issues might be a topic for discussion.  Saudi Arabia is another country which must be a dialogue partner on Pakistan’s future.  Obviously, the subject of Pakistan’s Islamist groups and how to reduce extremism is an issue, as well as the terrorist threat from the Taleban and Al Qaeda.  It should be kept in mind that Pakistan faces ongoing internal tensions with regard to its Shia minority population.  Militant Sunni groups with support from wealthy Gulf states could create problems if they entered into conflict with the Shia minority, which would only encourage Iran to get involved. Obviously, the US must be in close consultation with European and Asian allies who have a stake in Pakistan’s future.  Indirectly, we might try and bring Iran into the dialogue, without much expectation of success.  An initial probe might be sent out by way of India, to see if there is any traction.  There are lots and lots of other ideas, but I believe my time is up.