American Eyes

By Chris Jones

According to Laura Rozen at POLITICO, don’t expect a new START treaty anytime soon. Concerns about whether the treaty has a chance to pass the Senate this year are still up for debate but there is yet another wrench in getting a new START treaty signed: domestic politics fueling Russian intransigence. Rozen explains:

But now sources in and out of the administration are saying Russia may not feel it needs to sign a new agreement soon. And perhaps not in time for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference that the Obama administration is hosting in New York in May. There are a number of issues holding up a new treaty but the primary overarching concern is that Russia may not feel it needs to sign a new agreement, a Washington nonproliferation hand who asked for anonymity said. As the U.S. has its domestic political dimension to START in terms of ratification, so too does Moscow. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir “Putin may not be so eager for [President Dmitry] Medvedev to achieve a foreign policy success,” the foreign policy hand said. “They are haggling, fighting internally, and trying to figure out how to get more water out of a stone,” a former senior U.S. official knowledgeable about Russia told POLITICO. “Also, wondering when the next shoe will drop -- i.e., what country will announce that it is also a site for US missiles/interceptors. Also, thinking that the President is weak and may not be able to get this damn treaty thru Congress, so there is no rush to agree -- especially if it's not likely to get thru before the NPT Review Conference” in May.

As we can appreciate here in the U.S., domestic politics can be a monster. Whether it’s time and resources spent on the Health Care debate, electoral concerns evidenced by the looming 2010 midterms, or the more general sense of bitter partisanship running through Washington, it is not hard to find reasons why being tasked with running the point on ratification efforts for a major arms control treaty would be no cake walk. Russia’s domestic political dynamics appear to be much more about the Putin/Medevev struggle than dealing with the Russia Duma, a comparatively easier task from an Executive Branch perspective, but nonetheless highlight how things at home impair doing things internationally. That said, there’s another interesting dynamic at play. Remember in December when the administration was getting lambasted for trying to quickly finalize a deal so Obama would have something to show in Oslo? Needless to say, this didn’t come to pass though there could have been some truth to the idea that the Russians were using some gamesmanship to try to extract additional concessions. Fast forward three months, and the same gamesmanship could also be a factor in Russian intransigence with the Review Conference two months out. More so than the Nobel speech, the U.S. really does wish it could roll out some tangible Article VI progress in May and a signed START was going to be one of the few opportunities to do so. This is not to say the U.S. team will make a deal for the sake of making a deal. Oslo made clear that securing U.S. interests in the treaty trump diplomatic benefits gained from its passage. Furthermore, the negotiating team also has an incentive to “minimize the presence of issues that could provoke a backlash,” as Rogin wrote, to ensure the best possible prospects for ratification.

What could a strong U.S. desire to get a treaty signed before May highlight? A lack of Russian interest in the same goal. In some respects, this makes sense. The Obama administration desperately wants to put its money where its mouth was in Prague by showing to Review Conference that, unlike its predecessor, they really do care about international nuclear forums and do want to seriously begin tackling the Article VI challenge. For Russia, no such urgency exists. At the same time, there’s an argument to be had that the Russia should care about showing up to the Review Conference with some good news. After all, it is the United States and Russia that must lead the path to zero, not just United States. Even if they haven’t embraced zero like the Obama administration, concluding a new START can help detract focus from the fact that Russia is generally increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. Despite this, press reports convey a rather nonchalant from Moscow about moving before May.

Therein lies an example of a much larger issue for the United States: countries don’t view nuclear issues through American eyes. Whether it is trying to conclude new START with Russia before May, getting China to agree on Iran sanctions or pushing Brazil to join the Additional Protocol, what we see as a pragmatic move is not seen as such by others. For us, a major reason behind these efforts is nonproliferation. For other countries, they don’t disagree that more countries developing nuclear weapons is a bad thing. The question is whether it is their responsibility to deal with it and at what cost? A nuclear Iran could destabilize the Middle East but is that worth cutting off lucrative reactor help or vital oil supplies? That’s a much tougher question.

To some degree, these differences are inevitable. There are historical, cultural, geographic, economic, political, and military reasons that help shape the worldview of other countries viewpoints. As explained by Mark Jansson:

These are important distinctions. And they indeed fly in the face of the Administration’s approach to dealing with not just Iran but also with North Korea, the security of nuclear material and sensitive technologies, and nonproliferation writ-large. Earlier this week Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech at USIP about the administration’s efforts to honor and uphold the core bargains at the heart of the NPT.

[These efforts] must start from the premise that the nuclear threat is a danger that all nations face together, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is not just in the interests of the existing nuclear weapon states, as it is sometimes asserted. Indeed, the nonnuclear weapon states have as much or more to lose if these weapons spread or are ever used again. The same logic applies to our work to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. A nuclear terrorist bomb detonated anywhere in the world would have vast economic, political, ecological and social consequences everywhere in the world.

Following Hiro’s reasoning, the first premise that the threat is one that "all nations face together" is only partly true. Yes, any kind of nuclear attack would likely create far-reaching repercussions affecting many, if not all, states. However, it should not be presumed that all states will feel these repercussions in the same ways and to the same extent; they will not. Furthermore, the assertion that the "same logic applies" to efforts to curb nuclear terrorism begins to fall apart by lumping together the problems posed by North Korea and (potentially) Iran, which represent large political issues that need to be sorted out among states diplomatically through negotiated frameworks, with the issue of nuclear terrorism, which entails an intensive effort among and within states to secure materials, enforce export controls, and participate in the pursuit and capture of extremists. More to the point, it again presumes that all states - not just similarly powerful states like China and Russia - share our perception of the threat and the consequences.
 

Hillary Clinton is absolutely right that nonproliferation is not a passive exercise and deserves a great deal of credit for saying so. However, if nonproliferation is indeed a participatory project, then would be a little hasty to presuppose that all states will feel equally and similarly motivated to participate. Other large, militarily powerful P5 states with a strong interest in preventing radical shakeups to the status quo don't share our perceptions, as Hiro points out, and it is a virtual certainty that there is a much wider range of motivations among the many non-nuclear states. Hence the trouble with 1540 implementation.

What to do about it? Tough to say. Answers to this won’t come easy but will critical for the U.S. to address over the years to come. Two areas to start could be:

1. Reduce the perception of U.S. schizophrenia on nuclear issues

There are perceived double standards, such as Israel and the India Deal, which remain sore spots for which the United States does not have a great answer. The justification for these reside in larger economic and strategic considerations, which very well may be justified, but it is also undercuts our credibility when we are frustrated with states unwilling to set aside their economic and strategic interests to match ours. Another issue is convincing states of our nonproliferation commitments over the long term. 15 months ago, America was run by administration that saw little value in international nonproliferation forums. Prague was a good speech but what is to prevent it from falling by the wayside like every disarmament speech made by past presidents, especially when the party in power inevitable changes again?

2. Change the threat perception balance among other countries

The threat perception balance has two components: the likelihood and severity of a certain threat (e.g., WMD terrorism) and the costs of measures that could help reduce that risk. For many countries, nonproliferation just doesn’t ring as such a pressing priority, regardless of U.S. credibility on the issues. Compared with many of the basic development priorities within growing countries, nonproliferation obligations may be viewed as a luxury for wealthy countries that would hamper much needed economic growth. While WMD terrorism is the top threat in the minds of many U.S. national security experts, this view is by no means shared universally. Changing the balance requires either increasing the risk countries assign to the problem or decreasing the costs for them to pare down that risk. Both should be pursued but there should be no illusions about the likelihood of success. Explaining to countries, perhaps via intelligence and other information, the threat that WMD terrorism does pose may garner more interest in stopping the problem but will not be a silver bullet solution. In parallel to these efforts, the U.S. should explore ways it can increasing the sharing of technology, without compromising national security, and other best practices that could help reduce the costs for countries to opt-in to certain nonproliferation commitments.