Analyzing the CTBT

The Morning Joe and NOH referenced a recent op-ed written by some of the NOH staff in The Register Citizen that advances a number of questionable arguments in favor of ratifying the CTBT. Diving right in, it argues:

Nuclear weapons tests are a toxic relic of a past characterized by arms races and fallout shelters. Except for outlaw nations like North Korea, the world today has quit the business of testing nuclear weapons.

The French test in 1995 and the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998 (not to mention recent murmurings within India they should test again) at least call into question the idea that only “outlaw nations like North Korea” have refused to quit the "toxic relic of the past" business of testing. It is unlikely the U.S. (and France…and probably India and Pakistan) test anytime soon but the core of the debate is whether the fact we are unlikely to test means we have no reason not to sign the treaty or whether the U.S. should refuse to lock itself into permanently forswearing nuclear tests. The latter argument, whether or not correct, could certainly include unpredictable scenarios where another country, including one that may not be an “outlaw nation,” tests or undertakes other destabilizing measures that could put significant pressure on the U.S. to test. Next it argues: 

There’s a growing bipartisan consensus among experts that testing nuclear weapons isn’t in the best interests of the United States.

This seems far from apparent. The piece cites Kissinger's support for the CTBT as part of the Gang of 4 effort and Scowcroft's role as the co-chair of the CFR Task Force which could be important shows of support but it seems a stretch to argue there is a bipartisan consensus on CTBT. The Strategic Posture Commission, which does represent a valuable consensus as argued in an August back and forth here, here, and here, agreed on everything except CTBT. As detailed previously, the administration is far short of the votes it needs for CTBT and getting the 7ish they need may prove to be an amazing race. In the same way CTBT has become a lightening rod internationally to gauge US commitment to nonproliferation, it is a symbol of an extremely bitter partisan divide here in DC.  The article goes on to argue: 

One benefit of ratifying the Test Ban Treaty will be an effective freeze on nuclear arsenals across the globe. For nations with less advanced nuclear technologies, such as China, to increase the deadliness and accuracy of their weapons, testing is required.

Let’s be clear: CTBT would, at most, only constitute an “effective freeze” on some qualitative aspects of nuclear arsenals that could be upgraded via testing in countries that have ratified the treaty after it enters into force. There are some things it could theoretically constrain the Chinese, for example, from doing but testing has not been necessary for them to increase the size of their arsenal or deploy road-mobile, solid-fueled ICBM’s or work on their nearly completed JL-2.  The article also states:

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The Test Ban Treaty not only makes such testing illegal, but also includes a sophisticated global monitoring system that will help the international community detect any attempts to secretly test nuclear weapons.

The International Monitoring System is already in place, albiet not fully, and claims to have detected the 2006 and 2009 North Korean tests. A commitment by the United States, and therefore possibly others, could theoretically provide increased resources and attention for improving and completing the IMS but the capability to detect exists now which is a key reason Democrats hope this time will be different for CTBT in the Senate.  One of the most curious argument made in the piece is that: 

The treaty would also hinder efforts by countries like Iran to join the nuclear club. And it would permit onsite inspections on short notice in countries of concern. What better way to verify nuclear activities than to have scientists inspect a country’s facilities? Had the Senate approved the treaty a decade ago, North Korea and Iran would today be operating in a much stricter international environment.

It is unclear what the correlation is between U.S. ratification of CTBT, now or in 1999, and stopping Iran and North Korea. Neither have ratified the treaty, nor are they likely to. Even if they did, there are potential political hurdles that could stall a movement for inspections following suspected tests. Together, these problems make the possibility of conducting onsite inspections a less compelling argument. The reference to a ‘stricter international environment’ presumably refers to the willingness of countries to adopt measures such as sanctions against North Korea and Iran but it is far from given North Korea or Iran's nuclear programs would be much different today if the U.S. ratified CTBT at some point, particularly when one imagines the Bush administration trying to get cooperation on nonproliferation after Clinton ratifying the CTBT.  On entry into force, it argues:

China has indicated that it will follow the U.S. lead. Ratification by these five permanent powers of the United Nations Security Council will send a powerful signal to the rest of the world and help create the momentum to bring the treaty into force.

Many think the Chinese will ratify not long after the U.S. That seems reasonable although I certainly take a quip made by a former high-level official in an off the record meeting recently that “the Chinese will ratify after U.S., or they say they will anyway.” The problem, however, is that even if you get the U.S., China, and Indonesia on board , India and Pakistan will be tough although not impossible to get.  Even more difficult is the task of convincing Egypt, Iran, Israel, and North Korea all to ratify which is probably why the Strategic Posture Commission opponents of CTBT concluded there is a “near zero” chance of entry into force.  Regarding the stockpile, the article argues:

The United States knows more about maintaining its nuclear weapons today than ever before, and its stockpile is more advanced, safer, and stronger than any other country’s in the world

Without getting into too much detail about the stockpile management discussion, it is unclear what is a "stronger" stockpile entails and while there have been valuable technological advances in areas such as computing, the ability to certify the stockpile without testing does become tougher over time which is why all eyes are on what will be included in the Democrat's Grand Bargain to try to win CTBT votes.  Lastly, the article states: 

The Test Ban Treaty is a simple, necessary, and effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

As discussed above, it is important to remember that the CTBT in and of itself in no way prevents horizontal proliferation. Theoretically, it could stop certain types of vertical proliferation and/or provide the U.S. credibilty with other countries in trying to stop the spread of weapons but this conclusion might be a bit oversimplified.