Answering Some Questions about START

By John K. Warden

If 2010 is to be the year where arms control makes a comeback, the momentum will begin with the ratification of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  START has been at the top of Obama’s arms control agenda since his Prague speech last May.  As the negotiations have dragged on, people have begun to question when (if ever) negotiations will finish and what the final make-up of the agreement will be.  I’ll try to answer some of the main questions below.

Is an agreement between the United States and Russia close?  Why has there been a delay?

The short answer is:  it depends on who you ask.

Some believe that the Russians will continue to drag out the agreement and that there is no end in sight.  Ariel Cohen, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, for example, believes that Russia feels they have the upper hand and will continue to push for more and more concessions.

Others are much more optimistic.  The AFP recently reported, citing U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns, that the two sides are “on the verge” of an agreement:

"We're on the verge of completing the agreement and ... I'm optimistic that we'll complete it soon," Burns said, according to the transcript of an interview released by the US Embassy in Moscow as he was visiting Russia.

However, it’s hard to take Burns seriously.  For months now, there have been too many ‘sources close to the negotiations’ with ‘inside information’ saying negotiations are just about to finish.  Officials have ‘cried wolf’ one too many times, causing Page van der Linden, a contributing editor for Daily Kos, to comment, “I'll believe it when I see it.”

The most realistic assessment comes from U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Ellen Tauscher, quoted in the Global Security Newswire:

Tauscher confirmed reports that the deal is essentially complete but that some challenging treaty-verification issues remain unresolved.
"When do you declare yourself done?" she said. "We could actually say we are done with negotiating, but we have all these other things to do," said Tauscher, noting that complex details in the body of the treaty, technical annexes and protocols are not yet final.
"There's going to be a lag time between the time we say we're done and the time that it actually gets up to the Senate," Tauscher added. "I couldn't say that [we're done] now."

When officials say ‘an agreement is close’ or that ‘most issues have been resolved,’ they’re telling the truth.  However, that doesn’t mean that we’re going to see an agreement tomorrow.

But, the Obama administration originally hoped to complete negotiations by December 5th of last year when the original START expired.  So, what’s holding up an agreement?

Given our similar choice for blog post titles -- mine from December: "It's Verification, Stupid!" and his from this week: “It’s the Telemetry, Stupid,” it's obvious that both Kingston Reif, Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and I  think that verification (and now more specifically, telemetry) is what's holding up START negotiations.

On more than one occasion, Linton Brooks, the lead U.S. negotiator for the original START, described negotiations over verification details as the most difficult part of negotiations in the first START and predicted that verification would also be the most difficult and time consuming part of this round.

And, Ellen Tausher, in the same article cited above, acknowledged that telemetry is one of the remaining hurdles:

Specifically, Tauscher acknowledged, Moscow to date has not accepted a U.S. proposal for exchanging technical data on offensive-missile tests. Sharing such "telemetry" under the recently expired START accord has boosted confidence on both sides that they understand the capabilities of the other nation's nuclear-armed weapons, she said.
"Expectations have always been that telemetry -- which ... certainly is very valuable to the Pentagon and very valuable to the Russian [Defense Ministry] -- that these things are part of confidence-building and they are part of the ability to reassure that there is no break-out, that there is not going to be some kind of surprise," she said.

Kingston Reif adds that one of the reason negotiations over telemetry might be taking so long is that the United States and Russia have lost some of their qualified experts who could find a technical compromise:

[T]he U.S. has not negotiated a meaningful arms control agreement since the early 1990s.  As a colleague on the Hill put it to me, telemetry is “complicated, and very technical, and both sides are very short on people who remember how to construct this sort of a verification regime.”  This lack of expertise has undoubtedly slowed things down.

The telemetry issue is difficult to resolve because the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals are in different places.  The United States is not currently developing new offensive missiles, while Russia is, and will continue to, test new missiles.  Therefore, a provision to report telemetry data would be largely one sided.  As a result, some in Russia have called for the United States to report telemetry data from U.S. missile defense tests.  However, the Obama administration, like the previous administration, has refused to link limitations on offensive and defense weapons systems.

Josh Rogin, reporting in The Cable, says that telemetry is more of a political issue than a needed verification measure:

Many insiders see the telemetry issue as somewhat of a red herring. New verification and tracking technologies, most of them classified, can provide the same capability without the Russians directly providing the data. But a lack of a provision on telemetry could complicate Senate ratification of START.
"For the United States, the politics matter because certain senators will go nuts without access to the data," said Travis Sharp, a nonproliferation expert at the Center for a New American Security. "Substantively, however, the United States may not need the same level of information as negotiated under START I, particularly because ‘New START' will likely have streamlined counting and verification rules and technological advancements allow us to get the data in other ways. On the other hand, Russia politically doesn't want our noses in their business and substantively is hesitant to give up too much information."

Kingston Reif clarifies:

START I stated that “telemetric information…assists in verification of Treaty provisions concerning, for example, throw-weight and the number of reentry vehicles.”  Given that New START is likely to have new provisions on throw-weight (in fact it might not have any provisions on throw-weight because we don't really care about it anymore) and new counting rules for delivery vehicles and warheads, we should be able to live with “simpler” and “less demanding” provisions on telemetry.

The Obama administration knows that including limitations on missile defense in a new START would doom ratification in the Senate.  Therefore, the likely outcome is an alternate technical solution or a compromise that shares some, but not all, telemetric information.  While this could cause some political problems in the Senate, I don’t think it would be enough to block ratification assuming the Administration makes other commitments (discussed below).

Are Putin’s recent comments about START significant? Will Putin block successful START negotiations?

When negotiations took a break last December, most people thought an agreement would be finished sometime in January.  However, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s comments at the end of December caused some to question whether an agreement was possible.  Here are Putin’s comments, quoted on an ABC News blog:

 “What is the problem?" Putin responded on December 29 when asked why a deal wasn't yet done. "The problem is that our American partners are building an anti-missile shield and we are not building one.”
"By building such an umbrella over themselves, our [US] partners could feel themselves fully secure and will do whatever they want, which upsets the balance," he added.
The US has long tried to separate strategic arms talks from discussions over missile defense, apparently with little success as Putin reiterated Moscow’s plans to continue to develop new nuclear weapons to offset US plans.  Moscow welcomed Obama's September decision to abandon President George W. Bush's proposed missile shield in based in Poland and the Czech Republic, but it's clear that suspicion lingers over Obama's plans for a more sea-based European missile shield.
"To preserve the balance, we must develop offensive weapons systems, not missile defense systems as the United States is doing," he said. "The problems of missile defense and offensive arms are very closely linked."
Russia has been developing the sea-based Bulava ballistic missile and the land-based RS-24, both capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads.
"Let the Americans hand over all their information on missile defense and we are ready to hand over all the information on offensive weapons systems," said Putin.

There are a two prevailing explanations for Putin’s comments.  On one side, there are those who believe Putin’s comments were an attempt to undermine Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.  Proponents of this view argue that Putin was trying to reassert control over the content of START and make sure that Obama and Medvedev both understand that he is still influential.  This view is elaborated by David Kramer, a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund:

Comments by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in late December must have come as an unwelcome surprise to Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev as they try to conclude a new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, that expired on Dec. 5…This wasn’t the first time that Putin has tried to throw a monkey wrench into Medvedev’s efforts to finalize major agreements…Depriving Medvedev of victories seems to have become an objective for Putin…signing an arms control agreement with the United States would have marked another accomplishment for Medvedev and an early milestone in the “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. It seemed that Putin feared that Medvedev could show him up in one of the most important areas in global affairs — nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

On the other side, there are those who see Putin’s comments as a move that was calculated to support Medvedev and Russia’s negotiators as the final details of the START agreement are worked out.  Josh Rogin describes this “competing theory”:

The competing theory is that Putin and Medvedev are working somewhat in lockstep, again with Putin calling the shots and benefiting from the illusion of a power split. For Putin, it's useful to have Medvedev out there as the nice guy (aided by the fact that he may genuinely want to cooperate), setting up a good cop/bad cop routine. That catches Western officials off guard and makes it convenient for Putin because he can wait until negotiations with Medvedev play out and then make his move at the eleventh hour.

Of the two, I’m more included to agree with the latter.  After all, Putin’s comments weren’t that revolutionary.  For a while now, Russia has expressed concern about U.S. missile defense.  Also, Putin’s comments don’t suggest that missile defense is a deal breaker; instead, he’s describing the issue that’s holding up negotiations.

It’s also hard to imagine that Putin and Medvedev aren’t, at least to some extent, working together.  Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, reminds us that Medvedev was chosen by Putin because of his loyalty:

In 2008, Medvedev was installed in the Kremlin as part of "Putin's plan,"…Putin chose Medvedev carefully, and not only for his unquestionable loyalty, vitally important as that is. Putin, among other things, is a combative nationalist, and he wants Russia to succeed in a world of competing powers. He is certainly conservative, but he is also a self-described modernizer.

I also agree with Trenin when he says that the competitive relationship between Putin and Medvedev, like past “struggles” in Russia, is often misunderstood in the West:

Westerners often see Russian politics in terms of a high-level struggle between liberals and conservatives: Ligachev and Yakovlev under Mikhail Gorbachev; reformers and nationalists under Boris Yeltsin; siloviki and economic liberals under Vladimir Putin.
Westerners also view Russia in terms of a tradition whereby every new czar partly repudiates the legacy of his predecessor, creating a political thaw at the beginning of a new reign. Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization is Exhibit A.
Both methods were used to describe the Putin-Dmitri Medvedev relationship — to understand its nature and dynamic, and what it portends for Russia. But observers remain puzzled.
To dismiss Medvedev as a mere Putin puppet, a constitutional bridge between Putin's second and third presidential terms, would be both unfair and wrong. Russia's third president has a broader role and a distinct function.
Conversely, portraying Prime Minister Putin as "a man from the past," and President Medvedev as "a hope for the future," exaggerates the differences between them and omits the more important factors that unite them.

Therefore, it’s easy to see Putin’s comments as a way to reaffirm Russia’s negotiating position and try to get more concessions out of the United States.  This explanation is consistent with comments by Linton Brooks who, speaking from experience, has said that the Russians are extremely tough negotiators.  William Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, describes Putin’s comments as “political posturing,” and Clifford Kupchan, a Russia specialist at the Eurasia Group, (quoted in the Washington Times) called Putin’s statement a “negotiating ploy.”

Another explanation for Putin’s comments is hinted at in Ellen Barry’s column in the New York Times.  Paraphrasing Putin’s statement, she writes:

To preserve the balance, he said, Russia must develop new offensive weapons to counter the missile shield — or the United States must provide Russia with data on its missile defense plans in exchange for data on Russian weapons development.

It’s possible that, while Putin would like restrictions on missile defense, he’s willing to accept Russian development of offensive weapons to counter missile defense as an alternative.  Therefore, Putin’s comments could be interpreted as a reminder that, even after Russia agrees to limit the size of its arsenal, it would still need to develop offensive systems to counter the U.S. advantage in defensive systems.

No matter the explanation, it is highly likely that Putin’s comments will, at worst, slow down negotiations.  But, in the end, an agreement will be reached that includes a statement in the preamble acknowledging the connection between offensive and defensive systems, but does not include any real limits on U.S. missile defenses.

With stated Republican opposition in the Senate, would a new START be ratified?

Even if an agreement is signed some have questioned whether Obama will be able to achieve ratification in the U.S. Senate.  All forty Republican Senators and independent Joe Lieberman have sent Obama a letter indicating that, among other things, they will not vote for a new START unless the Obama makes substantial financial commitments to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of America’s remaining nuclear arsenal.  Many questioned the logic of the Republican letter, but the political reality remains.  As a result, Kingston Reif concludes:

Of course, Jon Kyl and company don’t really care about this distinction; they want to score political points.  How else to explain the fact that when the Bush administration was in office, Republicans couldn’t have cared less about verification?

Many of the objections to START will be non-issues when negotiations are complete and the Senate has a treaty in hand.  Commenting on a blog post by Ariel Cohen and Baker Spring, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, that made a lot of the same arguments that Republicans have been making recently, Amy Woolf, a Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Service, said, “They have imagined, and object to, a treaty that is not going to exist. START will not require de-alert, will not limit [missile defense], etc.”

However, the one objection that will remain is funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.  Colin Clark, a DoD Buzz correspondent, describes the funding that Republicans are looking for:

However, there are key nuclear components that need refurbishing, the congressional aide said. And the administration’s February budget will be a key indicator of just how serious the Obama administration is about pursuing arms control solutions.
The focus is on two facilities, the uranium facility at Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge [pictured above] and one at Los Alamos. They are going to cost a great deal — roughly $3 billion each. So, if you want to stay ahead of the arms control debate, watch the president’s budget to see if it contains funding to get those started..
“If you don’t see good support in the NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) budget for those two buildings and for surveillance and for labs to be maintained that’s going to be worse than difficult to get something passed,” the congressional aide said.

The Obama administration realizes that compromises will be necessary to get START ratified.  There won’t be funding for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal without arms control, and there won’t be arms control without funding for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal.  Tom Z. Collina, Research Director at the Arms Control Association, says that Obama’s budget will fund many of the same programs that are identified in the Senators’ letter to Obama.

Of course, Obama and Republican Senators will have to work out the details.  For example, Republicans will have to be convinced that the U.S. deterrent is safe without a new warhead, which the Administration opposes.  After many long months negotiating and compromising, it is extremely likely that a new START will eventually be ratified by the U.S. Senate.