Approaching Damascus

By Andrew St. Denis

Tuesday on the Hill, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its hearing on the nomination of Robert Ford as U.S. Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic, the first in five years.

Ford’s statement had this to say about Syria on the nuclear front:

[W]hile we urge countries in the region to comply      with their obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and their obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the Syrians have so far refused to provide the IAEA access and information necessary to resolve the concerns about Syria's nuclear activities. 

And more generally, on prospects of policy change in Damascus:

I do not think that the Syrians will change their policies quickly. Finding avenues of cooperation with Syria will be a step-by-step process that will require patience and steady commitment to our principles.

Ford goes on to emphasize that “[i]f we are to succeed in stabilizing the region, we must persuade Syria that neither Iran nor Hizballah share Syria’s long-term strategic interest in a comprehensive Middle East peace.”

This last statement has become particularly salient in recent weeks. Following the announcement of Ford’s nomination and comments by Hillary Clinton that Syria’s ties with Iran were a concern and her call for Damascus “to begin to move away from the relationship with Iran,” Presidents Assad and Ahmadinejad mocked her remarks and vowed closer ties.

There has been some Congressional pushback against the Ford nomination by Senate Republicans warning against engagement with hostile regimes for engagement’s sake. While engagement for its own sake is in no one’s interests, it is definitely in U.S. interests to find common ground with Syria as a basis for further efforts to put a wedge between it and Iran.

Despite the show of unity, Syria and Iran have a lengthy list of divergent interests, as this Al-Ahram article by Bassel Oudat points out. Among them is Syria’s labeling of Turkey as a strategic partner, its improving ties with Saudi Arabia, stability in Iraq, and the fate of the million-plus Iraqi refugee population in Syria. And while Iran gets significant mileage out of its anti-Israel rhetoric, Syria has an interest in returning to talks with Israel and, in the long run, settling their disputes, especially over the Golan Heights.

However, this long-term goal is undermined by Syria’s continued obstruction on the nuclear front. In its February report, the IAEA indicated that chemically-processed uranium particles found at the al-Kibar site bombed by Israel in 2007 may point to covert nuclear activity. Syria continues to suggest that Israeli munitions may be responsible for the particles’ presence and has yet to provide a solid explanation for water cooling facilities at al-Kibar and large purchases of graphite and barium sulphate, which could be put towards constructing a nuclear reactor.

Compounding Syria’s intransigence is its recent announcement – in tandem with Israel at a Paris conference on civilian nuclear energy – that it is interested in pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program of its own. Together, these announcements might complicate efforts to pressure Tehran on its own nuclear program. Any decision to pursue a civilian energy program is well down the road for Syria, given economic and technological barriers, let alone suspicion over its current activities. If down the line, the U.S. and the international community can convince Syria of the benefits of coming clean on its nuclear activities and follow in the footsteps of the UAE and its nuclear aspirations, it could undermine Iran’s adversarial model. The riskier possibility is that Syria follows Iran’s cue and pursues the full nuclear fuel cycle, complicating U.S. efforts to curb the Iranian program, and feeding back into concerns over Israel’s own nuclear ambiguity.

Bassel Oudat’s Al-Ahram article notes that “Damascus has been emphatic that only the US should sponsor any future talks with Israel.” While Syria recently announced willingness to restart indirect talks under Turkish auspices, the announcement would be a serious signal to focus U.S. attention on the subject.

If the U.S. is able to pursue incremental change in its relationship with Syria, there is serious potential for undermining more than one long-term issue in Middle East stability.