Are Disarmament and Nonproliferation Two Sides of the Same Coin?

There was a lot of discussion about nonproliferation and disarmament last week.  In addition to Clinton's speech and the Arms Control Association's Iran panel (discussed here), both the Hudson Institute and the Elliot School's new Institute for Security and Conflict Studies hosted panels.

On Wednesday morning (10/21), two different Hudson panels discussed "U.S. Nuclear Weapons, Fron 32,000 to Zero" and "Enlisting Other States and international legal regimes to strengthen nuclear security--Nonproliferation and Arms Control" respectively.  Panelists included Jack David, Paula DeSutter, Douglas Feith, Christopher Ford, William Hartung, Abram Shulsky, Walt Slocombe, and Ashley Tellis.

On Thursday evening (10/22), the Elliot School panel discussed "Nuclear Futures: The Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament."  Panelists included Ambassador Abdallah Baali, Ambassador Bonnie D. Jenkins, Joe Cirincione, and Charles Glaser.

Within and between the events, there were a diversity of viewpoints, but one important question emerged:  What is the connection between disarmament and non-proliferation?  Is it possible, in the short-term, for the U.S. to demonstrating that it is fulfilling its obligation under Articles VI?  Will U.S. nonproliferation credibility lead to tangible benefits in the nuclear nonproliferation regime?

According to Cirincione, there is a new security paradigm in which disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin.  After the U.S. makes disarmament commitments (reducing the size of the arsenal, ratifying the CTBT, etc), the coin flips, and non-nuclear weapons states will increase cooperation (enforcing export controls, strengthening the NPT, etc).

There are two parts to the argument.  First, disarmament commitments must sufficiently enhance U.S. credibility.  As we've written before, doing enough to satisfy the international community is a tough task.  There are obvious commitments that the U.S. needs to make, such as decreasing the size of the arsenal and ratifying the CTBT, for countries to think we're taking Article VI commitments seriously.  But are those actions enough?  Would the U.S. also have to change its official doctrine and force posture?

Two other concerns are the India Deal and Israel's suspected nuclear arsenal.  These concerns were identified by Ambassador Baali, the current Algerian ambassador to the U.S. who was the president of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), as examples of the NPT being implemented a la carte.  While the India Deal is a new problem, Israel's arsenal has been an issue at RevCons for years, especially from Egypt, an important NAM country.  Can the U.S. be seen as credible without exerting pressure on Israel to abandon their arsenal and accept a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East?

While it is probably true that nothing the U.S. does will be 'enough,' serious disarmament commitments could potentially have some impact. The weaker argument is that nonproliferation credibility will dissuade countries from seeking nuclear weapons.  According to Tellis, there are a number of reasons countries seek nuclear weapons that are unlikely to be countered:  1) nuclear weapons are superb deterrents 2) nuclear weapons are engrained within the national security establishment (Russia, China, Israel, France, Pakistan) and seen by elites as key to their survival (Iran, North Korea, Pakistan) 3) the competitive international system is unlikely to disappear soon, which will cause declining states (to assert their importance), rising states (fearing the response of declining states), and fragile states (that face an uncertain security environment) to have an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.  And, according to Walt Slocombe, the success of U.S. nonproliferation credibility will be limited because countries have strong political incentives to acquire nuclear weapons; it's not just prestige.

Slocombe's point implies that while U.S. disarmament commitments might counter prestige by decreasing the perceived importance of nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to effect other proliferation motives.  This applies to future proliferants as well as current nuclear aspirants.  Glaser argued that Iran and North Korea are more worried about U.S. conventional weapons than Article VI commitments.  Even Cirincione admitted that disarmament commitments are unlikely to have any direct impact on North Korea and Iran.

The stronger argument is that nonproliferation credibility will get countries to support the nonproliferation regime.  Winning support to alter or strengthen the NPT will be difficult.  Non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) maintain that countries have a right to civilian nuclear energy and have been reluctant to accept limitations (such as a proposed international fuel bank).  Ambassador Baali made it clear that the only obligation NNWS have under the NPT is not to acquire nuclear weapons.

However, some argue that with increased credibility, the U.S. could persuade NNWS to support nonproliferation efforts both inside (such as strengthening IAEA authority or increasing punishment for violations) and outside (such as export controls) the NPT.  Cirincione argued that nonproliferation credibility would cause states to take on burdens they otherwise wouldn't.  He argued that countries like Malaysia and Dubai, who helped Iran's nuclear program, might support export controls after the U.S. made substantial disarmament commitments.

There are a number of problems with this example.  To start, export controls will be increasingly difficult as technology advances (a point made by Tellis).  Even if these countries had a role in developing Iran's program, there's no reason to think they can help reign in either Iran or North Korea, which are considered the two greatest threats to the nonproliferation regime.  The two countries most important for this task, Russia and China, have been reluctant to sacrifice economic benefits to counter proliferation.  Ford also noted that disarmament is the last thing that Russia and China want; disarmament would horrify strategic planners in those countries and do nothing to get their support in putting pressure on Iran and North Korea.  Finally, even if progress on disarmament is a necessary condition for increased cooperation, it might not be sufficient.  Andrew Grotto argues that political and security factors are likely to prevent states from cooperating in nonproliferation efforts:

The behavior of states is guided not only by normative considerations about fairness, hypocrisy and the like; it is also animated, and in many cases dominated, by security and economic interests. A state may oppose an NPT-plus obligation on principle because it is unfair, but it does not follow that a state would necessarily support the obligation if the unfairness were remedied. That’s because taking on new nonproliferation obligations is not costless. Budgets and time are finite for all governments, and officials must spend scarce resources—time and money—formulating, evaluating, and negotiating the content of a proposed obligation. Then they have to implement it, which could entail a new set of costs, such as adjustment costs and a potential loss of sovereignty. In short, a state may continue to oppose a nonproliferation measure on the grounds that it will not produce a net security, economic, or prestige benefit.

Later, Grotto points out that NNWS, and especially their diplomats at NPT meetings, have an incentive to overplay the importance of disarmament commitments to get more concessions.  He then concludes that there is insufficient evidence to prove that nonproliferation credibility 'works':

The legitimacy framework....has become increasingly influential in international debate over nonproliferation and is viewed by many as showing the way out of the current impasse....There are good theoretical reasons rooted in constructivist accounts of international relations to hypothesize a causal linkage among NAM countries between support for NPT-plus obligations and disarmament, but the empirical record is thin and a key nonproliferation decision—the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995—appears to be better explained by an alternative account of nonproliferation decision-making, the material interests framework. But there are simply too few studies of the private motivations of decision-makers vis-à-vis NPT-plus obligations to permit firm conclusions.

The point of this post is not to argue that the U.S. shouldn't decrease the role of nuclear weapons or ratify New START and the CTBT, but instead to question the connection between disarmament commitments and nonproliferation credibility.  It's dangerous to describe nonproliferation and disarmament as two sides of the same coin without sound evidence.  In order to secure support for nonprolifaration efforts, it might be more important for the U.S. to offer economic incentives or explain the risk of proliferation to a country's national interest.

More importantly, what happens if the coin doesn't flip?  If disarmament is justified primarily as a way to achieve greater nonproliferaiton, and doesn't achieve that result, people may start to question its desirability.  Instead, advocates might do better to focus on the benefits of deep cuts, decreasing operational readiness, or securing a global ban on nuclear testing to U.S. national security, while noting nonproliferation as an added benefit.