Article review: “Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion”

Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, “Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion,” Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2009), 1-25. Available at: http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/index.cfm Flikr photo by United Nations Photos, used under a Creative Commons. Colletta and Muggah’s article begins with the observation that the transition from civil war to peace is frequently prolonged and difficult. Traditionally, the international community has attempted to assist post-war states through what Colletta and Muggah call “conventional security promotion activities”, namely disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). However, as the authors point out, the record of these measures has at best “fallen short of expectations” and at worse done “more harm than good”. In response to these failures, the article argues that practitioners have developed new techniques. The article attempts to codify these by grouping them together into two categories: “interim stabilization interventions” and “second generation security promotion activities”. The concept of “interim stabilization” is the article’s most novel and exciting contribution. It recognizes that the transition from civil war to a stable-peace will be a long and complex phase. It rightly points out that the reason many states slide back into conflict is because the situation is not “ripe” for conventional post-war security promotion. For example, during the transitional phase, conventional disarmament attempts are often thwarted by high levels of criminal activity. Few civilians or former-belligerents feel secure enough to hand in their personal weapons. Thus, the transitional phase must be treated separately to earlier and later phases. This means the introduction of initiatives specifically intended to respond to the unique challenges emerging during the transitional phase. The authors’ make several constructive suggestions concentrating specifically on demobilization. The conventional aim of a rapid and complete demobilization has proven to be insufficient, in their place the authors suggest:

Civilian service corps: this involves former-military groups being redeployed as reconstruction brigades. Civilian service corps provides occupations for former-belligerents and gives the central government some control over their activities while also working towards responding to the country’s desperate need for physical and social infrastructure.
Military or security sector integration: former-military units can be integrated into the government’s military or transformed into local militias. The advantages of this approach are that the central government gains some control over these forces and also increases it ability to react to criminal activity.
Dialogue and sensitization: former-belligerents may be sent to “half way houses” and prepared to reenter society after being provided with education and training.
Autonomy: opposition groups can be given a degree of political autonomy on the stipulation that they refrain from violence and continue to be actively involved in the peace process.

The article’s identification of “second generation security promotion activities” is compelling, if not as paradigm breaking as the discussion on “interim stabilization”. The authors’ argument is twofold. First, second generation security promotion differs from conventional techniques in aiming to follow the specific contours of the security situation rather than the “top-down” approach typically employed. Second, instead of creating complete new institutions and structures, second generation promotion is forged on “formal and informal cooperation with existing (including customary) sub-national institutions”. Over all, Colletta and Muggah have made a timely and novel contribution on post-war security promotion. The article challenges readers to think beyond the traditional dichotomy of war and peace and focus more clearly on the specific dynamics of the transitional phase itself.