The Assure to Deter (Japanese Breakout) Strategy

Revisiting the Japanese nuclear discussion, Sean Varner had a piece I picked up on Twitter (follow us as csisponi) about the prospects for and consequences of Japan going nuclear. Fairly standard set of arguments (although I do question the assertion a nuclear Japan prompts Taipei to do the same) but it got me thinking: what are the various issues at play in a Japanese decision to go nuclear:

1. First and foremost: The Japanese perception of its security relationship with the United States. Extended deterrence, which is a multi-faceted effort that involves a full spectrum of diplomatic and military assurances, is at its core an effort to make sure the Japanese sleep easy at night (or at least some NyQuil so they can fall asleep). Therefore, the primary question is whether they believe, in the worst case scenario, we'd trade Los Angeles for Tokyo. This NyQuil assurance has (at least) two important components: capability and credibility. Capability is relatively straightforward. Do we have the quantity, quality, and delivery methods to quickly deliver a devastating nuclear strike in the theater (and beyond) in a hypothetical crises? Now does that mean if we don't replace our vacuum tubes the Japanese are going to instantly seek a nuclear weapon? Probably not but I will say I have been surprised at the number of anecdotes I have heard about how much that Japanese care about certain capabilities. That said, as a forthcoming CSIS publication on the question will argue, it is also important to prevent the "leading the witness" phenomenon where US experts convince the Japanese they need certain US capabilities (when that may not be the case) such that they will be very unhappy if they are convinced they need a Ferrari instead of a BMW. (which, to be clear, is to make a point about managing expectations and nothing more). Moving to the credibility ingredient, which is inevitably difficult because it is not a black and white matter, may prove to be the tougher one to tackle for the Obama administration due to the combination of rising nuclear threats in the region and the goal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. While the Obama team does have a tough task cut out for them, one that could be even more difficult with the seemingly inevitable DJP victory, I would caution against the characterization that

If President Obama cuts warheads to below 1,700, and without consulting Tokyo, as outlined by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START agreement), Japanese officials may perceive the U.S. "extended deterrent" to be insincere and unreliable . . . In short, whether Japan goes nuclear may depend largely on whether the United States neglects its responsibilities. By not addressing Tokyo’s security concerns and consulting it prior to the START reductions, the United States may force Japan to make the least miserable choice out of a list of bad options.

primarily because I think we are consulting with allies about our nuclear policy (including START and the NPR). Kurt Campbell and Chip Gregson flew out there in July to chat extended deterrence and set up a "nuclear umbrella forum." Brad Roberts has indicated that in the NPR process "there will be increased emphasis on extended deterrence and the assurance of allies" and that "There is an "active process" within the administration to consult with ally countries on the Nuclear Posture Review." The Pentagon's NPR fact sheets are very up front that one of the NPR themes is to "Maintain extended deterrence to allies; consult with allies and friends" and that

Government leadership has consulted extensively with U.S. allies as the NPR process began and has continued to unfold, and will be central to ongoing analysis.

and

NPR leadership is committed to broad-based consultation across the stakeholder communities throughout the course of the review to effectively integrate views from Congress, think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Allies/friends and the public.

Is there always more that could be done?? Sure but it seems like this administration's team is giving it a strong effort and that should not be ignored. The announcement there will be an unclassified version of the NPR is a welcomed one and efforts like "Consultations with Congressional members, key committees and staff will continue on at least a monthly basis, and more frequently if requested" can play a valuable role in trying to synchronize all of the moving parts of the bullet train that is currently US nuclear policy. After drifting a bit off topic, another major issue is the Japanese extended deterrent debate is:

2. Japan's view of the regional security environment in East Asia. Obviously they are not so stoked with what is happening here. The preeminent short term worry is the belligerence of North Korea as they fire off missiles theoretically capable of striking Tokyo. The increasingly impressive military, including nuclear, capabilities of the Chinese are also in the back of their mind. There's no doubt Japan is feeling a bit uneasy but the crux of the extended deterrence equation comes down to:

3. Are the answers to the first two factors so overwhelming negative that it justifies the substantial risks of going nuclear vis-a-vis the benefits those nuclear weapons would provide. There are two issues to unpack here:

A. The risks of going nuclear are substantial. For the only country to suffer a nuclear attack who plays a leading role in calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons to opt for a nuclear weapon would be an enormous deal. It would probably require NPT withdrawal. It would be a substantial, maybe nail in the coffin, blow to disarmament efforts. It would be based on a calculated decision to lose much of their fuel supply. The international community would seek other punitive measures. It would send waves of instability throughout Asia as countries scramble to respond to a country whose constitution mandated pacifism tries to get an independent deterrent as quickly as possible.

B. How large are the benefits of an indigenous Japanese deterrent? Suppose Japan "breaks out" and develops a few deliverable nuclear warheads. Despite their impressive knowledge and capability, it will still take some time to get all that right once they decide to head down that path. In the interim, Japan is standing alone in the rain openly flaunting international law and providing a big incentive for adversaries to strike and thereby delay or stop their effort to get a weapon. Furthermore, suppose they produce a small number of deliverable warheads. That may help "deter North Korea" (a phrase that is not particularly helpful because it connotes a Cold War MADesque relationship that doesn't adequately capture the situation) although having two very small nuclear powers close to each other in an unstable region also creates the propensity a number of problems. The Japanese focus on missile defense while remaining under the US umbrella makes a lot more sense because it can start to provide them an independent capability that is nonetheless defensive without all the problems posed by going nuclear. Moving to China, if they had enough deliverable nuclear weapons they may be able to "deter China" insofar as China would calculate the costs of a war against Japan as too high but the more likely (albeit still low) conflict scenario is that a nuclear Japan is begrudgingly forced to get involved in a dispute of territorial integrity, according to the Chinese, over Taiwan. That would be ++ungood.