The Audacity of Pragmatism?

By Chris Jones

For some time now, there’s been serious concern that the “nuclear bureaucracy” is slow rolling Obama’s ambitious Prague Agenda, particularly through the NPR. While that might be part of the explanation, there’s another interesting possibility to consider: what if the President agrees with the purportedly terrible options presented in the NPR? Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus’ report in the WP today:

Does he substantially advance his bold pledge to seek a world free of nuclear weapons by declaring that the "sole purpose" of the U.S. arsenal is to deter other nations from using them? Or does he embrace a more modest option, supported by some senior military officials, that deterrence is the "primary purpose"? . . . The president was briefed on the document this week and requested additional intermediate options, officials say 

In other words, the primary purpose to sole purpose spectrum set the bandwidth for the decision. Obama’s request for intermediate options very well may be an indicator of where he will try to come out on the issue: somewhere in the middle. As is often the case, the race to the middle will leave both sides disappointed. Chipping away at the role of nuclear weapons will be seen as undermining national security to some and an abandonment of the transformational Prague speech by others. Responding the first group will largely rely on fundamental disputes like the degree to which conventional weapons constitute an effective deterrent and the value of international (nuclear) arrangements like the NPT. Those debates will continue to be had but it is the argument of the second group that this post will discuss. After a campaign driven largely by the lofty ideals of hope and change, the President has had a hard time actualizing what that means. Part of it can be chalked up to the difficulty of getting things done “on the ground” in Washington. In a highly partisan atmosphere where scoring political points for tomorrow’s election trump incentives for trying to compromise, the President has come up empty handed on many of his big-ticket items like health care and climate change. Another important part of the equation may be the transition that occurs by officially becoming the Commander in Chief.  David Broder argued last May:

What we have witnessed in the past few weeks is Barack Obama trying on and fitting himself to the role of commander in chief. The most controversial decisions of this period -- expanding the troop commitment and replacing the commander in Afghanistan, opposing the release of photos of abused detainees, keeping the system of military tribunals and delaying any change in the "don't ask, don't tell" policy on gays -- are of a pattern. In every instance, Obama heeded the advice of his uniformed and civilian defense leaders and in each case but Afghanistan, he abandoned a position he had taken as the Democratic presidential candidate.

As with other national security decisions to this point, it will not come as a large surprise should the results of the NPR decision day will disappoint those hoping for something more. The Prague speech arguably places nuclear weapons in a unique category because the administration announced such a transformational policy upon taking office but the fact still remains: Obama’s pragmatism will often be at odds with his transformational ideas. Writing after the State of the Union, Richard Stevenson explored the “ideological eclecticism” that describes Obama:

Yes, he’s a liberal, except when he’s not. He’s antiwar, except for the one he’s escalating. He’s for bailouts, but wants to rein in the banks. He’s concentrating ever-more power in the West Wing, except when he’s being overly deferential to Congress. He’s cool, except when he’s fighting-hot. In a world that presents so many fast-moving and intractable problems, nuance, flexibility, pragmatism — even a full range of human emotions — are no doubt good things. But as Mr. Obama wrapped up his State of the Union address on Wednesday night with an appeal to transcend partisan gamesmanship, he was plaintively testing a broader proposition: Is it possible to embrace complexity in a political and media culture that demands simple themes and promotes conflict?

The same seeming schizophrenia could also be cited on nuclear policy

He wants more money for the labs but he wants to get rid of nuclear weapons. He wants to engage with Iran but remains clear that all options are on the table. He wants to reduce the role of nuclear weapons but probably won’t even adopt a “sole purpose” declaration in the NPR. Etc etc.

Beneath all these seemingly contradictory decisions lies a complicated decisionmaking effort by the President.  Known as a leader who wants all of the facts and the view of everyone at the table, tough choices become excruciatingly difficult.  As a result, a more measured decision that is driven more by pragmatism than transformation often wins out.  That is not to say Obama does not hold these aspirational goals but once in hot seat that is the Oval Office, transformative ideas often have to take a snap back to reality as the President tries to juggle all of the legitimate arguments on both sides of a decision.  On decisions as complex and important as nuclear issues, the same sort of measured response will likely carry the day, much to the chagrin of those hoping for more.