The Autonomous Nuclear Agency

The debate has been heating up on the idea to transfer control of the nuclear weapons complex from DOE to DOD (original PONI blog post on the issue here).  A New York Times op-ed over the weekend proposed a third solution: "letting the nuclear administration stand as an independent agency whose importance could be underscored by having it report to the president."  This solution has some degree of intuitive appeal because neither DOE nor DOD have a pristine record when it comes to all things nuclear.   That being said, creating an autonomous nuclear administration from scratch is no cake walk.  If the article's statement that the "Energy Department has a poor record in managing costly and complex programs" is true, it means you cannot just copy NNSA/DOE's homework. The hypothetical planning for such an agency would need to take an in-depth look at the initial formulation and current structure and performance of NNSA.  Areas of striking efficiency and inefficiency have to be flagged to help create the blueprint for nuclear management heading into the future.  If possible, the advice of the military should also be included.  The article's statement that the complex, "will have to be modernized, reduced in size and managed a lot more carefully"  is no easy task.  The nuclear weapons complex in particular suffers from the bureaucratic dilemma of requiring a great deal of oversight while desperately needing to avoid the quagmire of inefficiency.