Beating a Dead Horse

In the most recent issue of Arms Control Today, Daryl Kimball writes that:

Since there is no viable or prudent pre-emptive strike option and punitive sanctions alone cannot stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile buildup, the latest crisis requires a renewed diplomatic push, led by Washington, combined with the implementation of more effective economic, military, and political sanctions.

In that same vein, Leon Sigal today wrote on the North Korea crisis that the United States needs to engage in “sustained diplomatic give-and-take” - the result of which, he claims, would be “steps [taken by North Korea] towards full denuclearization.”

Haven’t these same tactics been used previously though in attempts to deal with North Korea? In fact, Kimball notes in an earlier piece of his article that:

In each of the past three major nuclear-related crises in 1994, 2002, and 2006­ - when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test - ­North Korea has raised the stakes with provocative actions. Each time, U.S.-led diplomacy, backed by sanctions, has led to agreements involving food aid, fuel, and offers of normalized relations in exchange for verifiable constraints on Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

All of the actions taken thus far (and in prior incidents with the DPRK) have proven, at best, to be short-term patches - the practical equivalent of the United States merely buying itself time. Time and again, sanctions, talks, and materials (fuel, money, food, et cetera) are incorporated into negotiations resulting in North Korea “abandoning” its nuclear aspirations, only to pick them up again a short while later. Looking at the bigger picture, one can see that, within the last fifteen years, North Korea has made massive strides in both its nuclear program and its missile program - despite all so-called diplomatic efforts.

Will things really be different this time around? As Kimball’s piece shows, people realize that the whole basket of previously-used tactics has never worked outside of the very short term (possibly the equivalent of Chamberlain’s “peace in our time”?). As it would appear though, a return to the same tried-and-failed tactics is likely.

This is not to suggest that there is a feasible solution to the problem of North Korea - perhaps there is not. All of the U.S. negotiations and Six-Party Talks have revolved around the idea that the DPRK can be dissuaded and convinced to abandon its weapons aspirations. This may not be true. It is entirely possible that Kim Jong Il’s regime is intent upon obtaining a real nuclear capacity and is simply willing to delay it slightly in order to obtain concessions from the United States and its allies. If this is true, maybe the U.S. should, while still working diplomatically, begin preparing to deal with a nuclear-armed North Korea and its repercussions for the world.