Brian Mazanec’s Recap: Nuclear Scholars Discuss Pressing Nuclear S&T Issues

This past Friday, roughly a dozen PONI members met to discuss U.S. nuclear security and science and technology (S&T) as part of the PONI Nuclear Scholars Initiative (NSI). This initiative is intended to "build and sustain a network of young nuclear professionals by providing a unique venue for interaction, scholarly research, and policy-relevant analysis." Each NSI class meets one a month over a six month period to discuss major nuclear issues with senior officials and experts. As one of the NSI class of 2009 participants fortunate enough to participate in Friday's session, I thought I'd share a brief synopsis of what was discussed. Of course, as with most things PONI, all NSI sessions are subject to the Chatham House Rule in order to encourage open and candid discussions, thus my comments below won't associate any specific remarks to any one individual nor will our chair or guest speakers be identified.Our nuclear S&T-focused session was broken into four segments: Leveraging Science for Security; National Technical Nuclear Forensics Overview; Sustaining the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile; and Restoring a National Consensus on Nuclear Security. The first session initially delved into the history of the U.S. national security S&T enterprise (i.e. the national labs) and how it was in large part supported by the labs' nuclear weapons mission. Due to the impact of globalization and the demise of major private labs in the U.S. (such as Bell labs), today only the national labs invest heavily in large, high-risk/high-payoff, interdisciplinary research applicable to national security (think National Ignition Facility). Due to the national labs' previously well-funded primary mission of designing, building and maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal, they have an institutional capability to support other U.S. government (USG) projects of a non-stockpile nature. Recently, these projects include critical issues such as counterterrorism and nuclear forensics. We then discussed the prospect that the narrow "foundational" scope, focused on offensive nuclear weapons, is likely to lead to diminishing investments due to the renewed energy focus associated with climate change and the brewing arms control efforts likely to further reduce the U.S. nuclear stockpile. This will bring about an end to the "science on the cheap" that the labs provided for non-stockpile efforts. A new model was proposed to maintain the broad USG national security S&T enterprise as these nuclear investments decline. Speakers proposed removing NNSA from DOE and creating a new "Agency for National Security Applications." This proposed agency would presumably achieve stable long-term S&T investments, improve the S&T interagency planning mechanism and lead to the development of an integrated national security S&T strategy. Our second segment delved into the hot topic of National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF). As in the prior segment, it was pointed out that the vast majority of NTNF capabilities exist and were developed as part of the national labs' offensive nuclear mission. The concern was echoed that an increased focus on climate change could reduce resources for this foundational nuclear mission. NTNF capabilities are critical in both the pre and post detonation phases of the terrorist nuclear threat and it was very clear that much is being done internationally on this front. Ideally, the mere existence of NTNF capabilities will deter both illicit NRM traffickers and nation-states from smuggling or failing to robustly secure NRM materials, respectively. The third segment on Friday discussed the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), and by this point it was painfully clear that this program had value well beyond the maintenance of a safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear stockpile. The point had already been driven home that the science developed through the SSP and the broader nuclear weapon production effort that preceded it was responsible for much of the USG's national security S&T successes. This segment was a great refresher on the SSP and the related Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) debate. I for one came away with the realization that, although the SSP was successful in maintaining our stockpile in the near-term, it clearly could not continue in perpetuity as greater and greater risk is inevitable. NSI participants also learned a great deal about our nation's impressive advanced computing capabilities that support the SSP. Anyone familiar with the raging debate over cyberwarfare can't help but think this technology will also have a cryptological national security benefit in the increasingly important cyber domain... but I digress. Our fourth and final segment discussed the prospect for restoring a national consensus on nuclear security. This was a broad ranging discussion covering both nuclear-specific issues as well as general foreign policy concepts such as the democratic peace theory (don't ask how we got there... I'm still not sure). We truly explored a variety of factors impacting the international security environment. The way ahead for developing a national consensus seemed fairly clear with a new NPR under development, the bi-partisan Strategic Posture Commission report due this summer and START negotiations and other arms control discussions heating up. The convergence of all these efforts will likely lead to the development of a comprehensive nuclear strategy that addresses size, composition, alert posture and conditions for use. All in all it was a very interesting way to end the week. This was our fourth session this year and I know I speak for all NSI "scholars" when I say we're truly grateful to CSIS and its sponsors for putting together such an interesting program.