Carrier Diplomacy to Nuclear Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula

Mar 17, 2011

By Mark Jansson

The ongoing crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power site in Japan has overshadowed other troubling news in the region. Recent intelligence estimates suggest that North Korea has upped the ante with its nuclear weapons program, as testimony given last week by Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, reportedly attested that “the North may now have several plutonium-based nuclear warheads that it can deliver by ballistic missiles and aircraft as well as by conventional means.” Interestingly, this quote, which was reported widely in Korean media outlets, does not appear in the official transcript from the meeting.

True or not, the reports will add volume to the voices of those who want more assertive responses such as the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Recently, senior members of the ruling Grand National Party suggested that the U.S. consider doing so. And last year South Korea’s Defense Minister at the time, Kim Tae-young, stated matter-of-factly that this would be one of the options that the newly-formed U.S.-South Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee would consider.

Responding to the comments of the Grand National Party, Gary Samore said that he believed that the U.S. would say ‘yes’ to a formal request to place tactical nuclear weapons back in South Korea. He further speculated that doing so would motivate China to exert as much effort as it could to put an end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

At one point, the U.S. stationed over 900 nuclear weapons in South Korea and of a variety of types, including surface to surface missiles, anti-air missiles, 8-inch Howitzer nuclear artillery and a variety of bombs. The arsenal was decreased over time and the last nuclear weapons were removed in 1991. Today, it’s unclear what we’d deploy (likely gravity bombs), though it is certainly clear that there are significant practical problems, including the fact that South Korea simply doesn’t have the capability to handle forward deployed nuclear weapons.

Other officials in the U.S. and South Korea have sought to downplay the possibility of a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. Robert Einhorn dismissed the idea while in South Korea that week and the Cheong Wa Dae did the same.

If you follow Samore’s line of reasoning, however, then it seems as though the motivation behind voicing this possibility may be tied more directly to an interest in getting China’s attention than to an interest in actually following-through. Hopefully, that’s the case. Nonetheless, and all practical and logistical problems aside, this will apparently be an ongoing topic of discussion for U.S. and South Korea during Extended Deterrence Policy Committee meetings. The arguments in favor following three main themes that are worth teasing out a little bit more: (1) motivating China to intervene, (2) deterring North Korean aggression, and (3) assuring South Korea so that it doesn’t feel compelled to resort to more extreme responses.

Inspiring China to Do More

Samore has a point that it is important to demonstrate to China that North Korea cannot do whatever it wants with impunity and that acts of aggression will bring consequences. And the U.S. and its allies have done so through developing and deploying ballistic missile intercept capabilities, increasing U.S. military presence in the region, and revving up joint military exercises. China’s resounding opposition to the idea to the U.S. reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea may belie the fact that they can get over it if it happens, but it is another matter to assume that China will respond the way the U.S. wants it to and crack down hard on North Korea. That hasn’t been the case historically when we’ve deployed missile defense systems, sent the USS George Washington to the region, or conducted other demonstrations of collective resolve intended in-part to get China’s attention); it may not even be possible considering what China says about the limits of its powers of influence over North Korea; and trying to force China’s hand through nuclear tit-for-tat escalation will likely lend support to cynics on the Chinese side who fear that the U.S. is continuing to market extended nuclear deterrence as a proxy to advance its interests in other areas.

The potential for backfire with respect to China is always a concern, however, so that possibility should not be solely determinative of policy. But thinking of this as a “teachable moment” for China, in which the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons plays an instructive role, only makes sense insofar as we assume that China needs an education on how important stability on the Korean peninsula is to the U.S. and South Korea. And while some visible reminders to reinforce this idea may serve a purpose in this regard, going as far as redeploying tactical nuclear weapons is probably overkill. China already recognizes that it, too, benefits from a stable peninsula. What China is not convinced of is that a unified Korea with a capital in Seoul is to its long-term benefit. A better approach to engaging China will focus on tackling that issue by ameliorating China's concerns rather than exacerbate them through nuclear weapon redeployments.

Deterring North Korea

Putting aside a scenario in which this particular escalatory step serves as the one that inspires China to take decisive action to reverse North Korea’s nuclear program, the other presumed benefit would be that this step will have unique effects on North Korea that the subs, destroyers, troops and aircraft carriers in the region, not to mention all other manner of U.S. military capability, have not yet been able to induce. However, it is already abundantly clear that the U.S. has both the capability and longstanding affirmations of intent – solidified in the Nuclear Posture Review Report, establishment of the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, etc. – to protect South Korea with its nuclear weapons, so it’s hard to see what will be gained by pursuing new ways of demonstrating to North Korea what it already knows. While the U.S. and South Korea can trouble themselves ad infitum about whether or not they have done enough to convince North Korea – and for that matter, China – of their solidarity, we are already running out of room for ways to up the ante through demonstrations of power. And while it seems reasonable to assume that continuing to increase the military footprint, or making it a more nuclear one, will make things better by posing an ever graver threat to North Korea, there is also a danger of getting stuck in a mode of thinking linearly about the problem and, in so doing, come to believe that simply rattling the sabers harder will correct the failures of past saber rattling to achieve desired effects.

In weighing the risks and benefits of such a move, it is also tempting to be sanguine in reflecting about the role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and some have gone as far as suggesting that Russia take on a role of teaching North Korea about nuclear deterrence “to undercut false notions” that “a few nukes in the basement” affords them the ability to act reckless. But the Cold War strategy, no matter how good it looks in hindsight, brought us several serious nuclear crises that we’d do well to avoid recreating, let alone compounding the risk by attempting to scare a bizarre, brutal and paranoid authoritarian that Secretary Gates himself confesses to not understand into believing he is vulnerable. Stability on the nuclear level would be questionable and, as Pakistan and India can attest, would necessarily determine whether or not low-level provocations – like the Cheonan sinking and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island – are carried out even if some aspect of nuclear parity obtains.

Assuring South Korea

Finally, if the issue is assuring South Korea of its security, then there is no reason to think about this in purely nuclear terms. It is troubling to hear a South Korean defense minister mistakenly refer to the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee as the “nuclear deterrence committee.” Sorting these things out is what the committee exists to do and, hopefully, the new defense minister, Lee Hee-won, will bring a more nuanced view. But if it is at all desirable to have a U.S.-South Korea consultative body on deterrence issues, then it is crucial that this forum does not become an order-taking operation in which wish lists are created by allies with little incentive to be restrained and promptly fulfilled by a nervously eager to please U.S. or become an echo chamber in which hypotheticals are voiced and repeated enough times that they are presumed to represent feelings of genuine need. (The U.S. had a devil of a time retiring TLAM-N, partly due to a situation in which the U.S. and Japan simply kept doing what they thought the other wanted them to do.)

Samore emphasized that the purpose of the redeployed weapons would largely be symbolic. But both sides should be wary of running the risk of recreating the same dilemma that the U.S. and NATO are grappling with over tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, where the weapons’ symbolic importance has superseded and outlived their military usefulness.

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Prolonged periods of high tension on the peninsula and a growing sense of fatalism about whether or not North Korea will ever give up its weapons program are indeed cause for concern. The speculation on the possibilities of responding in-kind through new nuclear deployments is even somewhat predictable. However, the benefits of exercising this option are illusory and the arguments that would suggest otherwise, neatly theorized as they may be, are largely speculative and do not clear the high bar that should be set as the standard for such decisions, especially when the policy of the U.S. is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations.

Improving the security situation on the peninsula is better accomplished through making progress through diplomatic channels with China and North Korea too. It is no doubt exasperating for diplomats on all sides to deal with North Korea. But silence as a negotiating tactic – now nearly two years old – has outlived its usefulness for both sides. Restarting negotiations that seem undeserved in the first place and will undoubtedly be frustrating once they get going seems like rewarding bad behavior – and it will be. There’s no getting around that. But it could also be rewarding for South Koreans, too.

Incremental security gains are gains nonetheless. Negotiations are the best bet for de-escalating things in the short term and making progress towards a better situation in the long-term. To that end, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons would only makes sense insofar as it enables South Korea to feel okay about restarting talks. Even then, however, it is an unreasonable proposition. Using nuclear weapons as units of diplomatic currency has been the tradition of the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea. The U.S. and South Korea have been right in objecting to that and would be wrong to imitate it.