CATO Event: Matthew Kroenig's "Exporting the Bomb"

 

By Andrew St. Denis

 

Last Tuesday, the CATO Institute hosted a book forum with Georgetown professor Matthew Kroenig. Accompanying him were Charles Glaser, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University and Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prevention at the Council on Foreign Relations. Kroenig’s book, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, seeks to provide a logical strategic framework for the spread of nuclear weapons. Rather than focusing on the demand side of the equation – with its multitude of existing explanatory frameworks – Kroenig delves into the question of why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to others seeking the bomb.

 

Professor Kroenig began by outlining a logic to supply-side nuclear proliferation. Rather than economic benefits, it is strategic calculus that Kroenig believes drives proliferation. Relatively powerful states often face greater negative consequences due to nuclear proliferation that weaker states due to a number of factors, including deterrence of military intervention, a weakening of military coercion, the risks of being pulled into regional nuclear crises, dissipation of states’ strategic attention and assets to cover one more security development, and threats to the cohesion of alliances. As it constrains more powerful actors, weaker states will often benefit from nuclear weapons proliferation.

 

From this, Kroenig derives three propositions for the conditions under which states chose to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to others. The less powerful a state is relative to the recipient, the more likely it is to provide assistance. Common enemies are another condition that can spark nuclear assistance between states. Third, the less dependent a state is on a superpower patron, the more likely it is to undertake illicit transfers, as it will not have to weigh the costs of losing security guarantees against the perceived benefits of proliferating.

 

Kroenig then gave a brief overview of two case studies from his book: French assistance to Israel and Pakistani assistance to North Korea, Libya, and Iran. France’s decision to aid the Israeli program contrasts with U.S. resistance. After providing a research reactor to Israel in its second act of cooperation under Atoms for Peace, the U.S. refused further high-level requests from Tel Aviv. Israel then turned to France, who provided the young state with its reactor at Dimona, plutonium reprocessing capabilities, and quite possibly even designs for a nuclear device. Once it found out, the Kennedy administration attempted to pressure France and Israel into ceasing cooperation. The contrast between French and U.S. reactions to Israel’s requests is elaborated on under the three conditions that Kroenig previously outlined:

 

 

Kroenig also outlined his analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. He sees the AQ Khan network as an offshoot of state policy, not the work of a rogue scientist. In addition to formal agreements with Iran, North Korea, and Libya, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry frequently hosted Khan on his trips abroad. There is also evidence that top leaders either supported the program or allowed it to continue unhindered once they discovered it, including Benazir Bhutto’s personal involvement in transferring technology to the DPRK.

 

With the possible exceptions of Iran, Pakistan did not have to be concerned with projecting power over the three states to which it proliferated and vice versa. On the common-enemies front, while no immediate opponent comes to mind, some within Pakistan believed that the U.S. had become too powerful after the Cold War ended, and saw proliferation as a form of strategic defiance. Additionally, Pakistan’s proliferation activities occurred during a period in which Pakistan did not see the U.S. as a strategic partner, bookended by strategic cooperation with the U.S. during the Soviet War in Afghanistan and the post-9/11 period.

 

But wait, some might think: What about U.S. assistance to the UK in attaining its nuclear capabilities? Kroenig pointed out that, after it attained the bomb but prior to Britain’s display of its nuclear capabilities, the U.S. had attempted to shut the UK off from the benefits of the Manhattan Project. It was only once Britain had developed its own program and nuclear arsenal that the U.S. relented and began providing assistance to the UK nuclear program. Micah Zenko brought up the interesting topic of U.S. opposition to proliferation before a state achieves a nuclear capability, yet willingness to cooperate on various aspects of states’ nuclear programs after the fact - as in the case of the UK, France, Israel, and Pakistan. (It should also be noted that missile proliferation and civilian assistance in the form of education, training, and power generation don’t fall under the research focus of Kroenig’s work.)

 

Subsequent discussions among Kroenig, Glaser, and Zenko ranged from Soviet assistance to China’s fledgling nuclear efforts in the late 50s to nuclear assistance below the threshold of Kroenig’s research. Whether proliferation has a positive or negative effect on alliances was also debated, with Glaser taking the position that if the goal is to make allies more secure, then some may see proliferation of nuclear capabilities to them as a good thing. Kroenig responded that while this may negate the need for security guarantees, it also weakens a more powerful ally’s influence, making it harder to moderate or leverage others. International perspectives on proliferation as a danger were also debated – the varying interests of suppliers and receivers of nuclear technology, and variances in states’ views on a case-by-case basis.

 

Overall, the discussion was wide-ranging and both the guests and audience offered thoughtful input. Kroenig’s book provides an interesting exploration of supply-side proliferation, and the discussion last Tuesday opened avenues for further elaboration and expansion on the themes of his book.