Channeling the JASONs?

By Chris Jones

Murmurings that have been made in off the record meetings for some time now have been aired publicly in a big way: there are serious disagreements about how the unclassified summary of the 2009 JASON report is being interpreted when compared to the classified version of the report. Responding to a request from Michael Turner, ranking member on the Strategic Forces subcommittee, the three laboratory directors have submitted letters to turner giving their take on the study. I cannot yet find copies of the letter but according to Politico :

In letters responding to Turner, the lab directors said the unclassified version failed to spell out all the risks involved in modernizing weapons over the long term. “The JASON report states that the lifetimes of today’s nuclear weapons could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss of confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in [Life-Extension Programs] to date. I do not agree with this assertion,” Los Alamos Director Michael Anastasio wrote. “The available mitigation actions…are reaching their limits.” Lawrence Livermore Director George Miller said the JASON report’s executive summary “understates the risks and challenges” of modernizing the arsenal and warned of “increasing risk in our ability to certify the safety and reliability of our Cold War stockpile into the indefinite future.”

NNSA Spokesman Damien LaVera also followed up on the administration’s November statement indicating possible disconnect between the two document last Thursday:

The November 2009 JASON report confirmed key challenges associated with adding performance margin and incorporating modern safety and security features into aging nuclear weapons systems. It also supported the emerging bipartisan consensus on the need to preserve our workforce, build a modern nuclear security infrastructure, and enhance the science, technology and engineering at our laboratories and plants

What does this all mean? A few things.

1. Quoting the 2009 JASON report as evidence that the stockpiles can be maintained for decades with current efforts should be followed by an asterisk.

Opponents of RRW-esque type modernization programs were elated with the strength of the conclusions reached in the unclass summary. That excitement, however, should be tempered by recognition that there are disagreements at senior levels within government about the interpretation of the unclassified summary as opposed to the full classified report. It would be interesting to see if the JASONs panel was allowed to comment on the difference between the two reports.

2. The warhead issue is far from settled.

Vice President Biden’s January op-ed answered how the administration planned to tackle the infrastructure side of the equation but said little about warheads. As the NPR and START ratification descend upon Washington over the next few months, a difficult task remaining for the Obama administration, both substantively and politically, will be how to best reconcile maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile (as opposed to infrastructure or delivery stems) while trying to make good on moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. Hans Krisensen provided his take on the letters in the POLITICO article:

The directors disagreed with Jason's conclusion that continuing warhead refurbishment would work for decades, that we actually need warhead replacements, but that we can avoid a return to nuclear testing only if we send the labs more money.

That characterization is a little misleading. It is important to remember that the laboratory directors are not disagreeing with the JASON’s conclusions but rather the unclassified executive summary of the report. Pitting the lab directors versus the JASONs is much different than saying some of the report got lost in the declassification translation. How different the class and unclass versions of the report are we'll never know but saying the directors "disagreed with the Jason's conclusion" is not entirely fair.

3. At the end of the day, the answer to the warhead question is a technical one.

Lab directors are placed in a precarious situation: they are in charge of certifying the effectiveness of our stockpile but mentioning shortfalls in the ability to do so are disregarded as biased. POGO was quick to criticize the letters from the directors:

The directors of three national laboratories are going on the offensive . . . One key factor in the story, that Politico didn’t state clearly enough, is that unlike JASON, the Labs and Department of Energy (DOE) are not independent experts. They have a financial and bureaucratic conflict of interest. The Labs are privately run, and would see far less money coming in the door without these new buildings and programs
Unfortunately, they have convinced many decision-makers that two of these buildings — the proposed $5 billion Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement - Nuclear Facility at New Mexico’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and the unnecessary $3.5 billion Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12—and their missions, are necessary to ensure that the stockpile is reliable.

Two details about POGO’s piece are not quite right. First, the letters are a response to a request from Representative Turner as opposed to a director-led effort to drum up money for the labs. Second, the funds for modernizing physical infrastructure, which the Strategic Posture Commission noted is in “serious need of transformation,” is a separate question than the warhead question. Whether you are doing LEP or LEP 2.0 or RRW’s new cousin, the fact that you have Manhattan Project era buildings in shambles still remains.

The larger question about the credibility of statements from laboratory directors also deserves attention. While it is true that NNSA and the labs need to fight the same budget battles that every other agency does for their slice the federal budget pie, it does not mean that the statements from the lab directors about the nuclear stockpile should be thrown out. Their assessment is based on the reading of the classified JASON report and the outcome of this decision is a technical one.  Their job is to answer whether the warhead will be able to perform within certain margins should it need to.  If the lab directors disagree with the conventional wisdom about what the JASON's report says, it very well may be because they have gotten to read the entire classified report.  There is often fear of a classification boogeyman, whereby "it's classified" is used as a way to duck hard questions or exagerrate differences, but that is not sufficient to dismiss the lab director's arguments of out hand.  The debate about whether the stockpile can remain safe, secure, and effective under current procedures has been a long and intense one.  The 2009 JASON report was cited as the new silver bullet which should ameloriate concerns about the stockpile but if the conclusion of the unclass report is off base that raises even more questions about what should be done with the warheads.  Unfortunately, there is no way to discenr the "truth" of what the JASON report says but the fact that the weapons lab directors that the current interpretation of the unclass JASON summary is inadequate should say something

The debate about the JASON's study is also a recent example of a larger problem for lab directors: they are the ultimate source to quote, if they agree with your position.  As technical experts that have an enormous impact on policy, there are frequently cited as pre-eminent authorities when they make statements defending aspects of the current ability to maintain the stockpile yet they are dismissed as motivated by bureaucratic self-interest if they make statements that more needs to be done to maintain the stockpile. 

UPDATE: Thanks to Mark Donaldson at UCS who pointed out that the full text of the letters can be found here.