Commentary | On Shifting Ground: U.S. – Pakistani Relations

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) discusses the emerging crisis in U.S.-Pakistan relations, which threatens stability in South Asia, progress in Afghanistan, and broader gains made in the War on Terror.

According to MEMRI, the opposition parties that defeated General Pervez Musharraf in the elections of February 18 succeeded largely because they renounced Pakistan’s cooperation in the War on Terror and pledged to eliminate the United States’ role in Pakistani affairs. A majority of Pakistanis see the United States as a meddlesome hegemon. Now that they’ve had the chance to vote, U.S. relations with Pakistan are in a dangerous state of limbo. Hanging in the balance are the United States’ long-term strategic goals in the region, as well as the tenuous gains of the long slog in Afghanistan.

In recent years, the United States hasn’t done the best job of making reliable friends in Pakistan. Scorned by the international community after assuming power in a military coup, Musharraf became one of Washington’s favorite dictators following September 11. The autocrat renounced his former support of the Taliban and positioned himself as an expedient ally to the United States’ war in Afghanistan. Unfortunately for the U.S., Musharraf has been all but politically neutralized by an electorate grown tired of his rule, U.S. support for his army, and U.S. military operations.

Since taking charge as Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani has repeatedly emphasized Pakistani sovereignty, often in opposition to a U.S. military presence, and has openly engaged the Taliban in a dialogue. Pakistani proponents of the dialogue argue that it will end the risk of destabilizing terrorist attacks; vehement critics, including Washington, argue that such measures will aid a resurgence of the ousted extremists, who continue to seek shelter in Pakistan while keeping up the fight in Afghanistan. As Gilani defines the foreign policy that his government will pursue, it remains to be seen what kind of relations he will have with the U.S. An outright rejection of the U.S.-Pakistani partnership would be disastrous for American efforts in the region, which are confounded by a resilient enemy and impeded by Pakistan’s growing inconsistency as an ally.

Cultivating strong ties with a democratic Pakistan—not just with our man in its military—will be essential if the U.S. is to see continued progress in Afghanistan. This was the subject of a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), echoed by Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE), as well as General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), and Wendy Chamberlain, President of the Middle East Institute, called for coordinated U.S. policies towards Pakistan that tie future aid to performance, support a rejuvenated democracy, and build the long-term political, economic, and military capacities of our South Asian ally. The old tack of “transactionary” relations has arguably done more harm than good. By ignoring Pakistan after it helped U.S. proxies defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan, then buying Musharraf’s support for our most recent episode in Afghanistan, the United States has convinced an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis that we are an unreliable ally focused solely on our own interests. Meanwhile, Pakistani forces have done little to help secure the Afghani border or prevent Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) from becoming havens for militants. Many in Washington feel that we haven’t gotten much in return for the $5.5 billion in military aid that has gone to Pakistan since September 11, 2001 (although hundreds of millions did buy a nice air-defense radar for Pakistan’s “counter-terrorism” efforts).

At the hearing, General Zinni reiterated what other leaders, including General David Petraeus, have said before: Pakistan is the primary front in the War on Terror. The United States’ success in combating global terrorism will be determined by our success in Pakistan. Zinni also joined Chamberlain and others in emphasizing that success cannot be achieved by force alone. Victory will be the result of a sustained U.S. commitment to abolishing conditions of economic underdevelopment and disenfranchisement, which are widespread in Pakistan, and to restoring the United States’ image in South Asia as a principled, beneficent nation. According to Chamberlain, this becomes an “accountability” issue, not simply an issue of “accounting.” What matters are the results of our efforts, not how much funding we continue to pump into the region.

The hope is that the current—but more importantly, the next—administration in Washington will pursue a new kind of engagement with Pakistan. Despite currently tense relations, it is likely that the U.S. retains enough political capital in Islamabad to make good on this vision. Polls taken after the United States’ humanitarian response to the earthquake of 2005 suggest that there is latent popular support for the U.S. in Pakistan. The way to access this support is through effective public diplomacy, investment in sound development projects, and humanitarian assistance. But here’s the rub: while billions of aid dollars will be hard for Prime Minister Gilani to ignore, so is the shouting of millions of voters who are frustrated with the United States. Pakistanis are increasingly exasperated by any American presence, not just that of our military. Because of this, the United States must walk a diplomatic tightrope, strengthening local support for our continued presence in South Asia while waging a difficult war against extremism—necessary in our view but more and more unwelcome in the view of Pakistan. This time, we had better not lose our balance.