The Commitment Trap

Armchair Generalist (a solid defense blog) argued against strategic ambiguity in saying:

I hate this game the politicians play - “we will retaliate and it will be massive,” but we’re not going to tell you if it’s coming by cruise missile with a nuclear or conventional warhead. For some reason that I don’t fathom, this “strategic ambiguity” is supposed to be the preferred diplomatic response. I suppose “civilized” nations aren’t supposed to openly discuss the potential of nuclear warfare, except behind closed doors. It might offend the senses.

The Strategic Posture Commission outlines the general defense of strategic ambiguity when it states:

Second, the United States should retain calculated ambiguity as an element of its nuclear declaratory policy. Potential aggressors should have to worry about the possibility that the United States might respond by overwhelming means at a time and in a manner of its choosing. Calculated ambiguity may not be wise in every instance, as deterrence in crisis may be better served by being explicit. But calculated ambiguity creates uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about just how the United States might respond to an act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce restraint and caution on the part of that potential aggressor. The threat to impose unacceptable consequences on an aggressor by any means of U.S. choosing remains credible.

While there could be a bit of a “nuclear warfare allergy” in public efforts, the SPC gets at the core justification behind calculated ambiguity: trying to sow doubt in a potential aggressors mind.  Telling Iran, for example, we will respond to attacks on Israel with massive cruise missile strikes means that the United States will have to do precisely that should that unfortunate situation arise. This “commitment trap” (admittedly from an article opposed to having a nuclear response to chem/bio attacks on the table) could actually make it more likely that countries try to test the United States to see if we will follow through.  The President will have no choice but to honor our specific declared response, even if he/she doesn’t agree, to appease the American public and to ensure that allies around the globe do not consider security commitments made to them worthless.

The question of strategic ambiguity gets even stickier when dealing with asymmetric responses. When head of STRATCOM Kevin Chilton, for example, explicitly says all options are on the table in response to a cyber attack it raises a couple questions:

1. How credible is the threat?  Given that “a nuclear response appears highly unlikely” to a cyber attack,  would it actually give hackers some pause before engaging in cyber attacks? If so, it might be very good to keep on the table given the substantial worry about cyber in the defense arena and the hundreds of thousands of daily probes of DOD computers.

2. That said, could there be a “nuclear creep” when these options are (sometimes not so) subtly left on the table?  Launching nuclear weapons at Beijing in response to a cyber attack seems unlikely and probably is.  Nonetheless, in the panic and fear that would take hold in the aftermath of a comprehensive cyber attack that crippled the nation’s infrastructure, things could be very different.  Would an administration opposed to a nuclear response be able to rebuff possible domestic (and/or international) calls for a nuclear response? Hopefully.  Nonetheless, the nuclear game in particular is one where the little things, even in highly unlikely scenarios, make a very big deal. Choose your words carefully.