Consultation Station

Carnegie hosted an event yesterday titled "Rethinking U.S. Nuclear Posture" featuring panelists Michael Gerson and Jeffrey Lewis that was moderated by James Acton. Gerson's remarks centered around establishing the case for a No First Use pledge and Lewis centered his attention on extended deterrence. The discussion of extended deterrence was split into two main topics: Japan and NATO. To close the session, policy recommendations were provided for each. In the case of Japan, Lewis argued consultations can help us "hold hands" with Japan in an effort to begin to pare down what may be currently considered necessary capabilties or positions in the name of extended deterrence. For NATO, the recommendation was to consolidate the TNW's located in Europe to two sites (and perhaps reduce numbers). Both proposals begin to tug at a core question with regards to extended deterrence: how should the United States go about the consultation process with its allies when discussing extended deterrence?

The fundamental difficulty about extended deterrence consultations is that they inevitably depend on the the recipient nation's interpretation of the situation. If they are assured, all is well. If not, there are some serious problems. This can put the U.S. in a tough place because, as Jeffrey Lewis explained, this results in a "wish list" phenomenon where Japan will always order, as one audience member quipped, a TLAM/N, a side of fries, and a litany of other capabilities because there is no reason for them not to. In response to the “eye of the beholder” curse that complicates extended deterrence consultations, Lewis argued that the prospects that the Japanese take a cue from Sarah Palin and decide they are Going Rogue to develop their own nuclear weapons are overhyped. Rather, he argued that the Japanese see their relationship with the United States as so fundamental to their security that the chances they decide to muck it are low. I tend to agree that Japanese nuclearization claims tend to be exaggerated. That said, it is important to prevent the consultation pendulum from swinging from wish list scribe to informant of bad news that the Japanese will have to swallow because they don’t have much of a choice. I don’t think this is what Jeffrey Lewis is arguing for but am merely pointing out that it is important to be cautious of the perception that the argument the Japanese are very dependent upon us can foster.  Finding the middle ground between the two ends of the consultation spectrum is the tough but necessary task.

What does this mean for consultation? A few things. First, the more the merrier provided the consultation strategy is well defined. I agree with Lewis that Kurt Campbell (and I’d add Chip Gregson/DoD) have made consultations with Japan a priority. Their new "nuclear umbrella forum" for consultation seeks to create a more involved effort to engage Japanese concerns and should be applauded. That said, the tough task is figuring out what is the U.S. game plan heading into the consultations. Few, if any, people would contest the idea that we should consult with our allies about extended deterrence questions but sometimes it seems like consultation, particularly when peppered positive adjectives like “deep,” “strategic,” "robust," and “constructive,” is tossed out as an almost panacea-like solution to security alliance problems but there needs to be more discussion about what that consultation should entail. As our friends at the CSIS Pacific Forum explained in their excellent new US-Japan report:

It is mildly disconcerting then that one Japanese participant warned that “things will get worse before they get better.” If so, then there is an even higher premium on consultation and close coordination between the two governments. But, this Japanese warned, the consultation should have results, and not just be consultation for its own sake. That sounds easy, but as several speakers reminded the group, the U.S. has not always been good at consultation.

Second, the U.S. needs a wish list of its own before heading into consulations. The U.S. needs to determine what it views as vital to deterrence and/or extended deterrence, in terms of both declaratory policy and force structure, and what can be gifted to cash for clunkers. The NPR will play a big role in this effort and while I agree with Jeffrey that extended deterrence may be the biggest theme in the NPR, I don’t think that will necessarily foreclose the ability of the NPR (or perhaps DoD led interagency teams after the NPR) to tee up a few things for the extended deterrence chopping block.

Third, accompanying the U.S. wish list needs to be what they intend to offer as bait to adequately assuage Japanese concerns. Given that the Japanese may view the TLAM/N sitting in storage as "their" missile with a talismanic halo around it, if the U.S. wants to begin a discussion to get rid of the TLAM/N, it needs to be able to adequately explain to the Japanese how other U.S. nuclear and conventional commitments can be altered and/or are sufficient to make the Tokyo for Los Angeles pledge credible. Some of this formula might include ways to visibly show our commitment through bomber flights and intentional submarine surfaces to prove we are there or highlighting commitments to visible troop deployments in Asia. The U.S. could also investigate further technology transfers such as missile defense or fighter jet sales. As the Pacific Forum report argues, the “Japanese see missile defense as central to the alliance and the extended deterrent.”  Using the interoperable Japanese missile defense platform to conduct the 2008 test, despite it failing, can be the type of joint exercises and cooperation that strengthen the military cooperation of the alliance. 

Fourth and finally, consultation needs to build on the progress started this summer by Campbell and Gregson to be institutionalized as an ongoing dialogue. Exhibit A of how not to do this is the what happened with the recent pseudo-botching of the missile defense decision (whose announcement occured on the 70th Anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland). As explained by the Cable:
 

The administration had hoped to finish consulting with allies before announcing the plan, but that idea was ruined by exactly the kind of transatlantic rumor-mongering the administration was trying to avoid, one senior official confirmed on the record to The Cable "What happened was that some of the consultations that we had abroad started creating some leaks with erroneous information about what the plan was," said Michèle Flournoy, under secretary of defense for policy, who traveled to Europe with Ellen O. Tauscher, under secretary of state for arms control, and Alexander Vershbow, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, to deliver the news.

While the Obama administration's consultation efforts got undercut midway through by a leak from pro missile defense Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski and therefore sort of have an excuse, it nonetheless highlights how painstaking consultation with allies on thorny security issues can be and the importance of having a strategy in place to effective guide those consultations.  Extended deterrence consultations in particular, because the existential security of a country is at stake, require an in-depth discussion over time that explores issues like the direction the U.S. intends to take its policy, the Japanese (or other U.S. ally) reaction to U.S. goals, and ways to forge a sufficient compromise when the two sides disagree on particular capabilities or policies.  It may be a difficult fight trying to hammer our a workable deal for both sides but it is worth the effort to do so instead of opting for the FYI method or the Santa Clause method because it is convenient.