Cordesman: Will Iraq become the forgotten war?

CSIS's Anthony Cordesman wrote an op-ed in today's Washington Post warning that the gains in Iraq could be lost if we rush our exit.

Sadr City, Baghdad. Flickr photo by Army.mil used under a Creative Commons license.

He argues that the costs of completing the clear, hold, and build strategy "will be far lower than the mid- to long-term cost of throwing away a high probability of leaving Iraq with lasting security and stability." He further writes, "[i]n strategic terms, Vietnam was always expendable. Iraq and the Gulf are not."

I'd say we should definitely

I'd say we should definitely pay great attention to our strategy while leaving, even though the costs can be expensive. That said, we are working within the context of an Iraqi populace that wants us to leave. Running against that has cost in its own right, after all the violence reduction of the surge came not just from troops but also Sunni allies and the ceasefire with Sadr's group. Outside of the Kurds, I think there's little interest in alliances if the U.S. is not seen to be leaving within the deadlines set by the Status of Forces agreement.

I'd also go a bit further and say that U.S. interests do not require providing hegemonic stability to the Gulf. I read the Op-ed and I think that was what Dr. Cordesman was arguing, although I could be wrong on in my interpretation.

I don't think Russia or China, let alone Iran, now or in the foreseeable future, are in a position to dominate the region themselves. Absent such dominance by another great power we should be able, through diplomatic and economic means, to get around any attempt to appeal to the self-interests of Gulf states that might act together to drive up oil prices to a level that actively harmed U.S. interests. Moreover, much of the hostility we face is a result of our interventions, thus without providing hegemonic stability we wouldn't be a target of as much anger in the region.

This does still leave the issue of finding a way to work out a peace agreement within Israel and with its remaining neighbors, but I don't think hegemonic stability is the way to go there either.

Obviously, we also want a stable, peaceful Iraq because it's simply a good thing. However, when accounting for the interests of the Iraqi people we must also account for their democratically expressed wishes, so I think that also points to withdrawal strategies within the confines of the SOFA.