The Credibility Asterisk

Two things seem to be the case: -The nonproliferation regime is at a tipping point -The United States is on a quest to restore its nonproliferation credibility. Ideally, increasing the second can be used to prevent a negative outcome of the first.  Unfortunately, it may not be that easy.   There are a number of factors that complicate that equation: A. The U.S. is just getting back to zero-- While it is likely that the U.S. will try to take steps such as negotiating a START follow-on and ratifying the CTBT in the lead up to the May 2010 RevCon in part to score image points, it begs the question of what we look like right now.  U.S. credibility has eroded to the point were CTBT ratification, for example, will be seen as making good on long overdue debts (the 1995 RevCon indefinite extension deal) rather than leading the charge forward. Countries will also continue to criticize us that we still have not gone far enough to meet Article VI demands. B. Nuclear elephants in the room 1. Russia/China- U.S. nonproliferation credibility is only a fraction of the problem for NNWS concerned about nuclear weapons.  China may sign the CTBT at or around the time of the U.S. and does not like being isolated internationally but at the same time there are strongly opposed to transparency measures (necessary for any serious move towards zero) and show no signs of slowing modernization.   Likewise, a START follow-on is probably in Russia's interest but they are also modernizing and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons in their posture to offset conventional inferiority.  These are both huge obstacles to progress that will not be easy to tackle. 2. Israel/India/Pakistan- These 3 nuclear elephants represent fundamentally unacceptable circumstances for some countries.  Egypt, for example, held the 2005 RevCon hostage and will not discuss CTBT ratification (necessary for entry into force) because of the Israel question.  While the prospects for roping these countries into the NPT are dim, this will be a challenge that has to be dealt with at some point for major nonproliferation gains to be made. C. NPT Loopholes- Even if U.S. nonproliferation credibility is top of the line, the credibility of the NPT hinges on its ability to prevent NNWS members from acquiring nuclear weapons.  The ability for countries to stay in bounds and learn about things nuclear and then call no joy under Article X (North Korea) or make potentially worrying progress towards a nuclear weapons capability while roughly staying in bounds (Iran) casts doubt on the NPT as a whole to be an effective mechanism for curbing proliferation.  U.S. credibility may lead to slightly increased international support for punitive measure (although by no means guaranteed) but does not serve as a major driver for whether these type of countries make the decision to try for a bomb. The argument is not that we should not pursue nonproliferation credibility but the estimated impact it will have needs to be realistically assessed.  One small step for US nonproliferation credibility does not automatically mean one giant leap for nonprolifkind.