CSIS RA/PONI Member Matt Dupuis’ original post on North Korea’s mixed signals

CSIS RA/PONI member Matt Dupuis wrote the following original piece for the PDTI blog on the mixed signals that North Korea has been sending to the United States:

It didn’t take North Korea long to begin fighting for space on the new administration’s agenda. In the weeks leading up to President Barack Obama’s inauguration, Pyongyang unleashed a flurry of statements undoubtedly aimed at capturing Washington’s attention as other crises and diplomatic flashpoints took precedence. Yet it sent mixed signals in the process.

The North initially gave the impression that it was adopting a conciliatory tone toward the new lineup in Washington. Then it later reversed course and hardened its stance. Table 1 briefly summarizes the latest string of Pyongyang’s schizophrenic-like headline diplomacy.

Table 1: North Korea’s Mixed Signals

Good NORK Behavior	Bad NORK Behavior
Soon after Obama’s election, a North Korean official coolly remarked that his country would enter into dialogue with any US administration willing to do the same. [11/7/2008]	Said it would not get rid of its nuclear arsenal until the US established normalized diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and ended the extension of a “nuclear umbrella” to the security of South Korea. [1/13/2009]
The North was reportedly interested in sending Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea, to join the festive crowds at Obama’s inauguration and brave the cold. [1/12/2009]	Called for inspections of US military facilities in the South to guarantee that US nuclear weapons were not stationed there.[1/13/2009]
Chinese media quoted Kim Jong Il as saying his country “is committed to the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, and hopes to live in peace with all other sides.” Kim also remarked that North Korea does not “want to see tension emerge in the situation on the peninsula, and we are willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with China and push forward the six-party process without interruption.” [1/23/2009]	The weekend before Obama’s inauguration, a uniformed military official read a statement on North Korean television calling for an “all-out confrontational posture” toward South Korea. [1/17/2009]

What’s behind the North’s shift? Pyongyang’s latest statements and hard-line rhetoric seem designed to accomplish several objectives: forge an early split between the Obama administration and its counterparts in Seoul and Tokyo; test the patience and resolve of a newly-minted leadership in Washington; and raise the stakes of its standoff, hoping, perhaps, to extract a high price for early engagement with the US.

It might also be a calculated effort to project a strong and unified image to deflect outside suspicions that a succession battle is underway in the country following the recent ill health of North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Il. (The conflicting messages might even be a sign of a power struggle underway in Pyongyang, with varying factions seeking to assert themselves as Kim’s demise looms on the horizon.)

Whatever the case may be, Pyongyang’s verbal offensive poses a unique challenge for the US. The Obama administration cannot let North Korea’s outbursts set the framework for engagement, forcing the US to respond before its policy has been fully formulated. At the same time, Washington cannot completely ignore North Korea’s erratic remarks or the continued existence of its nuclear weapons program and arsenal.

The first order of business should be to engage with South Korea, Japan, and China to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to a diplomatic solution and gauge what these countries are prepared to do to assist the Six-Party Talks (either to bolster the process or punish Pyongyang’s intransigence). The US will then have to pick up where the Bush administration left off and negotiate a verification protocol to begin the full investigation of the North’s nuclear history.

To counter Pyongyang’s apparent claim that it will not disarm without normalized relations with Washington, the US should offer to meet North Korea halfway by proposing to open an interests section in the country provided North Korea reciprocates by temporarily placing its nuclear arsenal under international supervision. This should only be done once verifying Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration has begun and progress is being made in other areas identified by the Six-Party Talks.

Such an arrangement would not be the end of the road; it would not establish complete diplomatic relations between the two countries and, crucially for North Korea, would be reversible. Yet it would be a useful first step toward greater confidence and mutual trust, something both countries will require more of if the disarmament effort is to succeed. And a bit of creative flexibility on Washington’s part could influence other Six-Party partners to influence their leverage where appropriate.

Skeptics might argue that North Korea would never consent to such an exchange. Perhaps. But it has taken similar steps in the past. For example, under the 1994 Agreed Framework Pyongyang placed 8,000 spent fuel rods under the IAEA’s watch and in recent years has made significant strides in disabling its plutonium-production infrastructure.

If nothing else, the overture itself would provide a clever litmus test by which North Korea’s sincerity could be judged.