CTBT Follow-On

There’s been an exchange over the past few days between us and NOH about an op-ed published on CTBT ratification (the original article, the initial response, their response). For the most part, the disagreements boil down to the degree to which many of the arguments for CTBT in the original and follow-up are correct. It is not an argument for or against CTBT but rather a discussion about whether some of the claims advanced about why ratification should happen and the benefits it would provide are overstated.

Regarding testing, the fact that all nations spare the DPRK have refrained from testing in the last baker’s decade is undoubtedly positive. The claim, however, that “Except for outlaw nations like North Korea, the world today has quit the business of testing nuclear weapons” sets up a binary that could be unhelpful. While the prospect of testing by “responsible stakeholders in the international community” seems and probably is faint, delineating the distinction between the two sets of countries could be a tougher task than initially assumed. For example, India and Pakistan, not shockingly, received some flak for their 1998 tests. If this relegated India and Pakistan to outlaw status, it didn't last long, relatively speaking, as evidenced by the landmark India Deal which many think de facto accepts India to the nuclear club.  If it didn't, the explanation is presumably that the anti-testing norm was not as strong but that may not be sufficient to explain the situation.  Take Iran in today's environment.  They probably fall somewhere in the middle of the responsible stakeholder and outlaw dichotomy as they tiptoe around compliance with international norms, particularly on nuclear issues. What happens if they decide to test after acquiring a nuclear weapon?  There would surely be the same wave of diplomatic outrage and perhaps some sanctions and similar punitive measures but would the severity and likelihood of these punishments be enough to convince the Iranian leadership to balk?  Discussions of outlaws are inevitably tricky in the world of nuclear proliferation when you have 4 states,  3 of which currently seem to fall under the "responsible stakeholder" status, that are not party to the NPT.  Analyzing nonproliferation norms is a not cut and dry calculation that can be determined by dividing countries up into cops and robbers.

The argument about CTBT locking the U.S. into testing was followed by the caveat “The latter argument, whether or not correct” which seeks to highlight the fact that it will be made, as Steve Rademaker did in the PDI debate on CTBT, whether or not one thinks it is a red herring. The argument that Article X allows withdrawal doesn’t seem as pertinent as the debate about what conditions will be attached to CTBT ratification to ensure stockpile certification. This is why there would be many who would strongly disagree with the characterization that "scientific experts have affirmed repeatedly that the nuclear arsenal can be reliably maintained for decades without testing," which is a much stronger statement than saying the JASON's study concluded plutonium pits are good for 80-100 years.  Regardless, it may actually be disadvantageous for those in favor of CTBT to make statements, even though caveated, such as “there is no CTBT Police that is going to put the U.S. nuclear arsenal under lock and key if the Senate approves the pact” when one of the main reasons for ratification is gaining political points on the international stage by succumbing to a major international treaty.

While the debate about consensus is limited to “experts,” it still may be too early to use the C word. For CTBT proponents, there’s no doubt adding voices such as Scowcroft and Linton Brooks will be valuable in trying to pick off Republicans like Lugar and McCain. That said, SPRC opponents of the CTBT in addition to experts like the New Deterrent Working Group will be front and center at places like Congressional Hearings and other important discussions about the "longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control negotiations."

The only disagreement on entry into force is purely one of likelihood. The more countries that ratify the merrier but there is good reason to be skeptical, "near zero" skeptical, that renewed momentum will be sufficient to get all the Annex II countries to ratify.

The “horizontal proliferation” discussion prompts two quick arguments. First, my original argument stemmed from the skepticism about the paragraph not mentioned in the follow-up about the CTBT, now or in 1999, doing a great deal to resolve Iran and North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapon in conjunction with the conclusion that “The Test Ban Treaty is a simple, necessary, and effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.” Perhaps this can be chalked up to the word limits of an op-ed but this seems like an overly simplistic conclusion, as highlighted "jumbled, beautiful political morass" of the nonproliferation regime.  Second, while the CTBT is, or is claimed to be, the litmus test for U.S. dedication to the interlocking nonproliferation regime, there’s also an argument to be had about the limitations of just how much ratification will get us. The NPT/CTBT quid pro quo is a great example. The NNWS reason, at least in part, they agreed to the 1995 extension presumed quick ratification of CTBT. While lack of U.S. ratification does appear as foot dragging, NNWS also often argue that making up for that will just be seen as paying past due debts, rather than a fresh new impetus behind these countries adopting economically painful and diplomatically sensitive measures to try to stop countries like Iran and North Korea from developing an nuclear weapon.

Update: edited for clarity.