De-Alert Debate Recap

By John K. Warden

Last week, we hosted our fifth live debate.  In one of the best debates of the series, John Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and Walt Slocombe, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, debated about de-alerting the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.  The audio and video is available here.

The specific topic wording was:

Resolved: that the United States should pursue a negotiated agreement with Russia to de-alert each country's nuclear arsenal by implementing reversible physical changes to substantially increase the time required to launch

Each side, Steinbruner on the affirmative and Slocombe on the negative, gave an opening statement.  The statements were followed by a series of question periods (asking each other, moderator, then audience) and brief closing remarks.

Steinbruner began with five points that together made the case for de-alerting.  First, U.S. military might makes conventional weapons an adequate deterrent.  Second, because nuclear weapons are the only fundamental military threat to the U.S., the U.S. has an incentive to restrict global deployment. Third, the legacy deployment pattern of our nuclear arsenal greatly exceeds what is required for a credible deterrent; it's set up for preemption.  Fourth, a superior force configuration could include removing warheads and keeping them in storage with transparent protocols for reactivation; this would provide for adequate deterrence, eliminate the risk of inadvertent catastrophe, and help hinder terrorist access.  Finally, de-alerting unilaterally would expose the U.S. to a preemptive attack; it must be done reciprocally as a result of negotiations with Russia.

Slocombe raised two main issues with de-alerting.  First, de-alerting is not technically feasible.  How would a system equally restrict the ICBM heavy Russian force and the SLBM heavy U.S. force?  How could U.S. submarines be unable to launch immediately, while remaining survivable?  Second, even if those questions could be answered, de-alerting would be dangerous in a crisis.  As tensions increased, both sides would have an incentive to quickly reactivate their forces, which would actually increase the chance of a mistaken nuclear conflict (Slocombe compared this to conventional build-ups that started World War I).  Unlike the current arrangement, the first country to get their forces on alert would have a short-lived nuclear monopoly, which would incentivize nuclear preemption.

Instead of de-alerting, Slocombe proposed that the U.S. and Russia take other actions to prevent the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or miscalculated nuclear launch (he also downplayed the risk).  If there are deficiencies in authorization, safety, or early warning, those problems should be fixed.  Also, if the core danger is preemption, the better solution would be for the U.S. to improve the survivability of its forces and command and control.  While a survivable force would retain the ability to launch quickly, it would be less likely to be used.

The questions and answer period following the opening statements helped narrow the debate to a few fundamental questions:

1) Would de-alerting help in a crisis?

Steinbruner and Slocombe agreed that a technical glitch, unauthorized nuclear launch, or somebody misreading a radar screen is unlikely.  Instead, the scenario to worry about is a crisis escalating out of control.  When prompted for a more specific scenario, Steinbruner described low-level tensions between Russia and NATO in a country like Estonia.  Russia, fearing conventional inferiority, might opt for nuclear preemption.  According to Steinbruner, de-alerting might increase the chances that nuclear weapons remained out of the conflict.  Slocombe argued that, instead, a race to remobilize would be more likely to escalate to nuclear use.

2) What are the technical possibilities?

Steinbruner proposed that a de-alerting regime might be designed so that no country could get an advantage in a re-alerting race.  Slocombe was skeptical that such an arrangement was possible.  In particular, Slocombe couldn't imagine a solution to submarines.  While this question cannot be answered without further inquiry by technical experts, it could determine whether a stable de-alerting regime is possible.

3) When, if ever, should de-alerting happen?

As a member of the audience put it after the debate, the real question is whether we should pursue de-alerting now to help improve the relationship between the U.S. and Russia and decrease the risk of miscalculation, or pursue other measures to improve the relationship, putting off de-alerting.   Slocombe doesn't think we should de-alert as long as nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain a part of the international system.  Even Steinbruner doesn't endorse de-alerting immediately.  Instead, he said that it was a necessary step as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons, but shouldn't happen without security accommodations between Russia and China, a solution to Iran and North Korea, a global accounting arrangement for nuclear inventories, limitations on NATO and U.S. conventional capabilities, and other changes to the current security environment.

The debate was both entertaining and informative, and the entire PONI team would again like to thank Mr. Steinbruner and Mr. Slocombe for participating.