Deadlines for Negotiations with Iran?

On September 2nd, the US, Britain, France and Germany are expected to try and persuade Russia and China to support a new round of UN sanctions against Iran. Much will depend on the forthcoming IAEA report that will detail the extent of Iranian compliance with nuclear inspections. There have already been allegations from Israel (reported on this blog a few days ago) that the IAEA is withholding information to keep pressure off Iran. However, since then, there have been signs that Iran may be cooperating. Reports have come out claiming that Iran has not expanded centerfuges since May. Some analysts are also encouraged by Ahmadinejad's decision to keep Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, who is considered more soft-line.

However, those same reports are unsure if these changes are a real turn in Iran's foreign policy. Instead, Iran may be continuing its strategy of buying time by appearing to cooperate, while continuing to pursue its nuclear program. Conflicting signals in Iran have caused some to argue that these gestures are simply attempts buy time and to convince Russia and China to block UN sanctions.

It's possible that both are true. Yes, Iran wants to avoid UN sanctions, but its reversal should not be understated. If you look back on the Reuters time line of Iranian nuclear development, about three months ago:

A quarterly IAEA report says Iran now has 7,231 centrifuge enrichment machines installed, a 25 percent acceleration in potential capacity since March.

Iran has allowed unprecedented IAEA access to its nuclear facilities, while decreasing its production of centrifuges. A better explanation for Iran's mixed signals may be that Iran has not yet decided whether to produce nuclear weapons. They will continue to pursue their right to produce nuclear energy, but put off a decision on whether to weaponize. According to Mike Shuster of National Public Radio,

The U.S. intelligence community believes Iran's leaders have not made a final decision on whether to acquire a bomb.
Sahimi, of the University of Southern California, says he believes that is an accurate assumption.
"This is basically a political decision at the highest level of Iranian leadership. And I don't think they will make the decision so long as they think that every move that they make is being scrutinized," he says.

So, if Iran is making conciliatory gestures and the Obama administration has been calling for negotiations, what's the hold up? There are two potential answers. Either, Iran really has no intention of negotiating and is maneuvering to buy time. Or, more likely, there has been no clear communication over what is required for successful negotiations. US officials say that they have offered increased diplomatic and economic inducements, but there haven't been any formal negotiations. The hold-up may be the same thing that prevented negotiations during the Bush administration: US demands that Iran halt its enrichment activities as a precondition for nuclear talks. Iran has consistently rejected this, arguing that, if they complied, the US would drag out negotiations as long as possible to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program. However, this does not mean Iran is unwilling to negotiate. In fact, according to Kaveh L. Afrasiabi,

Iran is now about to unveil its own "package" of ideas about how to solve the nuclear standoff. Part of the debate within Iran is whether a temporary halt of the enrichment activity - putting it on "standby" during the coming talks - is called for. Another option is to refrain from adding new centrifuges and maintaining the level of cascades as the talks progress. This is partly due to Iran's confidence that with its nuclear transparency and respect for NPT norms, it would have the upper hand in any legal discussions.

Obama is in a tough position. With repression in Iran following the election controversy and increasing pressure from Israel, Obama would have a tough time selling engagement and flexibility over the nuclear issue. He would find it especially difficult to back off the demand that Iran suspend enrichment, which is seen by many as a true test of Iranian intentions. As a result, Obama has been forced to look for answers sooner rather than later. As Roula Khalaf put it, in the Financial Times,

In the US Congress, meanwhile, patience with Iran is running out and pressure for new unilateral sanctions is mounting. In the Middle East, concern is building over Israel’s own intentions – and how long it will tolerate Iran’s nuclear progress before launching military strikes.

In what appears like an attempt to find a more moderate solution, Obama is pursuing additional UN sanctions. However, there is little hope that they will be effective. First, they could easily be blocked by either Russia or China, who have veto power at the UN Security Council. Second, Iran has faced US and UN sanctions for years without thinking twice about continuing its nuclear program. Recently, an Iranian spokesman reiterated that sanctions would not prevent Iran from seeking uranium enrichment.

Another component of Obama's policy is a September deadline for Iran to show willingness to negotiate over its nuclear program. Imposing this type of deadline is dangerous. The deadline will function as a red line, and once it passes, Obama will face increasing pressure to act. If, for some reason, there is no progress in negotiations before the deadline, Obama will be in a tough position. Either, it will escalate tensions (Afrasiabi again):

Artificial or not, a deadline set by the West is fast approaching, and with it early winds portending an escalating crisis, at a time when neither Iran nor the US can afford it. Compared with Iran's new flexibility the White House's stance appears to be the opposite, considerably increasing the risk of a full-blown crisis.

It is easy to see how this scenario will play out. The same hawks in the US and Israel that are pressing for action now will point to the failed deadline and the futility of sanctions as a further justification for ratcheting up military tensions.

However, even if Obama is able to hold of hard-line pressure, US policy toward Iran will still suffer. Setting a deadline, then not seriously punishing Iran for violating the deadline, will erode US negotiating credibility and make it difficult to put diplomatic pressure on Iran in the future.

It seems unlikely that Obama's current policy will be successful. A better solution might be to maintain scrutiny on Iran by continuing rigorous IAEA inspections. This is the solution proposed by Thomas Fingar, a professor of international studies at Stanford and former intelligence official, in an NPR story mentioned above. Fingar argues that increased scrutiny will prevent Iran from diverting nuclear material to start a weapons program. If the US avoids threats and artificial deadlines, it can rationally engage Iran and ease some of their security concerns.

There is no clear policy that will bring success, but no matter what course Obama takes, he should dispense with overt deadlines.