A Defense of Deterrence

Eric Sterner wrote an op-ed for the Washington Times outlining the case for the importance of deterrence in today's strategic environment. The quest for a strong deterrent currently faces two strong obstacles. The first lies in infrastructure of our weapons complex. It is often described as "atrophying" and in need of renewed focus and rejuvenation. The second barrier is the growing momentum towards large stockpile cuts (possibly in lead up to a "global zero"). Sterner is wary of the Obama Administration's temptation to embrace the "long-held hope that it is possible to ban nuclear weapons altogether" given the current modernization efforts from other established nuclear powers and the other countries around the world seeking to join the nuclear ranks. As such, Sterner concludes:

Whether we like it or not, mankind has unleashed the power of the atom. Until defenses give us the power to render the consequences moot, deterrence offers a path to manage responsibly the threat of that knowledge combining with evil intentions and committing great harm. With that in mind, we owe it to ourselves, and to future generations, to ensure that our deterrent is reliable, credible and robust.

It does seem that many people, even many who argue for a move to global zero, agree with the need for a strong U.S. deterrent for some time into the foreseeable future. The real question will be figuring out what are feasible and sufficient "defenses" that "give us the power to render the consequences moot." For Sterner, this may mean workable missile defense or similar technology. For others, effective CBM's of verification regimes could be sufficient to hedge against the use of nuclear weapons.

Thanks for the posting. I

Submitted by on Thu, 02/12/2009 - 1:40pm.

Thanks for the posting. I guess Sterner would take Joe Cirincione's "nuclear neanderthals" charge with pride.

What interests me here is what Sterner means by atrophying. In the sixth paragraph of his piece he lumps together the embarrassing Air Force flights with aging hardware. But in so doing, never actually makes a clear connection between aging nuclear hardware and an inability to have a operational nuclear deterrent.

Now Cirincione believes Russia and America can cut down their arsenals, without eliminating America's ability to launch a catastrophic strike. Now he does not single out America's ability to reliably launch a limited launch a nuclear weapon at a specific location.

In any case, it seems clear that America could have a smaller but still effective deterrence.

While I agree the real question is one of "defenses", one may argue the best defense would be limiting nuclear proliferation, reducing stock-piles and further transparency of nations' nuclear stockpiles. And a first step in America taking the lead on this would be at least reducing our stockpiles.

And if reducing our stockpiles doesn't reduce our deterrent power, why not?

Also, Obama did make a pledge towards eventual nuclear abolition. But, as he showed in his presidential press conference last Monday, his chief aim is not ridding of America's nuclear deterrence but instead working cooperatively with Russia to trim stockpiles.

Sterners opt-ed doesn't give me a clear view of what he is against and why, and seems dependent on preconceived notions of liberals as woolly-headed idealists on national security.