In Defense of Small Reactors: A Response

By Micah J. Loudermilk

 

Last week, this forum posted a thoughtful commentary on National Defense University’s recent publication examining the possibility that the Department of Defense could embrace small nuclear reactor technology at its domestic military installations. In the blog, Terrence Smith lays out his main objections to the NDU article by honing in on the hurdles and potential pitfalls – challenges freely admitted by the authors – that would accompany a move by DOD to integrate small reactors into its operations. The concerns Smith raises are real and the report presents them in detail. Smith, however, opts for a cost-benefit analysis of the topic that largely ignores the benefit side, which, along with several misunderstandings about the larger argument, must be addressed.

 

At several points, Smith suggests that Andres and Breetz push for DOD adoption of small reactors “for the purpose of controlling a competitive technological edge” while failing to examine “the wisdom behind DOD’s interest.” While the article does argue that pursuing the technology will help to preserve the United States’ edge in nuclear technology, it is made immediately clear in the opening paragraph that:

 

A bit of clarification is needed here as Smith misinterprets this, evidenced in his statement that:

 

 

The central argument made by Andres and Breetz is that the military should look to small reactors as an energy source for domestic military installations – the U.S. is the country with the fragile grid. The claims about placing reactors in forward operating locations is a separate argument – and one discussed by the authors only due to its potential to save lives.

 

On both fronts (domestic and foreign), this is really a conversation about base vulnerabilities and energy security – all other considerations are secondary in nature. On the domestic side we know that the U.S. electrical grid is fragile (see 2003 Northeast blackout), that U.S. installations are almost entirely dependent on this grid, and that critical military mission capabilities are lodged at these bases. All of this adds up to a significant strategic risk for the U.S. – and one that was recognized by the Defense Science Board when it recommended “islanding” domestic military assets from the grid.

 

While the notion that this can be done entirely through increased efficiency and renewable technologies is pleasant, it is a pipe dream on par with expecting the rest of the United States to be powered solely by renewable energy. Small reactors on domestic military installations would provide a clean and assured supply of energy to bases – insulating them from electrical grid outages resulting from natural disasters, malfunction of outdated infrastructure, or attack by a foreign nation or group.

 

On the foreign side, where the bulk of Smith’s criticism is based, the authors are far more cautious – admitting each of the risks that are pointed out, especially that of contingency plans in the event that the reactors fall into enemy hands. However, at its core, the military aims to use the best available technologies in order to enable its warfighters to successfully execute their missions. This includes, but is not limited to, the best intelligence/surveillance equipment, weapons systems, operational vehicles, and yes, energy sources. Any and all equipment and technology brought into the field carries some risk of loss or capture, though that does not deter its use.

 

Ultimately, calculations must be made on the basis of costs versus benefits. The potential cost in this case is the risk that a small reactor could fall into enemy hands. What is the likelihood of this though? When was the last time that a U.S. forward base was overrun and captured by enemy combatants? How dangerous would it be for enemies to gain access to a small reactor? Furthermore, if the question is one of risk, most people would agree that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (weapons mind you, not reactors) is most likely significantly more vulnerable than U.S. bases. Finally, while the possibility of loss to the enemy is only distant and remote, the troops and drivers who die every month guarding fuel convoys are hard and ever-present reminders that the military depends completely on the consistent delivery of fuel supplies through hostile territory.

 

Smith’s final contention takes issue with the argument that DOD needs to operate as a “first mover” in the small reactor market – stating:

 

 

Though this contention is arguably true from a weapons-related standpoint, Smith’s point does not make much sense when discussing nuclear energy. The pursuit of nuclear energy is not remotely equivalent to an arms race and it is simply not possible to draw comparisons between the two.

 

What we do know, however, is this: the domestic nuclear industry in the U.S. has stagnated and virtually died since the Three Mile Island incident over 30 years ago. Meanwhile, foreign nuclear energy companies are surging ahead and making rapid strides in the energy industry – moving forward with advanced nuclear reactors while new countries constantly enter the market. Like it or not, the nuclear renaissance is here – the world is pressing on and the U.S. simply is not on board.

 

More than that, DOD investment as a “first mover” in the small reactor market in fact directly supports the nonproliferation agenda. As an increasingly large number of countries seek civilian nuclear power, real discussions on proliferation begin to center not on weapons, but on the weapons risk arising from the pursuit of energy.

 

Historically, this potential problem has been largely mitigated by the influence exerted by the U.S. in the global nuclear energy market. The U.S. is influential largely because of its historic lead in nuclear energy technology. However, with the atrophy of domestic capabilities, U.S. share of the global nuclear trade has declined precipitously as aspiring states turn elsewhere to meet their needs. Other countries, such as China, that are making rapid advances in the field, do not share the U.S. commitment to reactor safety and nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, as can be seen, DOD’s efforts as a “first mover” in the arena are imperative, not simply from a military security standpoint, but also from a mindset of preserving the nonproliferation agenda.