Defining NPR Success

The NPR bashing continued this weekend with Ron Rosenbaum's article in Slate last week sounding warning on the spoiler role the Pentagon will play in Obama's zero vision which led today's Morning Joe to be titled "Posture Review an Obstacle to a Transformative Nuclear Policy" (Daryl Kimball also had a related article titled "Transform US Nuclear Policy" here). It seems like the NPR is stuck between a rock and a hard place in how it will be spun: undermining our deterrent by embracing reductions according to some and a complete betrayal of Prague by others. Both are probably exaggerated positions and therefore figuring out how to create reasonable metrics by which to judge the "success" of the NPR is important. Rosenbaum's article makes a couple characterization's that I'd differ with:

1. Obama is sending a message "he can be rolled" by the Cold Warriors on nuclear issues. Rosenbaum argues:

Most troubling is Obama's failure to take up this challenge from his top generals: He's sending a message that he's not serious on the issue, that he can be rolled. If Obama wants to demonstrate his commitment to Zero, he should call Gen. Chilton into the White House and make sure they are on the same page when it comes to what our launch status is. And what he wants it to be. And if he thinks it's—in effect—on hair-trigger, he should promptly take it off.

The argument "Obama isn't serious" is based off of Chilton taking issue with the "hair trigger" formulation and defending current U.S. posture in a GSN article from February which is barely more than a month after Obama had been in office (although after WMD albeit not Zero czar Gary Samore was announced), and probably more importantly more than a month before the Prague speech. The Prague speech set the tone for the administration's nuclear policy and as we've argued elsewhere the Pentagon has been up front that the Prague speech will guide the NPR. Obama's seriousness should be seen in the Prague speech, the Joint Understanding with Russia, and his decision to chair the Security Council meeting rather than Norman Schwartz "pushing back a bit" on the phrasing of our alert level. With respect to the defense side of things, the evidence presented that "there are further indications that the nuclear-industrial complex is dragging its feet" is simply that the "safe, secure, and effective" and "as long as nuclear weapons" caveats show up in the Pentagon's talking points, both of which are administration policy. There isn't a concrete reason presented that the Pentagon is drastically favoring one part of the Prague speech over another-- it is just a question of what people decide to quote. For example, Rosenbaum adds italics to the line "if reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship does not continue" but one could just as easily italicize the beginning of the sentence that reads "including security environments in which relations with Russia dramatically improve."

2. Global zero hour will not be determined by the 2009-2010 NPR. Don't get me wrong: the NPR is a big deal. It needs to try to conceptualize the role of nuclear weapons which is a very tough task. It will need to square the "reduce reliance" and "safe, secure, and effective" priorities. It needs to explain to the Congress how, why, and it what ways they should appropriate funding for all things nuclear. It will be thoroughly read and analyzed by allies and adversaries. All that said, expecting the 2009-2010 NPR to completely transform U.S. nuclear policy may simply be too lofty of a goal this close to the April 5 start line for a race that will be decades long. The NPR fact sheet is up front that:

The review will examine ways to reduce both the role and number of nuclear weapons, although the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is not anticipated in the timeframe of this review.

which is consistent with the objective of the NPR:

To establish U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next 5 - 10 years.

The NPR did not set up a Zero working group as Rosenbaum suggests because that is not in the cards in the next 5-10 years. That does mean that Obama's agenda is not being taken seriously. Even the Global Zero Action Plan which is on the *very* optimistic end of abolition timetables has the date set for 2030. In other words, if the NPR doesn't decided to endorse Rosenbaum's ideas of countervalue targeting (based off the FAS/NRDC report) or de-alerting it does not mean it therefore just plays into the hands of "heavyweight generals and admirals and top-of-the-line think-tankers, almost all of them devoted to strengthening and lengthening the life of our nuclear-deterrent weapons . . . who see the move toward Zero as their own "death panel."" Joe Cirincione framed what is the heart of the disagreement nicely in an interview with Plutonium Page:

The real issue is, could you have gone lower? I think you could have gone lower. The Pentagon made recommendations saying "no, we're going to stop right here,". Okay, there's an argument for that. I'm not necessarily against that. I don't think there's anything sort of insidious or evil about that. The real problem comes up in the follow-on agreement . . . . and the kinds of numbers that people have talked about is going down to a force of about 1,000 weapons . . . That would require serious force structure cuts. The real danger in the [nuclear posture] review is that it would block those kind of cuts by saying that we have to maintain a larger force

Joe would like a more ambitious answer than the Pentagon will probably give to the "how low can you go question." That does not mean April 5 was for naught or that Obama is not serious about the NPR and his broader arms control agenda. Abolition is this administration's policy and one the United States has been legally obligated to since signing the NPT even though it has not always received enthusiastic support. The NPR can still be seen as calibrating a glide path down even if the curve is not as steep as some would hope. Abolition will be a long and arduous process and while those in favor of a world without nuclear weapons would like to see that sooner rather than later a great degree of patience is needed because it will take time; "not in my lifetime" kind of time. That doesn't mean a seemingly "modest" NPR can't also break some ground when the Pentagon says things like "Alternative postures and force structures are being analyzed in this NPR to address other possible futures" which will include both best and worst case scenarios but the former can be used to help begin the legwork to take the admittedly "serious force structure cuts" that may occur down the road.