Demining Efforts Wading through NPR criticism

Joe Cirincione, who PONI is grateful to for kicking off the PONI Debates the Issues series by debating PONI director Clark Murdock on RRW, had a piece in the Huffington Post today titled “The Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Landmine” that levels a number of criticisms against the ongoing NPR process.  He’s right on that there is a great deal of attention, both at home and abroad, being paid to what conclusions that NPR will reach.  That said, some of Cirincione’s arguments against the current process deserve some further examination:

Argument 1: the NPR is more of the Cold War. Cirincione states:

Rather than shaping a policy to prevent the 21st century threats of nuclear terrorism and new nuclear states, the Pentagon reviewers are defending Cold War architectures. If the Pentagon’s civilian officials continue on their current course, the new Obama nuclear policy will be Bush Light. Same doctrine, same weapons, slightly tweaked.

At the very least, this seems to be “putting the cart before the horse” in that the NPR drafters are being accused of upholding certain ideas for a document that has yet to be released.  More to the point, arguing the upcoming NPR will be more of the same is trying to make an overly simplistic comparison.  There will undoubtedly be major differences between the two.  For example, will the upcoming NPR continue shunning arms control and promoting new military capabilities for nuclear weapons? It seems unlikely, particularly because the background devotes an entire page to explaining the NPR/START interaction.

Argument 2: the NPR is on course to “make a mockery of the agenda Obama called for in the campaign”

Cirincione uses a number of ellipses to have the Prague speech read that nuclear weapons are a big threat and the administration has a number of proposals to help reduce that threat.  While both are true, these ellipses conveniently leave out the two important crucial caveats in the Prague speech:

I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime.

and

Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic.

Don’t get me wrong.  The Prague speech is quite historic and does an excellent job laying out the vision of moving towards a world without nuclear weapons which clearly represents administration policy but it does so in a complex way with some important caveats that cannot be ignored.  The NPR fact sheet that was released by the Pentagon (posted by ACW) does an excellent job grasping that in noting:

In his April 5,2009 speech in Prague, President Obama made clear his intent to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. He also promised that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. The President’s speech sets the stage for the Nuclear Posture Review . . . The NPR will recommend actions consistent with the President’s goals and will support a new approach to arms control that reflects the current and future international environment.

Argument 3: the Strategic Posture Commission report is “deeply flawed.”  Cirincione argues:

The commission — stacked with far-right nuclear ideologues — never developed a real consensus. The hardliners dominated the process, which almost collapsed, salvaged in the end by a report that spliced together very different agendas. Conservatives carry the report around like holy script, but few in Washington take it seriously outside of the Heritage Foundation…and the Pentagon.

There are 3 main arguments here that deserve some attention:

1. The composition- the commission, by definition, was designed as a bipartisan commission with 6 members from each side of the aisle.  CSIS hosted an off the record working group with two members of the commission from opposing sides of the political spectrum and not surprisingly, one thought the commission leaned too far left and the other vice versa.  Seems like a more reasonable assessment than “stacked with far-right ideologues.”

2. The consensus- many, including commissioners alluded to above, were very surprised at the degree of consensus that the commission was able to reach.  Sure, it was not enough to placate the left but getting people like Fred Ikle and Mort Halperin to agree on everything in the report spare CTBT is a big deal.

3. The exposure- While it is true that the Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) report has probably less than ideal coverage throughout Washington, that is not the case in the nuclear community.  Almost every meeting, presentation, etc. I have seen since its release has mentioned the report, regardless of where the speakers lie on the nuclear spectrum.  The lack of attention from broader circles in Washington is due more to ambivalence on nuclear issues as opposed to the report being bad and therefore only adopted by “the Heritage Foundation . . . and the Pentagon”

Argument 4: The Pentagon is “cherry picking” Obama’s nuclear themes as evidenced by emphasis on extended deterrence.  Cirincione argues:

Pentagon officials have cherry-picked the president’s agenda. Their main themes are not to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation, but to “maintain a safe, secure, effective and reliable nuclear deterrent” and “maintain extended deterrence.” This last theme is particularly insidious. It emerged during the Commission deliberations (I was a member of one of the expert advisory panels) as a way to justify keeping thousands of nuclear weapons.

In reality, the “NPR themes” as listed in the NPR background are:

• Maintain a safe, secure, effective and reliable nuclear deterrent
• Maintain extended deterrence to allies; consult with allies and friends
• Continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy
• Continue concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons
• Enhance the effectiveness of the global nonproliferation regime
• Provide a basis for defìning national arms control and non-proliferation objectives

The last 4 bullets are all strongly in the ballpark of what Ciricione is calling for.  Obviously “safe, secure, effective, and reliable” (admittedly an interesting word combo) and extended deterrence appear higher in the list but that seems like a very tenuous reason for saying they are the only main themes and that they Pentagon has “cherry-picked” from the Obama agenda.

Extended deterrence gets guilted as “a way to justify keeping thousands of nuclear weapons.” True and not true, or at least deserving of an asterisk.  The SPC was very upfront that extended deterrence commitments create larger nuclear force requirements than those needed just for just defend the United States.  That said, there is some pushback to be had on the argument that extended deterrence is “insidious” and a false pretense for keeping nuclear weapons.   One of the commissioners said at the aforementioned working group that one of the most surprising aspects of the commission was the degree to which allies they talked with care about specific U.S. capabilities for extended deterrence.  This is not just a mythical concept dragged out of thin air to justify the ideology of the Cold Warriors.  For example, Cirincione cites Democratic Party leader Yukio Hatoyama and an Asahi Shimbun article from last week that both endorse Obama’s vision of a nuclear free world.  There’s no doubt as a non-nuclear power in East Asia that was subject to nuclear attacks in World War II has strong strategic and cultural reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.  The flip side of the equation, however, is that they care a great deal about being assured about the U.S. extended deterrent, particularly with everything happening in East Asia.  For example, laced in the middle of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Hirofumi Nakasone’s April speech about benchmarks for disarmament is the sentence:

In light of the situation in East Asia that I mentioned earlier, it goes without saying that the extended deterrent including nuclear deterrence under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is of critical importance for Japan.

An even better example is the explicit reference of extended deterrence in the joint statement between the presidents of the US and South Korea:

President Obama reaffirmed this firm commitment to ensuring the security of South Korea through extended deterrence, which includes the nuclear umbrella, and this has given the South Korean people a greater sense of security.

In other words, extended deterrence is clearly an issue that plays.  There is inevitably tension as nonnuclear countries decry the evils of nuclear weapons but privately seek to be reassured the U.S. will use theirs to protect them.  The real question to evaluate is how does each ally feel given ranging views on extended deterrence and meanwhile trying to sort out what exactly each country actually thinks given conflicting statements from various agencies within their government.

Lastly, I do strongly agree with Ciricione’s conclusion that:

They should start by answering the most important questions of all: What are nuclear weapons for?

which is something  Laura Holgate eloquently explained the CFR report also failed to do.   Whether one agrees with Cirincione’s answer to that question is a matter for debate but nonetheless one that must be had.