Do Roles Speak Louder Than Numbers?

The $52 billion question looming large for the NPR and how to prepare the U.S. strategy for the 2010 RevCon: what are these things for? While the SPRC noted “the principal function of nuclear weapons has not changed in decades: deterrence” it was quickly explained that “the Commission takes a very broad view of the concept of deterrence, encompassing many elements.” Likewise, Laura Holgate noted the CFR Task Force “fails in what I believed was to have been its primary goal: to provide a clear and actionable statement of the purposes served by nuclear weapons.” In an effort to satisfy the President’s Prague object to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, many argue that the role should essentially be restricted to deterring the attack of nuclear weapons as seen in Daryl Kimball’s “Core Deterrence” concept, Joe Cirincione’s remarks in his interview with Daily Kos, and Scott Sagan’s article in Survival continuing his case for a No First Use.

Should such a policy be adopted, Josh Pollack explains in his recent Bulletin Article (and also see his related ACW post) the spillover benefits NFU could have for US nonproliferation policy:

How Americans conceive the role of nuclear weapons illuminates the role of nonproliferation in the eyes of a skeptical world. If Washington considers its nuclear arsenal suitable for coercing potential adversaries, then stopping the spread of nuclear weapons becomes an adjunct to the already considerable power of the United States. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons come to play a strictly defensive role for the United States and its allies, then nonproliferation can be more readily appreciated as broadly in the common interest of humanity. Given the prominence of the United States in the international system, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons will strongly influence the Obama administration's chances of finding support for strengthened nonproliferation measures at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. If U.S. nuclear weapons are flaunted as instruments of coercion and emblems of might, then the states that have failed to observe the NPT's rules--North Korea and Iran--are likely to receive more sympathy from the "non-aligned" camp than otherwise would be the case. Their illicit activities will seem like natural responses to an overweening superpower that behaves as if it were a dissatisfied actor. But if it is known that U.S. nuclear weapons exist only for deterrence, then the U.S. case stands to receive the more understanding reception. Less is likely to be made of the failure of the recognized nuclear weapon states to move rapidly toward disarmament.

At first glance, it seems quite straightforward that reducing the role of nuclear weapons a la a No First Use policy should seen be a huge good faith effort on the part of the United States to comply with Article VI because reducing the role of nuclear weapons cuts to the core question of their purpose and NFU scales it back. Unfortunately, there are a couple of reasons to be skeptical of how many political pointsNFU may actually get us on the international stage, particuarly at the Review Conference:

First, it should not be automatically assumed that by declaring nuclear weapons are only defensive therefore nonproliferation will be “more readily appreciated as broadly in the common interest of humanity.” As a wealthy Western nation who has nuclear weapons and would probably top an Extremist Family Feud “Best Place to Detonate a WMD” survey of non-state actors, the U.S. obviously makes preventing other countries from going nuclear and stopping the spread of nuclear materials a top national security priority. However, for many other countries, including some of the key states that could put pressure on the Irans and North Koreas of the world, it is much less evident that they share the same degree of worry over the proliferation problem or more importantly that NFU would be the lever to change that. Furthermore, at the end of the day, NFU still essentially says that nukes deter nukes which may not do as much as advertised to underine their role as "emblems of might" given just how large of a defensive showstopper they could be.

Second, there’s no doubt NFU can’t hurt nonproliferation credibility with NAMesque stautes but it may just force them to turn their criticism elsewhere, particularly at the Review Conference where a "Final Document" requires consensus. Take force structure, for example. In explaining a feasible way to incorporate NFU into the NPR, Pollack rightly argues “the fulfillment of that pledge cannot rest too much on actual changes in force structure” given the bureaucratic obstacles in making large reduction at this time.  Rather than giving credit where it is due for a U.S. NFU pledge, issues like force structure may prove to be just one of many "yeah . . . but" talking points for the key states we are hoping will buy in to our nonproliferation efforts.  These states could very well may choose to emphasize how modest “New START” turns out to be and how the U.S. still has 1,500 (or thousands if you count them all) nuclear weapons, hasn’t ratified the CTBT, will pass a stockpile management program that will be spun as "new," still focuses way too much on nuclear deterrence even after what NFU peels off, etc. While the shift in tone from administrations can help lend credibility to the claim that we are actually trying to move towards article VI, it is interesting to note historically how little credit the P3 and Russia have gotten for what have been substantial reductions (75% reduction by the U.S. since 1990 according to one counting interpretation). While NFU perhaps should be a deal maker, the U.S. has to be prepared for the onslaught of other “deal breakers” that will still be touted to exist.