Do Technological Improvements Make CTBT Ratification More Likely?

By John K. Warden

Last week the EastWest Institute release a report entitled "The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: New Technology, New Prospects?"  The report, edited by Jacqueline McLaren Miller, was the result of an “off-the-record meeting of experts in Washington, D.C., to evaluate the United States’ technical and scientific capacity to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear arsenal and to detect nuclear explosions.”  The report begins by reviewing technological changes that have occurred since the last CTBT debate in 1999.  The issues covered are:  1) whether the United States could maintain an effective nuclear deterrent after ratifying the CTBT; and 2) whether it’s possible to monitor global nuclear testing.

On maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent without testing, the report concludes:

There was widespread—but not unanimous—agreement that the U.S. nuclear stockpile can be certified as safe, secure, and reliable without a resumption of nuclear explosion testing. This assessment is primarily based on ongoing improvements to the Department of Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the enhanced understanding of nuclear weapons it has produced in the last ten years. The possible increase in the functional lifetime of U.S. nuclear weapons, as described in DOE studies of nuclear material and life extension programs and assessments of that work by outside expert groups, factors prominently in this judgment.

The report also concludes that the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS), has improved capabilities that “can now detect nuclear explosions well below the one-kiloton threshold that was originally envisioned.”  It also notes that there have been improvements outside of the IMS such as satellite-based interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) that could improve monitoring capabilities in the future.

However, on both monitoring and sustaining the stockpile, the report acknowledges that questions remain.  The continued success of the SSP requires a sustained investment in the nuclear infrastructure at the DOE.  And on verification:

Participants were divided on whether the IMS is good enough–or will ever be good enough–to function as the monitoring and verification mechanism for a treaty that stipulates that state signatories will not explosively test nuclear weapons at any yield.

Based on these caveats, the report acknowledges that technological improvements might not be enough to secure ratification in the U.S. Senate:

There remains considerable uncertainty in the Obama administration about whether the technological advances of the last ten years will be sufficient to change the Senate's views enough to obtain the minimum sixty-seven “yes” votes required to ratify the treaty. Many factors–not all of them related to the treaty or even nonproliferation–will determine when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decides to present the CTBT for debate and consideration for a second time.

The report's bottom line is that getting the CTBT ratified will require careful leadership by the Obama administration.  The Administration must get out ahead of the debate before Senators make up their mind that they're going to vote ‘no.’  The first step is to propose a budget that includes robust funding for all parts of the nuclear weapons complex.  This will be a key signal about how serious the Obama administration is about getting the CTBT (and START as well) to be ratified.

In order for the treaty to get ratified in 2010, Senators who previously voted against the treaty must be able to say, 'Voting against the treaty was the right decision in 1999 and voting for the treaty is the right decision now,' and Senators who didn't vote in 1999 must believe that technological improvements in stockpile stewardship and international monitoring have increased the viability of the CTBT.

The report lays out a good strategy for the Obama administration to pursue ratification.  Unfortunately, I’m not sure even the best strategy will get the CTBT ratified any time soon.