Does Okada's Letter Opposing TLAM/N Signal Changes in Japanese Foreign Policy?

By John K. Warden

A letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reveals that the Japanese government does not oppose the retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N).

Based on the findings of the Strategic Posture Review Commission, many have argued that maintaining TLAM/N is essential to the credibility of U.S. assurance to Japan.  The commission’s final report, which was released in May 2009, states:

One particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities...In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of...TLAM/N...In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.

Okada’s letter, which is dated December 24, 2009, seems to directly contradict the Commission’s findings:

It was reported in some sections of the Japanese media that, during the production of the report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States・released in May this year, Japanese officials of the responsible diplomatic section lobbied your government not to reduce…TLAM/N…However, the Japanese Government is not in a position to judge whether it is necessary or desirable for your government to possess particular [weapons] systems. Hence, although the discussions were held under the previous Cabinet, it is my understanding that, in the course of exchanges between our countries, including the deliberations of the above mentioned Commission, the Japanese Government has expressed no view concerning whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems such as TLAM/N and RNEP. If, hypothetically, such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.

Assuming that Okada's letter accurately portrays the Government of Japan's position, it's clear that Japan does not believe that U.S. assurance requires TLAM/N.  However, Okada's letter raises an interesting question:  has Japan's government ascribed little importance to TLAM/N all along or does the letter reveal a change in government policy?

In their reactions to the letter, two prominent nuclear bloggers came to opposite conclusions.  According to Hans Kristensen of the FAS Security Blog, Okada's letter shows that Japan's government never had a strong interest in TLAM/N:

Okada’s statement suggests that he has checked the government’s files. It also matches the statement made by Admiral Timothy J. Keating, the former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, in July 2009, that he was “unaware of specific Japanese interests in the” TLAM/N…It seems more and more that the TLAM/N claim resulted from a shady collusion between a few U.S. and Japanese officials (some current and some former) who sought to present private views as more than that in an effort to put brakes on the Obama administration’s disarmament agenda.

Jeffrey Lewis of Arms Control Wonk came to a different conclusion.  He argues that Okada's letter includes a "non-denial denial," which shows that at some point Japanese officials did believe TLAM/N was an important component of U.S. extended deterrence:

Although Okada seems to deny that Japan lobbied the Commission, it looks to be the classic non-denial denial. (It would be helpful to parse the original Japanese, but Okada admits to the exchanges, which in any event are listed at the back of the Posture Commission Report, denying only the expression of a “view concerning whether or not [the US] should possess particular [weapons] systems.”)  In any event, everyone in Washington knows that Mr. Akiba and Mr. Kanai expressed precisely such a view, even if it would be inconvenient, not to mention career-ending, for them to admit it now. (The documents will come out, sooner or later, however.)

While I agree with Kristensen that many Japanese and American officials hyped the importance of TLAM/N, I think that Okada's letter represent a shift in policy by the Japanese government.  This shift could be an important indication of Japan's foreign policy going forward.

Writing after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was elected, Clark Murdock and Jessica Yeats argue that there are two views of how Japanese foreign policy would be affected:

[E]xperts are divided on the extent to which the election will change the Government of Japan’s security priorities. One view is that the DPJ is only marginally less concerned with these issues and that the permanent civil service has far more authority over nuclear issues than we find in this country. Because the attitudes in the bureaucracy and the business community have not changed, these experts believe that any spike in regional tensions will bring these issues back to the fore. Others are more uncertain. Drawing upon a recent trip to Tokyo, one expert explained, “the election changed everything…And while it’s still not clear what the DPJ views on security issues are and while there are still some bureaucrats that think like the old government…we can’t assume that [Government of Japan] views are the same as they were pre-election.”

Instead of punting nuclear issues to the bureaucracy, the new DPJ government has taken an active role in nuclear issues.  As I wrote a few months ago, the DPJ seems much more receptive to changes in U.S. declaratory policy that would reduce the role of nuclear weapons, such as a no-first-use pledge.  This directly contradicts previous statments by LDP officials.  Members of the DPJ, including Prime Minister Hatoyama, have also supported nuclear disarmament.

Okada's letter about TLAM/N is a continuation of this trend.  It directly contradicts the previous position of the LDP government and Japanese bureaucrats.  To the extent they have occurred, the DPJ appears to have won internal debates with bureaucrats and are driving change in Japan's foreign policy.  As the DPJ continues to define their foreign policy priorities, more changes are likely.