Don’t START Believing, Just Yet: The Strands of the Modernization Discussion

There has been a flurry of activity in the past couple of weeks about START and modernization, thanks in large part to the WSJ’s 5 January “False START” op-ed. As we’ve noted previously, the WSJ op-ed pages, particularly on nuclear issues, can sometimes get away with a surprising number of assertions that are questionable characterizations, to say the least. The blogosphere responded strongly to this op-ed as seen in rebuttals by Nukes of Hazard, Democracy Arsenal, and Joe Cirincione in Foreign Policy.  As one wades through the arguments made on both sides of the debate, it becomes clear that there are many issues at play in under the umbrella of what people talk about when discussion "modernization."

Modernization as Politics

The first component of the modernization discussion is a purely political one. On this question, the WSJ piece actually isn’t that far off. With regards to the letter signed by 41 Senators sent to Obama, the WSJ statement that “Without modernization, it's unlikely that Senators will vote for” START follow-on is probably correct in that something will need to be done to buy off enough Republican support to get that treaty ratified.  Cirincione is right that the letter doesn’t explicitly say they will vote against the Treaty but it seems to convey a pretty strong hint hint that ratification without an acceptable level of modernization is a no go.  As evidenced by the Health Care vote, partisanship is running high in Washington and the GOP team led by Kyl and McConnell will conduct a full court press to ensure they can extract largest concessions possible out of the Democrats on START. While the Strategic Posture Commission and other bipartisan reports do highlight that in theory there is for the most part a bipartisan consensus on an initial round of arms reduction with the Russians, politics is politics. This also explains why reports like the SPRC did not explicitly link modernization and START: it’s not an issue of substance. It’s an issue of politics. Some sort of modernization efforts would probably have to occur sometime in 2010 but it became attached to START perhaps because it was the first big issue tackled on the Prague agenda. There is another interesting dynamic at play in the politics of START ratification: how modernization posturing on START will impact CTBT. Here the WSJ explains that:

Biden . . . is arguing that the White House should try to get the 67 votes on Start's merits alone. He wants to delay any nuclear modernization decision, holding it out as a carrot to offer Senators in return for ratifying the separate Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The implicit assumption in this statement is that the treaty won’t be able to get through the Senate on merits alone. The tough task for the administration will be determining how to calibrate the sequence  In other words, the Republicans, even if some or many of them may not disagree with the treaty in principle, will work to use the treaty as a way to sap any of the “whoopah,” as a senior Defense analyst recently quipped, the Democrats hope to have to get a CTBT. This dilemma was captured by Strobe Talbott, Brent Scowcroft, and Joseph Nye who explained:

Since the debates over the new treaty and CTBT are likely to overlap in both time and substance, sequencing their submission for ratification will be a complex and consequential calculation for the administration.

How the administrations plays their cards on this hand will be vital to Obama’s first term nuclear agenda.

Beyond the political aspect, there are often considered three major types of modernization: warheads, infrastructure, and delivery systems. As the 2010 Defense Authorization Act stipulated, there needs to be a report for a plan to:

(A) enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States;
(B) modernize the nuclear weapons complex; and
(C) maintain the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.

Delivery systems are a component of the modernization debates that is beyond the purview of this blog post. Kingston’s December article provides a factual rundown in the U.S. section about some of the efforts to maintain the delivery platforms, although some would question the modernization myth conclusion he draws from that evidence.

Modernization as Warheads

Often times, “modernization,” in the most politically divisive and controversial sense of the word possible, is referring to modernization of warheads in the nuclear stockpile. Here, the Wall Street Journal misrepresented the Strategic Posture Commission when it said, “the bipartisan report noted, among other things, that the U.S. needs new warheads.” Kingston provided a good rundown of some of the things the SPRC did say, included perhaps most principally the endorsement of a “spectrum of options” approach which could, but does not necessarily, require new warheads. The endorsement of a spectrum of options but not a place on that spectrum does differ a bit from Democracy Arsenal’s characterization that

All of several recent bipartisan reports on the future of the US nuclear arsenal have concluded that the United States does not need new weapons

The Strategic Posture Commission noted that any modernization options will occur within the constraints of no new fissile material, no tests, and no “new weapons with new military characteristics” but the Strategic Posture Commission did not rule out the prospect of “new weapons” insofar as it would refer to some possible refurbishment and replacement options that meet the listed constraints. Based on the composition of the commission, I’m sure there are some who sat on it that would strongly embrace RRW or RNEP options for the arsenal while others would likely fall much closer to the current LEP side of the spectrum. On this question, Cirincione’s rebuttal to the WSJ highlighting the success of the LEP needs an asterisk. He quotes the Strategic Posture Commission as saying

The Life Extension Program has to date been effective in dealing with the problem of modernizing the arsenal.

But the full text of the finding was:

The Life Extension Program has to date been effective in dealing with the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue within the constraints of a rigid adherence to original materials and design as the stockpile continues to age. [emphasis mine]

The 2009 JASON report does provide a strong piece of evidence for those in favor of current LEP type approaches to maintain the arsenal although it did say that cost/benefit analysis should be conducted to assess the pros and cons to some possible refurbishment and replacement efforts that could increase safety and security of the arsenal. Likewise, a technical study conducted by Sid Drell and Marvin Adams reached a similar “spectrum of options” answer:

Because we do not know what problems will arise in the future or what requirements will be imposed upon the stockpile, and because the best choice among the spectrum of options is problem- and requirements-dependent, a flexible response capability must include the ability to apply and assess a range of options. It would not be wise for the complex to focus only on replication or only on new designs, for example, for then it may not be prepared to apply the best solution to the next problem that arises.

How “Stockpile Management Program” comes to be defined is far from clear but there remains an underlying concern for some about the ability to maintain the effectiveness of the arsenal looking well out into the future. Jonathan Medelia’s July update on RRW highlights some of the contrasting views of what exactly needs to be done to maintain the stockpile.

Modernization as Infrastructure

Another component of the modernization debate is the actual physical infrastructure needed to maintain nuclear weapons. This is the one section that the Defense Authorization Act actually did use the m word. From a nonproliferation point of view, modernization of this type should be less contentious than warheads. Building new buildings is not nearly as worrisome to some as RRWesque efforts to fix warheads, particularly if it abides by the Strategic Posture Commission framework not to produce new fissile materials. That does not mean, however, that these efforts aren’t important to maintaining the complex. While there is a robust debate to be had about whether current SSP/LEP efforts will be sufficient heading into the future, the Strategic Posture Commission noted that “the physical infrastructure is in serious need of transformation” and that:

The production complex suffered a significant period of neglect in basic maintenance. Most of the sites and many of the facilities date back to the Manhattan Project over sixty years ago. The production complex requires significant modernization and refurbishment. In considering options for addressing this concern, the Commission believes it is necessary to take a long view. Physical infrastructure is unique in the long time scale involved in making changes to it.

What does seem to be more contentious with regards to modernization of the physical infrastructure is the cost. Cirincione argues that:

The U.S. government spends almost $6 billion a year on stockpile stewardship programs that maintain the massive nuclear arsenal. Some, like the Journal, want new facilities and new bomb production plants, but the Government Accountability Office has found that such plans would cost $150 billion. This is overkill.

This statistic also requires some explanation. Taken from a 2006 GAO report, the $150 billion figure is for the entire 25 year infrastructure program proposed by NNSA. The report explains:

Recently, NNSA offered a proposal to the Congress for transforming the weapons complex over the next 25 years. NNSA’s proposal calls for building a consolidated plutonium processing center, removing weapons-grade nuclear material from the laboratories, and modernizing the remaining production facilities at their existing locations. NNSA’s preliminary analysis estimates its proposal will cost over $150 billion. The proposal largely depends on the successful design of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) to replace some of the existing weapons in the stockpile.

The complications of the politically unsellable RRW throw a wrench into calculation of the overall figure but it is important to look at some of the specific costs for facility and production plant upgrades. Two of the major upgrades discussed in the Strategic Posture Commission were the uranium processing facility at Y-12 and the plutonium research facility at Los Alamos. The Commission was straightforward the cost for each “will be very expensive at well over $1 billion each,” which is no small chunk of change, but much less than the $150 billion number used above. The commission was also quick to warn that Congress “should not . . . expect that implementation of the complex transformation plan will result in major cost savings” and noted if one has to occur first due to cost constraints it should be Los Alamos. These facilities will not be cheap but the physical infrastructure needs to be sustained to a degree necessary to credible be able to say the U.S. is doing enough to ensure the effectiveness of its deterrent. In a statement somewhat at odds with his above quote, Cirincione argued that

Policy experts, however, expect the new budget to be released in February to fully fund the nuclear weapons complex.

The problem is that the answer to what “fully fund” means would produce an array of answers but it does seem there is good deal of political support for increasing investment in the physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. Language from the 2010 Defense Authorization Act can be found on page 512.

The Kids Aren’t Alright

In many of these modernization discussions about maintaining the stockpile, the most critical element of the discussion is lost: the people.  While sides line up to compare facts on whether the LEP can and will be enough over time, there is a more worrisome undercurrent at play. In public discussion in places like op-eds pages, there has been very little discussion the problem of maintaining the intellectual infrastructure that supports our nuclear weapons complex. The 2009 JASON report being cited as primary evidence as the sufficiency of LEP type efforts to maintain the stockpile made sure to highlight:

We conclude this section with a concern. All options for extending the life of the nuclear
weapons stockpile rely on the continuing maintenance and renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, technology, engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons program. This will be the case regardless of whether future LEPs utilize refurbishment, reuse or replacement. The study team is concerned that this expertise is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation of the work environment.

Similarly, the Strategic Posture Commission noted:

The Commission’s second main concern about the nuclear weapons complex is that the intellectual infrastructure there is in serious trouble—perhaps more so than the physical complex itself. It strongly recommends that significant steps be taken to remedy the situation.
It is important to understand the weapons laboratories are more than a complex of facilities
and instruments. The foundation of their work in support of the national deterrent is a unique
scientific and engineering capability. Although nuclear weapons have existed for over sixty years, weapons science was largely an empirical science for much of that period. Nuclear weapons are exceptionally complex, involving temperatures as high as the sun and times measured in nanoseconds. Understanding these weapons from first principles requires a broad, diverse and deep set of scientific skills, along with complex experimental tools and some of the fastest and most powerful computers in the world . . . . For decades, the laboratories were places that easily attracted the nation’s top talent and expertise in these disciplines. But retention and recruitment of such personnel has grown more difficult recently. With growing frequency, the best of the younger staff are seeking employment elsewhere, and some of the best of the older staff are taking early retirement. Morale and, with it, capability have declined and seem likely to drop further unless steps are taken to remedy the situation. [emphasis mine]

Unfortunately, there has been very few, if any, good answers on how to resuscitate and maintain a vibrant intellectual infrastructure. The WSJ article did not directly mention intellectual infrastructure while Democracy Arsenal argued:

“The Administration has pledged that the defense budget to be released next month will fund fully our nuclear labs, science and engineering base, and our nuclear stockpile.”

and Joe Cirincione likewise stated:

Policy experts, however, expect the new budget to be released in February to fully fund the nuclear weapons complex and support both the United States' science-and-engineering base and its nuclear stockpile.

The problem with these arguments is that human scientific capital is not a problem that can just be remedied by dolla, dolla bills. The creation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War was a hands on science at the heart of U.S. national security efforts. Scientists working on nuclear weapons had a secure job working on interesting science.  They were also driven by the fundamental mission of contribution to science that could help the United States prevail in the Cold War.  Fast forward to the 21st century and some of that has disappeared.  Nukes hit the back burner when the Cold War ended.  Regulations such as testing make the work somewhat less interesting from a science perspective.  Perhaps most critically, the nuclear career path at weapons lab has lost much of its mission and is increasingly perceived as an unstable career path.  As the scientists who have the first hand knowledge of working nuclear weapons retire en masse from the labs, they are suffering with how to attract the "best and brightest" to work in a field driven by the header of a vision of elimination.  Not ideal from a job security perspective, even if that will ultimately take decades to play out. 

Discussion about how to ensure the effectiveness of our stockpile will have to consider politics, warheads, physical infrastructure, and delivery systems but at the end of the day the answer to the people question will really be key to maintaining a safe, security, and effective deterrent on the road to zero.