Secretary of State Hilary Clinton traveled to India this past week, the first visit to the country by a high-level Obama administration official. Reporting on the Secretary’s meetings has focused on disagreements she had with Indian officials over carbon emissions and environmental policy as well as further solidification of the civilian nuclear energy cooperation deal negotiated by the Bush administration. While these illustrate the administration’s increasing recognition of India’s impact on global economic, environmental, and political issues, one topic merits greater attention from the administration: India’s status as a modernizing nuclear power.
India recently announced that it is preparing to trial-launch its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine on July 26. This submarine, the culmination of India’s long-standing Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Program, is reportedly capable of launching Sagarika/K-15 ballistic missiles (see also India Today’s 2008 article on the K-15 test and GlobalSecurity.org’s informative profile on India’s SLBM technology). Additionally, India is leasing a Russian-built Akula II class nuclear submarine which also is capable of launching nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. As a result, India, already a possessor of land-based nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and nuclear bombers, will likely have an operable nuclear triad (or at least the capability to field one) in the not-too-distant future.
The outcome of the ATV’s trial merits close attention. First, India’s ability to construct and field its own nuclear submarines puts it in a class of nations that, until now, has only included the US, Russia, China, France, and the UK-the five official nuclear weapons states. The symbolic importance of joining this “elite” club, an implication not lost on India’s official newspaper, The Hindu, in their article on the subject, certainly plays into India’s broader push to be recognized as a great power. Moreover, this highlights the importance of considering India in global nonproliferation and arms control efforts. India’s fielding of a new nuclear capability is certainly inconsistent with President Obama’s efforts for global disarmament and India’s status as a non-signatory to the NPT remains troubling. The Obama administration has to answer tough questions about addressing India’s position as a stakeholder in arms control and nonproliferation debates and how to bring India into the larger global effort to reduce nuclear weapons. India’s capability is surely too robust and too established for it to not be brought to the table in the discussions leading up to the May NPT Review Conference. Similarly, it also mandates close attention as part of Obama’s nonproliferation agenda. Overall, in the upcoming weeks, the administration should follow the logic of Secretary Clinton’s recent trip: Don’t Forget India.