Eastern European Defense Review: Special Operations Forces: New Opportunity for New Members

By Peter Kiss

The Global War on Terror unfolding after 9/11 initiated a new era of warfare. The past decade has been characterized by prolonged, low-intensity, asymmetrical conflicts where conventional solutions have not always been entirely successful. In the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the need for a highly specialized force (re)emerged. A This force needs to be capable of being rapidly deployed to a conflict zone, able to cooperate with local governmental and non-governmental actors, have versatile skills and be trained to conduct surgical tactical missions with possible strategic impact. They are the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their unprecedented deployment in recent conflicts illustrates the new nature of warfare.

The war in Afghanistan has truly shown the versatility of SOF. Before Operation Enduring Freedom even began, the first person in the country to seek out the Northern Alliance was a U.S. Army Special Forces master sergeant. Subsequently, U.S. and British Special Forces along with CIA operatives became force multipliers for the anti-Taliban powers and supported their offensive with tactical guidance and coordinated airstrikes. These “Horse Soldiers” embedded with the Northern Alliance managed to overthrow the regime in a matter of weeks without needing conventional U.S. military forces on the ground. Special Forces have also been deployed in later stages of the war in Afghanistan, but their role was scaled back as conventional troops gradually took over the stabilization process.

A revival of SOF in Afghanistan started with the troop surge in 2009, when General Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy emphasized surgical raids to eliminate Taliban field commanders. These night raids, conducted in cooperation with the newly trained Afghan Special Forces, put heavy pressure on the Taliban ultimately leading to the disintegration of larger insurgent units. In 2011, from January through early August, the U.S. - with Afghan and NATO assistance - launched 1,879 missions (nearly an 80% increase over the previous year), with 916 “targets” killed or captured.

This high operational tempo has placed increasing stress on the U.S. and Coalition SOF establishment. As demands have far exceeded resources, these specialized forces became “low-density/high-demand” assets. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the former head of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Admiral Eric Olson, noted the following: “As we have essentially doubled our force and tripled our budget over the last nine years, we have quadrupled our overseas deployments.” Consequently, the Armed Services Committee has concurred that the demand for such forces and their unique skills will continue to outpace supply for the foreseeable future.

Special Operations Forces in Central Eastern Europe

As Coalition and NATO missions have become increasingly complex during the 21^st century, Central and Eastern European members have found it increasingly difficult to support operations. The growing intensity and shift towards out-of-area missions has limited their options for contributing to operations due to their inadequate military budgets, lack of cutting-edge military capabilities, and unwillingness to contribute troops without caveats.

However, lessons learned from asymmetrical conflicts have prompted CEE countries to gradually establish and build up their Special Operations Forces. Historically, such units did not exist in the former eastern bloc, as the Soviet Union reserved this right for its Spetznaz units. The closest assets CEE armed forces had were Long Range Reconnaissance units, which enjoyed a considerable advantage in training and equipment over their peers. Unsurprisingly these elements were later chosen to be transformed into modern Special Forces units. Estonia, Lithuania, and Hungary began this conversion in the mid 2000’s, while the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia -  having started this process earlier - worked on further refining these forces to achieve NATO standards. These efforts were endorsed by the Alliance at the 2006 Riga Summit under the “special operations forces transformation initiative”. The following year, the NATO Special Forces Headquarters was established in Belgium, and by 2009 twenty-six Alliance member nations maintained special operations forces of varying size, capabilities, and level of ambition.

As the security situation began to deteriorate in Afghanistan, Western NATO members started pressing the new allies to contribute more troops to the ISAF mission. From Washington’s point of view the fledging SOF units in Central Eastern Europe seemed a good initiative to support. The United States has accepted an increasing amount of foreign military officers to various training courses, such as the renowned Ranger School. The aim is to teach new skills and methods to candidates, so that after a successful completion of training, the participants can transmit their new knowledge back to their own national militaries. The Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) held joint trainings and sent Mobile Training Teams to newer units in order to further enhance their capabilities. Within the framework of the Coalition Support Fund, modern electronic equipment such as navigation and communication systems were donated to the units. Rather than just strengthening bilateral military relations with the CEE countries, the U.S. assistance has undoubtedly aimed at creating highly-trained, interoperable units, which could be deployed in Afghanistan to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with their American counterparts. These efforts have resulted in fresh SOF capabilities for the new allies on par with their western peers both in terms of training and equipment.

Due to the increasing demand for SOF, this newfound capability has the potential to allow smaller members to “punch above their weight” and gain further reputation in NATO. Despite the fact that these troops are still dependent on Coalition logistical support in the field, (i.e. theater airlift), they operate without national caveats which is of tremendous benefit to commanders on the ground in Afghanistan. Furthermore, their missions are usually classified, so the units receive modest press coverage making them “invisible” to the public and thereby mitigating the political risk associated with their deployment. Currently, there are CEE SOF units serving independently or embedded in U.S.-led Special Operations Task Groups in the most volatile Eastern and Southern Provinces of Afghanistan. The three principal missions they conduct are special reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance. Special Reconnaissance is a capability whereby SOF can provide early identification of a threat or target assessment during combat operations. Across a range of military operations, SOF provide senior decision-makers with on-the-ground fingerspitzengefuehl, the “feeling in the fingertips” to inform their strategic or operational decisions. Direct action can entail night raids or integrated operations with conventional forces, being either the supporting or the supported component. Military assistance involves training or material assistance to the indigenous forces as well as joint employment to conduct major operations. As the “A” in the ISAF acronym implies, assistance is a core task in Afghanistan. SOF can adjust quickly to meet the needs of the specific force they are assisting. In addition to expert proficiency in combat skills, SOF excel at security force assistance because they have also learned to respect local customs, may speak the language, and often participate in a host nation’s special cultural activities and functions.

Still a long way to go

As the United States starts withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, military leaders are working to replace some of the exiting conventional forces in the war-torn country with a "mini-surge" of U.S. Special Forces, a measure to soothe commanders’ fears that the withdrawal of troops might put military gains at risk. Although CEE nations do not plan significant troop reductions, it is timely for them to reevaluate their contributions to the ISAF mission as well. Most countries run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, either as leading or contributing nations. This task requires the allotment of a substantial development budget which most CEE countries are struggling to provide. Low-budget PRTs can do little to help local citizens, and the entire PRT concept has been criticized by the Afghan President. These PRTs should be transferred to wealthier nations, and instead focus should be shifted to training the Afghan National Army and conducting special operations to curb insurgency. SOF personnel excel in both tasks and the results would enhance security in the country more than PRTs operating on a low-budget or in a dire security environment.
 

In order to increase their SOF numbers in Afghanistan, CEE militaries have to prioritize the expansion of this capability in their modernization process. Years of training and experience, acquired through an investment in time and resources, are necessary to establish capable SOF units; therefore allocating adequate funding for the task has to be a priority of each Ministry of Defense. In comparison to other defense expenditures, SOF capabilities are more cost effective and offer the potential for a high rate of return. An investment of approximately 13 million Euros could completely outfit a 110-man land-oriented SOF company with equipment including vehicular mobility, communications, computers, weapons, night vision, surveillance optics, and other specialty equipment. In terms of the value, military sources estimate that 16 special operations personnel are considered to be worth the equivalent of 100 conventional troops. While drawing such comparisons can be disputed, there is no doubt that SOF provide a value enormously disproportionate to the relatively minor financial resources required to fund them. Compared to expensive weapon systems, this relatively low cost makes the establishment of SOF attractive to those CEE countries with smaller defense budgets. Using 2009 figures, this amount of 13 million Euros (USD 18.7 million) would roughly calculate to 4% of the Estonian defense budget, 3% of the Latvian and Lithuanian defense expenditures, 1% of the Slovakian and Hungarian, or 0.5% of the Czech total defense costs. In smaller militaries where the value of the individuals is always emphasized, it makes perfect sense to invest in this form of “human capital” and increase the size of the SOF units.

Summary

Establishing a framework for nurturing a new special operations capability is a great opportunity yet also entails a significant challenge. Stable commitment and predictable financing for the project is paramount, but it is equally important to avoid potential mistakes such as creating rigid structures or following national approaches when creating a force which will almost exclusively operate with foreign partners. Fortunately, with the establishment of NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters, the standardization process is well underway, so if CEE countries diligently follow the international standards of SOF, these potential pitfalls can be easily avoided. Expanding these forces with further U.S. assistance would revitalize the CEE countries’ contribution to the operations of the transatlantic alliance. Most of the Central European countries cannot compete with their western peers in terms of complex and expensive weapon systems, but they can offer (or even specialize in) highly trained SOF personnel, which could be equally, if not more effective in responding to the international security challenges of the 21^st century.