The End Game with Iran

Today, administration officials and Iran watchers wait to hear whether Iran's leadership will agree to ship a substantial portion of its nuclear fuel to Russia, where it would be converted to fuel rods and returned for use in a medical research reactor.  A successful deal could have a number of advantages.  It would delay Iran's ability to create a nuclear weapon by decreasing its stock of enriched uranium.  The deal might also serve as a confidence building that could pave the way for future agreements limiting Iran's nuclear program. While there was agreement in principle, the Iranian delegation had to get approval from Tehran, which, they admit, is not certain.  Iran has until tomorrow to approve the agreement, and analysts disagree about the likelihood that Tehran will accept.

The proposal is an important test of Iranian intentions.  If they say no, White House officials have said that would show they aren't interested in real negotiations.  If they say yes, officials would be cautiously optimistic that an agreement that resolves the dispute over Iran's nuclear program might be possible.  Either way, it's important to remember that these negotiations are only a stepping stone.  Whatever Iran's reaction to this proposal, there will be months, if not years, of negotiations to come.

Future negotiations and the appropriate long-term policy for dealing with Iran was the topic of an Arms Control Association (ACA) panel this morning.  The event, hosted at Carnegie, featured Paul Pillar of Georgetown, Greg Thielmann of the ACA, and James Dobbins of RAND and was moderated by Peter Crail of ACA. In an hour and a half, the panel discussed intelligence, Iran's capability and intentions, and the appropriate role of negotiations.  There were a few important takeaways.

First, it is the belief of the U.S. intelligence community, based on the 05 and 07 NIEs and recent developments, that while Iran likely wants a nuclear program that has the capability to breakout and produce nuclear weapons, it has not made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons.  A number of commentators say that Iran is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons, but there is no evidence to support that.

Second, while ridding Iran of any enrichment capacity or freezing Iran's nuclear development might be the ideal outcome for the U.S., any realistic negotiated outcome will not deprive Iran of its enrichment capacity (Iran has continued to insist they won't give it up). Instead, the U.S. should focus on achieving increased transparency to ensure that Iran is not developing clandestine nuclear facilities.  This should include more intrusive verification and challenge inspections required by the Additional Protocol.  There seems to be a growing consensus that increased access and not enrichment suspension is the best way to contain Iran's program.

Third, no matter what Iran's response, negotiations are always beneficial.  If successful, they can lead to diplomatic breakthroughs; and even if they aren't, they can provide the U.S. with important information about Iranian intentions.

No matter the outcome of recent talks, the panel made it clear that the end game with Iran must be additional negotiations that give the U.S. confidence that civilian nuclear enrichment in Iran is not diverted for weaponization.  The Obama administration should dispense with deadlines and military threats, and seek to find common ground.  Seeking increased transparency and Iranian compliance with the Additional Protocol is consistent with the nonproliferation agenda set out by Secretary Clinton.  Wednesday morning, Clinton said:

Our experience with Iraq’s nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War showed that the IAEA’s rights and resources needed upgrading. The additional protocol is the embodiment of those lessons. A failure to make this protocol the global standard means the world will have failed to heed the lessons of history at our collective peril. The IAEA should make full use of existing verification authorities, including special inspections. But it should also be given new authorities, including the ability to investigate suspected nuclear weapons-related activities even when no nuclear materials are present. And if we expect the IAEA to be a bulwark of the nonproliferation regime, we must give it the resources necessary to do the job.

Gaining Iranian adherence to an Additional Protocol that is enforced by a strengthened IAEA could help resolve the nuclear dispute and might serve as an example to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.