Experts Discuss the Possibility of Reconciliation in Afghanistan

By Katherine Hubbard

The Crisis States Research Centre has released a report called Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a Solution for the Afghan Conflict.  The report focuses on an issue that has come to the forefront of the new strategy in Afghanistan: the prospect of negotiating with the Taliban.  During the 2001 Bonn Conference, the idea of reconciliation received little or no support from Afghan leaders or from the U.S.; but in the midst of the deteriorating security situation, all key players in Afghanistan have recognized the need for a new strategy and have expressed support for a reconciliation program.  The Crisis States report offers fascinating analysis of why previous attempts at reconciliation in Afghanistan have failed and what the Afghan government and the international community can do to make this process successful.

Broad international involvement in the reconciliation process began in March 2007 when the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) mandate was renewed.  It was understood that UNAMA would expand its participation in the ongoing reconciliation project, Program Takhim-e-Solh (PTS).  PTS was a program designed by the Afghan government to win over former insurgents.  Those who successfully completed the program were supposed to be given support to settle and live peacefully.  While the program was relatively successful at its beginning, it soon suffered some major setbacks.  Some of the program participants found that they were not actually kept safe and in a significant number of cases, participants were not treated by international security forces in keeping with the PTS agreement.  As a result, trust was lost among the anti-government elements that were willing to reconcile with the government.  

Despite these shortcomings, President Karzai is eager to strengthen the PTS and wants to leave its head, Sigbhatullah Mojadeddi, in charge.  Professor Mojadeddi is respected among key Jihadi groups, but has little influence beyond his own party members.  His background prevents him from being seen as trustworthy by most anti-government groups.  Recently the PTS has made some progress, but it has not reached far enough, largely due to the lack of coordinated support from the international community.  

Taliban leaders are divided on the issue of reconciliation.  Mullah Omar is reportedly ready to start negotiations, but he is afraid of punishment from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency and al Qaeda.  Very few Taliban leaders maintain close ties to al Qaeda and therefore most of them support the idea of reconciliation.  The problem, however, is that those who are willing to reconcile are hesitant due to the pressure from the more radical elements of the organization, and also because they do not trust the PTS program.  They are skeptical that they will receive support or protection from the Afghan government or from international forces.

One danger of reconciliation is that it is not necessarily well-perceived by the Afghan population.  Simon Shercliff, the British First Secretary of Foreign Security and Policy in Washington, discusses this issue in a blog post entitled Reintegration, Reconciliation – what do we mean?  He writes that the reconciliation debate can easily get distorted so that in the end the Afghan people accuse the international coalition of trying to broker a power-sharing deal with the Taliban so that its members can withdraw as quickly as possible.  Shercliff asserts that this is not what the international forces want, nor would such a deal be theirs to make.  He argues that it is the duty of the international community to create a context which will force the insurgents to change their strategy and stop fighting.  Once this point has been reached, it is up to the Afghan government to reconcile with the anti-government elements.

The issue of who exactly should lead negotiations is also addressed in the Crisis States report.  That report concludes that UNAMA must be the lead facilitator.  Anti-government groups are unwilling to speak with the Afghan government because, in their view, the government is too weak.  They also do not trust international forces because they are being targeted by these forces.  UNAMA, however, is generally respected by both sides of the conflict.  The language on reconciliation in the recent UN mandate renewal shows international support for UNAMA’s role as a primary facilitator and lead coordinator of negotiations.  The evidence of dozens of anti-government elements coming to meet with UNAMA in an attempt to seek an alternative to fighting, suggests that the Taliban and fellow anti-government elements also see a place for UNAMA as a bridge in this process.

The report also argues that the Afghan government should create a commission that is broader than the current PTS and will consist of representatives from key government institutions as well as community leaders from active conflict zones.  Anti-government groups seeking reconciliation could approach this commission, which would then interview individuals and issue documents to those approved for reconciliation.  These documents would guarantee non-harassment by international or Afghan forces. 

Finally, the report suggests that the Afghan government should create an official proposal regarding the delisting of Afghan nationals from the consolidated List 1267, a UN listing of individuals and entities subject to sanctions for being associated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda.  The delisting of Afghan nationals would show the readiness of the Afghan government to begin reconciliation and build trust with anti-government elements.  The report concludes, “Only by speaking with important Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami leaders can meaningful and important results be achieved.”

Flickr photo by the U.S. Army's photostream used under a Creative Commons license.