Extended Deterrence Capabilities

Reading through the transcript of the Strategic Posture Commission to the SASC on 7 May, Schlesinger made an interesting remark much in line with the prepared statement he submitted:

With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of U.S. preponderance and conventional capabilities, the need for so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless, the requirements for extended deterrence still remain at the heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended deterrence still remains a major barrier to proliferation. Both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone.

The complexities of extended deterrence will be an important driver in how the Obama administration tries to seek a world without nuclear weapons while at the same time maintaining a safe, secure, and effective arsenal and deterrent.  There is often a debate about what constitutes "good enough" for the allies when it comes to extended deterrence.  How much interest do allies have in following RRW and its implications for arsenal effectiveness?  The answer is obviously country dependent but certainly is not an across the board no.  In an off the record session, folks associated with the Commission said they were surprised by the degree to which some key allies care about specific United States capabilities.  It was also interesting that the Commission notes:

Their assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.

This becomes a difficult issue to tackle, particularly in a resource constrained environment, because the United States ends up retaining capabilities it does not directly need, to head off allies from going down the nuclear path but nonetheless wants to move towards a world without nuclear weapons.  Tackling the possible tension between these two will be a key challenge facing the Obama administration's nuclear agenda.