The Fogbank debacle continues

Press continues to pick up on the GAO report last week that talked about the management and cost difficulties that the Life Extension Program has encountered (the PONI blog had a post on the issue last week here) .  The Sunday Herald picked up on the issue with the title "How the US forgot how to make Trident missiles."  The sensationalist title is referring to the difficulties the NNSA faced in restarting Fogbank production for the W76.  The article likens the situation to

James Bond destroying his instructions as soon as he has read them

The reality is likely a bit more complex. The U.S. knowingly shutdown Fogbank production in the 1990's spare a pilot plant. The decision to quickly increasingly production on a large scale, particularly given that many of the people initially responsible for production are gone or retired, is not as simple as pulling out a recipe and pressing stir.  While the inadequate record keeping cited in the article certainly did not help matters, the delay and cost overrun was due, according the report, to a host of factors including: Construction delays for the new facility:

NNSA started the new facility’s operations about 1 year late because the schedule for building the facility was unrealistic, disagreements on the implementation of safety guidelines emerged, and the W76 program manager lacked authority to control the schedule.

Under usage of the pilot plant:

However, NNSA did not conduct as much work as originally planned and missed opportunities to learn more about the manufacturing process before starting operations.

Delaying research on determining whether a Fogbank alternative could be produced:

Had NNSA continued research and development of an alternate material during the program, it would have had more information on the viability of using the alternate material in the weapon before March 2007.

Long story short, Q can't just automatically regenerate past weapons he's made for 007 when they inevitably get destroyed.