Nuclear Reactions: The FY11 Budget Request and the Obama administration's nuclear priorities

The "PONI Debates the Issues" blog welcomes readers to the new "Nuclear Reactions" feature.  The purpose of the feature is to solicit reactions from top nuclear experts about major developments on nuclear issues.  Event driven questions will be sent to contributors periodically and responses will be posted as they are received.  For a list of contributors, visit the about page.  Without further ado, the first "Nuclear Reaction" topic is as follows:

On the heels of major op-eds by the Four Statesmen and Vice President Biden, the budget request for FY11 (and out years) contains increases for NNSA. Do these investments strike the right balance between maintaining a “safe, secure, and effective” nuclear arsenal while trying to meet the Obama administration’s goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons?

 Expert reactions by:

• Clark Murdock- CSIS Senior Adviser and PONI Director
• James Tegnelia- Former Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

The "new" nuclear warhead dilemma
Clark Murdock- CSIS Senior Adviser and PONI Director 

The NNSA Fact Sheet released for the FY11 budget includes a $7 billion request for weapons activities, up $624 million (9.8%) from last year. This $7 billion is broken down as follows:

• Stockpile Support activities -- $2 billion (up $405 million, or 25%)
• Science, Technology and Engineering -- $1.6 billion (up $153 million, or 10.4%)
• Infrastructure -- $2.3 billion (up $102.6 million, or 4.7%)

In many respects, the FY11 budget is a welcomed start to determining how the U.S. will ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Since the Prague speech, the administration has been quite clear that it seeks to reduce the role of and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, including through tangible steps such as a new START treaty and CTBT ratification, but much less vocal on how they fulfill the “safe, secure, and effective” part of the equation. The FY11 budget request represents a significant down payment on long-term investments needed in the infrastructure, both physical and intellectual, which is a necessary component of any effort to maintain the nuclear arsenal.

It is still far from clear how the administration plans to sustain a safe, secure and reliable stockpile of nuclear warheads. The Four Statesman danced around the issue, and vice President Biden emphasized the importance of certifying without testing. The Perry-Schlesinger commission endorsed a “spectrum of options” approach that would include refurbishment, re-use of components and replacement as options for sustaining each warhead. In the FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act, Congress defined the objectives of “Stockpile Management” as follows: “to increase the reliability, safety, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile,” “to further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing,” “to achieve reductions,” “to reduce the risk of an accidental detonation,” and “to reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States.” These objectives were based on the presumption that any refurbished or new warhead would possess no new military characteristics or capabilities.

From a technical perspective, the U.S. can produce a new nuclear weapon that has no new military characteristics, but does have greatly enhanced safety, security and surety features. I would argue that this is not a “new” weapon since its military effects have not changed. However, administration officials have said that the United States should build “no new weapons” because it will undercut its record on nuclear disarmament and make it more difficult to gain the cooperation of other states on non-proliferation issues. While the strength of this linkage is certainly debatable, the administration needs to be careful about how it characterizes what constitutes a “new” nuclear weapon. What the administration should say is that the United States will produce “no new nuclear capabilities” as it sustains a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Otherwise, it risks boxing itself into a corner where it has to forgo improved warhead safety, security and use control because it blurred the distinction between a weapon consisting of new parts and a weapon that has new military characteristics.

Let the Debate Begin
James Tegnelia- Former Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

I think the 2011 budget, the administration fact sheet on the NPR, and the QDR are critical acknowledgments by the administration of the difficult and long road that is necessary to achieve significant reductions in nuclear arms approaching "Zero." I believe that when the "Zero Option" was announced in Prague, a large percentage of the community and certainly the general public that was paying any attention underestimated the difficulty of achieving it and believed that it could be accomplished in the short run, possibly during this President's time in office with immediate reductions in investments and no need for modernization. This budget recognizes the difficulty of achieving significant progress on this goal in the short run. I think that when the recognition sets in that the US can not simply unilaterally make major reductions to its nuclear deterrent and therefore stop all nuclear modernization, we will be entering the second phase of this important debate. That step encompasses the realization of the the practical, technically difficult, expensive and uncertain steps that must be accomplished if we are to significantly reduce international dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence. That expense includes improvements in conventional defense, a topic that the nuclear community does not understand and never acknowledges. That discussion is ahead of us and will in my view be difficult and contentious.

All of the local press near the National Lab's acknowledge the adds to the lab budgets. They are thrilled with the economic implication to a poor State that is undergoing a difficult time financially with an unemployment rate that is still rising. But there is no recognition of the national security reasons that prompted the adds. New Mexico is progressive with a large anti nuclear and anti war community. It has a relatively new and still learning congressional delegation. Its universities are knowledgeable of nuclear issues. When the fundamental reasons for this budget increase are recognized, it will hopefully start a discussion, outside of the beltway, with a citizenry that has not concentrated on this topic and must be part of the consensus if we are to make progress toward the President's vision. Let the debate begin!