SECDEF Gates’ remarks related to North Korea at the IISS conference had two major components: North Korea as a state having weapons and North Korea proliferating those weapons and material. While Gates answered in the Q&A that the program itself was not a “direct threat,” he said the following on North Korea proliferating material:
The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies. And we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action
In reaction to this statement, Stephen Walt’s blog raised the distinction of giving nuclear material to countries versus to other terrorist groups and argues:
But giving nuclear technology to a terrorist group is another matter entirely, and we need to make it clear to Pyongyang that this is an act that would lead us to discard our normal reservations and remove them from power once and for all. Not only do we want to deter North Korea from ever trying something like this, but we also want to establish and reinforce a clear precedent for other nuclear powers.
The distinction between countries and terrorist groups, however, may not be so black and white. In evaluating attribution scenarios, what happens North Korea tries to send nuclear weapons or material to Syria and they end up as part of a Hezbollah attack? Assuming (which is a difficult task) the U.S. could have actionable evidence that the material came to Hizbollah via Syria via North Korea, both countries would point the blame finger at each other. In the same way that:
We obviously don’t want North Korea giving nuclear know-how or nuclear material to other countries, but it’s not clear we would do anything to them if we discovered that they were.
North Korea might be able to finagle its way out of potentially problematic actions to cast just enough doubt, which may not have to be much, that the U.S. should attack North Korea the same way it did Afghanistan (this article highlighted the resemblance of Gates’ remark to that of post 9/11 Bush holding countries accountable).
It is also important to point out that Gates’ remarks were specific to “nuclear weapons and material” (which makes sense given the potential severity of the threat mentioned). While preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and material is vitally important, the U.S. also needs to determine and communicate appropriate consequences if North Korea is found proliferating weapons-related material (which seems more likely). North Korea was very clear in their recent official statement that they are not part of the MTCR which makes that task even tougher. South Korea’s willingness to join the PSI is a valuable step but the daunting task of trying to dissuade and prevent North Korea from proliferating weapons-related technology needs to also be considered.