Gimme Shelter

Picking up on a post started last week, one area ripe for thinking is the implication of the threats from Iran and North Korea on extended deterrence.  As countries become increasingly concerned about the threat from these countries, they may turn to the U.S. to help assure their security as a much cheaper option to generating its own nuclear capability.  Recent statements by a UAE official harkening back to Clinton's idea of an umbrella in the Middle East are a case in point. As a caveat it should be noted much of this analysis about extended deterrence should be country and region specific.  That being said, extending U.S. security to additional countries has the advantage of reducing the risk of proliferation by countries seeking their own nuclear arsenal.  At the same time, "extended deterrence" requires some serious thinking about what exactly those commitments entail. A purely nuclear guarantee in the Middle East may prove uncredible and embolden Tehran as it decries Washington's attempt to protect people from the great nuclear Iran while adding conventional elements may leave the U.S. tangled up when it doesn't want to be.  The Bloomberg article cited above points out Dennis Ross' signature on the recent Washington Institute for Near East Policy that mentions extended an umbrella to the Middle East but it should be noted that the report is VERY cautious in what it says:

One issue needing much more thought is how a U.S. nuclear guarantee (or "umbrella") would work and whether it is appropriate in the Middle East. Many in the Gulf seem to think that the region already benefits from a de facto U.S. guarantee; they may welcome its formalization. But it is by no means clear that Tehran shares this perception and therefore feels deterred. For its part, Israel is not enthusiastic about a declared U.S. nuclear guarantee. First, Israel has its own deterrent capabilities. Second, a declared U.S. guarantee would clarify a situation of ambiguity that may already work to Israel's advantage. And third, many Israelis fear that a declared U.S. guarantee could come at the price of circumscribing Israel's freedom of action in confronting existential dangers. To be effective, extended deterrence must be credible in the eyes of both Iran and America's regional friends. Political commitment is an important component; perhaps such a commitment should be embodied in an agreement or treaty. The Cold War experience suggests that deployments of weapons and troops are often necessary to make pledges credible. However, it is not clear that this approach would apply to the Middle East. Regional states are often unenthusiastic about the presence of large U.S. forces. Any consideration of moving U.S. nuclear weapons to the region, such as putting nuclear cruise missiles on navy ships, would raise complex issues. Therefore, further thought and consultations will be needed to see how to make extended deterrence credible in a way that satisfies other U.S. interests. Any nuclear deterrence will require reliable, safe, and effective U.S. nuclear weapons. Extended deterrence is most effective and credible if there is a broad U.S. domestic consensus about the policies being adopted. The administration should engage Congress so that pledges offered by the executive branch can be promptly and fully delivered. Congressional endorsement of any U.S. security guarantees could do much to make those words more convincing. It would also not be useful to have prolonged tussles about arms transfers.