An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”

    By Terrence P. Smith

The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies recently released a report on Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications. The authors of the report, Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz, provide a thoughtful analysis of the benefits and key implications of a move towards the use of small nuclear reactors for the Defense Department and its fighting forces. However, in my opinion, the report’s focus is misplaced by encouraging the pursuit of small reactor technology for the purpose of controlling a competitive technological edge. In doing so, the report pushes the assumption that the technology is a good idea to begin with – an approval I am hesitant to give. The report makes some reference to the downsides, but too quickly brushes aside the risks, as well as the numerous unknowns.

In recent years the “U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use.” The NDU report does an excellent job of exploring why the DoD would have in interest in such an endeavor, but stops short of thoroughly examining the wisdom behind DoD’s interest, which is ultimately the more important question.

My point is demonstrated by a quick glance at the four key points the authors chose to emphasis on the front page:

1. Without Department of Defense (DOD) intervention, the United States runs the risk of a small
reactor market dominated by foreign countries, further eroding U.S. commercial nuclear power capabilities and damaging U.S. control over nuclear energy proliferation.

2. DOD has recently expressed interest in the possibility of integrating small nuclear reactors on military bases as part of its strategy to “island” bases from the fragile civilian power grid.

3. Small nuclear reactor technology offers a host of benefits over traditional large reactors—namely, a smaller footprint, scalable design, factory-based construction, portability, and passive safety features.

4. DOD has a chance to become a “first mover” in the emerging small reactor market; by providing assistance and guidance to the private sector, DOD can ensure that successful designs meet its operational needs.

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage.

The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”:
1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.”

The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me.

The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

What are the alternatives to small nuclear reactors (assuming we want to maintain a large oversees military presence)? The NDU report makes the point that the DoD has already been experimenting with “an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels.” But, according to the report, “unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas.” While, to my knowledge, the DoD has not seen any huge relief from what I would call its token attempts at ‘going green,’ it hardly writes off the possibility of alternative energy supplies short of going nuclear.

The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid.

I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says,

Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors.

The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.”

These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.”

On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.”

Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern.

The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps.

The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”

My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.