Ideas for Effective Aid in Afghanistan

Flikr photo by Barefoot Photographers of Tilonia used under a Creative Commons license.

Most of what we hear about aid projects in Afghanistan is their shortcomings. Tim Lynch, a contractor working on a small-scale project in Jalalabad has a more optimistic point of view - at least for the type of intimate, micro-level project he is working on. He writes in Free Range International:

[We] were asked to provide cash for work projects in largest of the contested urban areas in Afghanistan – a six month project designed to provide cash payments to the poorest of the poor while also providing a work force to those municipalities in support of large not to sexy projects like canal cleaning, refuse removal, and public health initiatives (like treating all shallow wells in the city during breakouts of water borne pathogenic disease.) The program is an 80/20 split – 80% of the money goes to the payment of labor, 20% to project materials – the only money leaving the country under this program is the salaries of the project managers and Filipino finance managers. Every other cent is spent in Afghanistan with the exception of an administrative fee paid to my parent company. There are no security teams, no armored vehicles, no guarded compounds no nothing – just a small life support payment for the 2 internationals to rent guesthouse rooms and pay for food.

He says his program is having greater than expected success, though it addresses the same problems as dozens of other aid projects, because he is able to travel more freely and connect with local people better than the staff in other places.

We are two months into our program and the results have been above expectations. We are conducting massive clean ups of critical canals... There are hundreds of aid workers and probably thousands of military people who could do this job just as well and probably better than we are. But they do not enjoy the freedom of movement which is a fundamental requirement for effective aid delivery. They would operate just like we are if they could – but they can’t due to current force protection rules which add billions of unnecessary costs to our aid packages.

He also suggests cutting food miles for the troops in Afghanistan (though a commenter is concerned about the safety of the proposition):

We are trying to tell the Afghans to stop growing poppy and instead grow fruits and vegetables for export but we won’t even buy the stuff they grow to feed our troops. This ungodly expensive logistical tail – which is tenuous at best as it most of it runs through Pakistan - can be trimmed fast by moving the combat troops off post and allowing them to be housed and fed on the local economy.

In the end, he suggests small military-civilian teams stationed around the country with close ties to the community and most of all, a team of well-paid and trained Afghans. Read his article for his full description of successful aid work in the least stable parts of Afghanistan.