The Importance of Declaratory Policy in the Nuclear Posture Review

By John K. Warden

A couple days ago, I argued that the delay in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was likely the result of intense negotiations to find an acceptable compromise:

Of the many explanations for the delay in the NPR, the one that makes the most sense is that there are difficult political compromises that have to be made to satisfy all the people involved.  The final document will likely include some ambitious language.  While no-first-use seems like a non-starter, there could be a declaration that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use.  The document could also call for additional cuts in strategic warheads beyond the new START range.  At the same time, the NPR will reiterate the importance of nuclear weapons in assuring allies and commit to investments to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Without a clear consensus among the parties involved, finding an acceptable compromise is taking longer than expected.  Like the final health care bill, the final version of the NPR will contain language that no one is happy with, but everyone can live with.

If this turns out to be the case, will the NPR have any nonproliferation benefit?

According to some, statements about the role of nuclear weapons aren’t enough.  In a recent post at the FAS Strategic Security Blog, Ivan Oelrich argues that those who focus on what declaratory policy will emerge from the NPR are “missing the point.”  Oelrich argues that declaratory policy and doctrine are only important inasmuch as they result in tangible operational changes:

So doctrine and declaratory policy are important in very concrete ways when they can affect force structure decisions, including the numbers and types of weapons we have, their capabilities, and how they are deployed.  Moreover, these are the sorts of changes that other nations will see and pay attention to…What I would hope to see come out of the NPR is not simply a statement of no first use but a plan for, for example, taking our nuclear weapons off alert…These are things the world can see…These are the types of changes that need to occur in the U.S. nuclear force structure and, if they do, debate about the words in the review is less important.

In some ways, Oelrich is right.  If the NPR says the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter an attack, while at the same calling for new nuclear testing, a new nuclear warhead, and more forward deployed nuclear weapons, it’s unlikely to convince the international community that the United States is serious about its disarmament commitments.

While that particular NPR is hard to imagine, it is very likely that the NPR will include some changes in declaratory policy that attempt to reduce the perceived role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. security policy, while at the same time endorsing robust funding to maintain the nuclear enterprise and ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and making no mention of decreasing the alert status of our nuclear arsenal.  Will this type of NPR give the United States increased currency internationally?  Or put another way, how important are changes in declaratory policy to U.S. nonproliferation goals?

While I agree with Oelrich that changes in operational policy are important and will be necessary to make a sincere attempt to get to a world without nuclear weapons, I think that changes in declaratory policy or the role that we ascribe to nuclear weapons can also provide the United States some short-term benefits.

The language of the NPR will be watched closely both domestically and internationally.  People are waiting to see whether the document will be a tangible step toward Obama’s vision for a world without nuclear weapons or a more conservative defense of a number of our current nuclear policies.  According to Josh Pollack, in an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, one of the things they will be looking for is changes in U.S. declaratory policy:

The first proposal concerns declaratory policy…whether to recommend making a statement that the U.S. nuclear arsenal exists solely to deter attack against the United States and its allies. Making this type of announcement comes at little, if any, price and would strengthen Washington's hand in its efforts to reinforce the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It would underscore that U.S. nuclear weapons do not play any coercive role that could be seen as legitimizing proliferation.

Something that might emerge from the NPR is a statement that the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons is to deter an attack against the United States or its allies.  Both Morton Halperin and Jeffrey Lewis argue that this change in declaratory policy could bring the United States nonproliferation benefits without the baggage of a no-first-use pledge.

Changes in declaratory policy in the NPR could be particularly important because of the timing of the NPR’s release.  The NPR is now scheduled to be released in March, only two months before the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon).  According to Deepti Choubey, U.S. credibility and influence at the RevCon will be determined largely by the content of the NPR:

As it currently stands, the START follow on agreement is a modest arms control measure, because it is meant to serve as a down payment on deeper stockpile reductions promised in Prague; FMCT negotiations are proving difficult; and the CTBT is unlikely to be ratified before the Review Conference. Given these circumstances, the Obama administration’s NPR will be a critical piece of evidence that the U.S. delegation to the Review Conference will either celebrate or take pains to explain.
Although the NPR is intended to provide guidance to the American bureaucracy, its public summary will be widely read. Even the NAM referred to the NPR when it reiterated in the final statement of its July 2009 summit… The NPR, for many states, will be the bellwether of U.S. nuclear intentions.

Josh Pollack concurs:

In this situation, the Nuclear Posture Review can deal cards into the hand of the U.S. delegation, or take them away. So let’s recognize declaratory policy for what it is, first and foremost: an instrument of diplomacy.

And because of the timing, the words of the NPR might be what counts for the RevCon.  James Goodby argues in his essay for In the Eyes of the Experts that declaratory policy can have benefits even before it is operationalized:

Several decisions are likely to be made by the incoming administration within the next year that will become part of declaratory policy…The announcement of these individual decisions, even before their implementation, in some cases, will affect the assessments other nations make about U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.

In this case, Goodby’s point is even truer because there is such a small time gap between the NPR and the RevCon.  Armed with language in the NPR deemphasizing nuclear weapons, U.S. diplomats might be able to more convincingly argue that the U.S. is committed to the ultimate goal of disarmament.  However, it’s important to point out that this argument assumes that there is a causal connection between U.S. disarmament commitments and other countries taking on nonproliferation responsibilities, which is far from certain.

There are two other potential benefits to changing declaratory policy that are external to changes in operational policy.  First, a declaratory policy that deemphasized the use of nuclear weapons might have positive effects on the doctrines of other states, such as India.  Scott Sagan makes this argument in another essay from In the Eyes of the Experts:

U.S. declaratory policy also influences the doctrines of other nuclear weapons states, especially new nuclear powers at early stages of doctrinal development. The best example of this is India’s movement away from a strict NFU doctrine. In 2003, the New Delhi government adopted a new doctrine including the explicit threat of Indian nuclear first-use in response to biological or chemical weapons use, a change that was the result of copying the United States and other nuclear states.2…The signaling and legitimizing effects of U.S. nuclear doctrine are by no means the only factors leading to such negative trends in India, or in potential other cases in the future, but they should not be minimized. A U.S. NFU declaratory policy would similarly have some positive influence in pushing India and other new nuclear states in the opposite direction in the future.

Second, changing our declaratory policy might improve our negotiating position with respect to China.  China has long used its no-first-use pledge to take the moral high ground on disarmament.  If the U.S made a similar commitment in the NPR, like a “sole purpose” declaration, the United States would be in a better position to pressure China to stop building up its nuclear capabilities and to increase the transparency of its arsenal.

In order to truly reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, it will be necessary to change both declaratory and operational policy.  However, political realities in the U.S. will require the Obama administration to make compromises.  People in the Pentagon and Republicans in Congress will only accept reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and further arms control if it is accompanied by robust funding to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the arsenal.  The Obama administration will have to find a way to convince domestic constituencies and allies under our umbrella that the United States has credible deterrent, while at the same time convincing the international community to support strong nonproliferation policies.  In the near-term, political realities might make language in the NPR that changes U.S. declaratory policy the best “tangible evidence” of a U.S. commitment to disarmament that the Obama administration can provide.  Fortunately, it might have some benefits.