Iran: 1, IAEA: 0

By Kevin Kallmyer

In a recent IAEA report, the IAEA disclosed that the agency does not have the confidence to declare Iran’s nuclear program exclusively peaceful.

The report states that Iran has not provided sufficient cooperation to permit the agency to fulfill its mission and confirm that Iran’s program is peaceful, and is the IAEA’s third report in a row to draw this conclusion. The IAEA report discussed multiple areas of Iranian defiance, which can be grouped into five categories.

First, Iran has failed to suspend its uranium enrichment, and is now enriching uranium at a 20% level.

Second, Iran has continued research and development of centrifuge technology, and denied IAEA requests for information on additional facilities related to centrifuge development. As a result, it is impossible to confidently know the status of Iranian nuclear technology, and whether new centrifuges have been placed in new facilities.

Third, Iran has rejected IAEA requests for information on their nuclear facilities. The IAEA does not have any information on the design of Iran’s new Fordow facility, and Iran has denied requests for design information on a new facility to be built in the next year. Iran claims that such requests are outside of its Safeguard Agreement.

Fourth, Iran denied entry of two IAEA inspectors into the country. Incidentally, the Safeguard Agreement does give Iran the authority to deny inspectors, but only to a point. Iran cannot deny inspectors in a way that “detracts from the Agency’s capability to implement effective and efficient safeguards.” Iran claimed that the inspectors have a history of supporting false reports, which the IAEA has denied.

Fifth, and most significant, Iran has not resolved the potential for military aspects of their nuclear program. Iran has simply refused to discuss “activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.” The IAEA states that there are indications such activities have occurred.

Iran’s repeated non-compliance with the IAEA Safeguard Agreement prevents the IAEA from detecting or deterring Iran’s use of its nuclear energy program for military purposes. In fact, an Institute for Science and International Security publication regarding the recent IAEA report concluded that,

One has to worry that Iran is working to degrade safeguards to such a degree that if it does decide to divert low enriched uranium or other nuclear material to use in making a nuclear weapon the diversion would remain undetected for a longer period of time…Add to that Iran’s determination to build centrifuge plants in secret, denying the IAEA’s legitimate request to receive early design information about such plants. The result is that Iran may seek to increase its capability to divert nuclear material in secret and produce weapon-grade uranium in a plant unknown to the inspectors or western intelligence agencies.

Regardless of Iran’s technical compliance with its Safeguard Agreement, the IAEA report describes a general theme of Iranian foot-dragging. Even if Iran had a valid point that some of the IAEA requests fell outside of their authority, and they are not in fact building a nuclear weapon, the discernable trend is that Iran seeks to limit IAEA authority at every point possible. The repeated attempt to bar inspections and decrease IAEA authority makes it difficult for countries to have confidence in Iran’s claim that they are only developing a peaceful nuclear program.

Further, this report has implications for both the U.S. and IAEA. In June, the United States led the UN in its fourth round of sanctions on Iran. Some nations have even ramped up sanctions beyond the UN requirements. Despite the strengthening of international sanctions, Iran has responded by sticking to its guns and digging in its heels.

IAEA reports seem to confirm the United States’ worst fear: that the U.S. strategy is failing to deter Iranian proliferation. The U.S. strategy to pressure Iran with sanctions has not appeared to change Iranian motivations to develop the bomb. This failure is most likely the result of multiple factors. Pressure has strengthened the case of hardliners that developing nuclear weapons is necessary to defend Iran against Western aggression, while liberal forces have failed to gain substantial influence in Iranian politics. Iran has also had the help of allies to maintain trade and its economy despite sanctions, allowing political elites to avoid the full force of pressure.

Additionally, the IAEA report has implications for the IAEA itself. The agency is tasked with the detection of illicit nuclear activity, but this report reflects that they cannot fulfill this central mission when faced with a determined proliferator. The credibility of the IAEA as an agency capable of preventing proliferation is therefore at stake. This problem is best illustrated with the report’s conclusion, a simple request for Iran to take steps to implement the Safeguard Agreement, without any mechanism increase Iran’s incentive to do so. Therefore, the future of the IAEA is increasingly tied to the international community’s success in pressuring Iran to comply with the Safeguard Agreement.

These two conclusions have a mutually reinforcing effect. The U.S. sanction strategy is failing, and the IAEA no longer has the capability to detect military aspects of the program. As a result, the international community is left with a determined proliferator that cannot be detected or deterred. Tommy Vietor, the White House Spokesman, responding to this sobering report, concluded that,

The IAEA's reports of obstruction and Iran's failure to cooperate are troubling to all who care about non-proliferation and global security.

However, sanction’s current failure does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all is lost and that the Obama administration’s policy is wrong. The effects of the fourth round of sanctions will not be seen immediately. Sanctions and U.S. pressure have scared away investment, in particular hurting investment in Iran’ oil and gas sector, the foundation of their economy. While Iran may be able to ride out the impact of sanctions for now, Iran is dependent on outside investment to maintain and repair the failing infrastructure in these sectors. Iran’s economy is already in trouble and the initial affects of recent sanctions have been promising, but even more promising is their long-term consequence—to cause the infrastructure that powers Iran’s economy to slowly fall apart. Further, the IAEA report may serve as a rallying cry for countries to further tighten sanctions, as seen by South Korea decision to ramp up its sanctions just two days after the release of the IAEA report, and Russia’s statement that Iran needs to comply with IAEA inspectors.

These sanctions, and their long-term implications, still have a chance to alter Iran’s calculus. As economic problems compound there is the potential to fragment consensus within the political elite to pursue a nuclear program. While Iran has responded by digging in its heels, this response might only serve to plant the seeds for internal conflict and debate over the sustainability of their defiance strategy. The vital question is whether this effect will be measured in months or years time, and whether Iran will have already acquired the bomb before sanction’s tipping point is reached.

Aside from the prospects for sanction’s success, it is important to recognize the lack of viable alternatives to this strategy. Increased pressure through direct military threats will likely increase Iranian motivation to acquire nuclear weapons by confirming their suspicions that they need nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. Abandoning pressure for actual military action would require perfect intelligence of their nuclear facilities, which, as the IAEA report seems to indicate, we probably don’t have. Further, while Iran does not yet have an assembled nuclear weapon, it does have the nuclear know-how. An attack, therefore, would only delay its program, while the United States faced Iran’s immediate retaliation in the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq and Afghanistan.

IAEA inspections and sanctions may not be a perfect strategy, but given the alternatives, they seem to be the best horse in this race.