Israel’s Nuclear Ambiguity

No country fears Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons more than Israel. Many in the Jewish State view Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat and take seriously President Ahmadinijad’s threats to “wipe Israel off the map.” Prime Minister – designate Benjamin Netanyahu made opposing Iran’s nuclear ambitions a central theme of his successful election campaign and heightened tensions with the Islamic Republic. As recently as this Sunday, OC Military Intelligence Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin remarked that “Iran had crossed the nuclear threshold’ and its attainment of nuclear military capability is now a matter of ‘incorporating the goal of producing an atomic bomb into its strategy." With an Iranian nuclear weapon seemingly imminent from an Israeli perspective, a recent piece by Louis Rene Beres in Haaretz calls for a reconsideration of Israel’s official stance of nuclear ambiguity. Beres states:

“Prime Minister-designate Netanyahu will understand that adequate deterrence of Iran could soon require some release of pertinent Israeli nuclear details. Concerning these details, less rather than more Israeli nuclear secrecy could be required. What will now need to be determined is the precise extent and subtlety with which Israel should communicate its nuclear positions, intentions and capabilities to Iran, and certain others. The rationale for any nuclear disclosure would not lie in expressing the obvious. Instead, it would rest on the presumption that nuclear weapons attributed to Israel can serve Israel's security by communicating certain military capabilities and intentions.”

Should Iran actually obtain a nuclear weapon, there will be a great urge by Israel to also declare itself a nuclear power and threaten Iran with total annihilation in response to any attack. However, changing its stance of nuclear ambiguity would ultimately harm Israel’s security in several key ways. First, one of the many anticipated US responses to an Iranian “bomb” would be extending the US nuclear umbrella to Iran’s Arab neighbors. Many Arab regimes would already feel pressure to reject this umbrella and respond to the “Iranian bomb” with the development of an “Arab bomb.” As the US tries to stem the tide of proliferation in the Middle East, this task will become significantly more difficult if the Arab states also feel the need to respond to an “Israeli bomb.” Second, by admitting to having nuclear weapons, Israel will strengthen Iran’s negotiating tactic that it must be treated in an even handed manner as other countries. Iran can claim, somewhat convincingly, that any rollback of its nuclear program should be accompanied by similar rollbacks in Israel’s nuclear program. Israel would be forced into a position of either giving up its nuclear capability, an unlikely prospect, or indefinitely living with an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Third, any change in Israel’s nuclear ambiguity could help undermine the global non-proliferation effort. As the list of nuclear countries begins to expand, many leaders look to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and other initiatives as opportunities to revitalize and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Israel, not being a member of the NPT, would face increased pressure to join and/or and abandon its nuclear arsenal. Many countries, including Iran, would likely use Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a means to try to sabotage the 2010 conference. Rather than increase its security, a declared Israeli arsenal could help lead to a new wave of proliferation that ultimately undermines both Israeli and global security.